UNDERSTAND THE DIMENSIONS OF ORGANISED CRIME AND TERRORIST NETWORKS FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR FIRST-LINE-PRACTITIONERS AND PROFESSIONALS

Deliverable D3.6
Empirical research report
Project

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Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Bulgaria
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Leuven Security Excellence Consortium vzw (LSEC), Belgium
Agency for European Integration & Economic Development (AEI), Austria
Valencia City Council - Local Police (PLV), Spain
Police Academy in Szczytno (WSPol), Poland
Cloud security Alliance (CSA), United Kingdom
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Executive Summary

The activities of organized crime raising particular concern among our informants were associated with the illegal drug business and with cybercrime. On both, however, there was a sense that information and knowledge remain incomplete. More collaboration between researchers, practitioners, experts and the civil society was advocated as a way forward to remedy this situation. Only in some national contexts was concern also addressed towards the complicities and partnerships between organized crime and the official world.

Opinions about the causes leading people to join organized crime networks converged on prevailing etiologies based around learning processes and environmental circumstances. In brief, cultural background and social context were the core explanatory variables.

The responses to organized crime favored by our informants emphasized technical and professional, rather than social, measures. This may reflect the composition of informants, who were preponderantly operating in law enforcement agencies.

The major areas of concern relating to terrorism were identified as propaganda and recruitment.

Cultural heritage and social marginalization were seen as the major drivers leading to involvement in terrorist activities. Individual pathology was discarded, while the role of religious leaders was also deemed essential.

Strengthening international cooperation was regarded as crucial in the fight against terrorism, as was the involvement of Muslim communities in preventative projects. Educational programs were also advocated, while invasions of countries were seen as being detrimental.

Only a section of our informants believed in the prevalence of hybrids, namely criminal groups combining elements of organized crime and terrorist networks. Skepticism characterized the views of many others, who underlined the difference between the two types of organization and found the very crime-terror nexus ambiguous.
1. Introduction

As the body of literature and several research studies indicate, there is a knowledge-gap between the scientific community and first-line-practitioners, law enforcement agencies or security solution developers. In order to be able to develop new tools and solutions for supporting the target-groups in their daily work, a major objective of TAKEDOWN is to examine the needs, requirements and perspectives of these stakeholders in a comprehensive empirical research applying both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Based on the outcomes of the empirical research that lasted for about one year in total and actually involved all TAKEDOWN-partners, this report explores the views and experiences of key stakeholders on the issue of organised crime and terrorist networks. The report seeks views on their experience of organised crime counter-terrorism policy and the drivers of both phenomena. It then draws upon the same methods to explore the various pathways of offenders into organised criminality and terror activities before assessing the influence of governments, law enforcement and the military on organised crime and terror networks. Finally, it looks at views on the various measures against organised crime and terror networks and at what challenges they may pose, before outlining solution approaches.

Using a mixed methodology that includes a quantitative empirical framework with qualitative empirical inputs from interviews, focus groups and workshops, this research canvassed the views of key commentators in the field. The respondents were selected from law enforcement agencies, policy makers, the academic community and practitioners and other stakeholders in the area of prevention of organized crime and terrorism. More specifically, expert interviews were conducted with academic and non-academic researchers, scholars, policy makers and selected practitioners (teachers, social workers, health care workers, community policy officers etc.) who work in the field. A quantitative survey was conducted to engage first-line practitioners and professionals involved in responding to organised crime and terrorism, and its prevention. Focus groups were then carried out with first line practitioner organizations working on OC or TN as well as law enforcement agents. Finally, workshops were conducted with solution providers, professionals and experts in the field of security. The research identified a rich seam of findings, which informs the TAKEDOWN project and is particularly crucial for developing the tools and solutions.

The following section explains the methodology employed for the interviews of experts in the field of organized crime and terrorist networks, the quantitative survey, focus groups and workshop. Section 3 shows the main results of these activities, outlining a descriptive analysis of the TAKEDOWN online survey data and exploring the differences between heterogeneous groups that participated. Section 4 synthesizes the results and interprets them, highlighting trends in the replies and comparing them with what academic literature considered so far. This section takes into account what are considered to be the drivers of organized crime and what has and could be done to counteract such pathways. In a similar fashion the inspection of terrorist related activities, drivers and measures to contrast them are analyzed. Hybrid forms of organisations, groups that simultaneously engage in organized criminality and terrorist activity, are also investigated in their structural implications, contributing to the current debate over a crime-terror nexus. Section 5 provides a summary of the research outcomes and discusses measures in order to reduce the impact.

Finally, the consortium gratefully acknowledges the participants’ effort to take part in the quantitative and qualitative empirical research of the TAKEDOWN project. Your support is crucial for the success of the project and for really making a difference in how Europe deals with organised crime and terrorist networks.
2. Methodology

2.1. Expert interviews

112 interviews aimed at obtaining deep and specific knowledge of the requirements, challenges, opportunities and obstacles regarding the adoption and implementation of national and international policies that address OC and TN were held within TAKEDOWN. This knowledge was provided by:

- researchers and scholars from different disciplines (criminology, political science, law, computer science, electrical engineering, psychology, etc.) who have proven expertise in the field of OC and TN – especially on the causes, functioning and perspective development of these two phenomena, and the policy-making/implementation process addressing them;
- context-aware policy makers who are responsible for defining the political framework to prevent/fight OC and TN at the European, national, regional and local level;
- selected representatives from practitioner organisations (e.g. teachers, social workers, health care workers, community policy officers) who are generally asked to implement adopted policies, measures or strategies.

Researchers, policy makers, and representatives of practitioner organisations were selected/sampled according to the “criterion-based sampling” method. This method entails that selection criteria are pre-established/defined. In principle, the “criterion-based sampling” method is very strong in quality assurance. Its adoption fitted the purpose of the study, the available resources, the questions asked, and the constraints faced.\(^1\) As far as the researchers are concerned, the criteria for their selection

\(^1\) The following are the criteria adopted for selecting research participants: 1. Researchers: (a) Hold a position of researcher in an academic institution or other research entities (research centers, think thanks) or serve as researchers in national or international organizations or authorities (to ensure professional relevance); (b) Have a proven research background on organised crime and terrorism (resulting from CV or short bio), in particular on the causes, structures, dynamics and perspective development of these two phenomena, and – more relevant – on the policies/strategies/measures to address them (to ensure relevance ratione materiae and expertise), (c) Have at least five scientific publications (academic journal articles or relevant papers, reports, policy briefs, studies, books) on either organised crime or terrorism released after 2000 (to ensure active contribution in shaping the scholarly debate); (d) Have publications on organised crime or terrorism with a focus on policies/strategies/measures adopted and/or implemented in Europe by European or other supranational or national actors (to ensure relevance of geographical scope); (e) Have been actively working on organised crime or terrorism for a minimum of five years – better if research has also dealt with ex-ante and ex-post policy impact assessment (to ensure seniority). 2. Policy-makers: (a) Have served or are serving in one of the surveyed States’ local or central public policy-making institutions/bodies – the ones responsible for adopting new rules, laws, strategies, measures - as well as in European or universal intergovernmental organizations making policies (to ensure relevance ratione personae and geographical scope); (b) Carry out policy making activity - or ex-post policy impact assessment – concerning the prevention, management, and response to either organised crime or terrorism – or related subfields (to ensure subject-matter relevance); (c) Record of policy-making in organised crime or terrorism for at least 3 years (to ensure some seniority and professional relevance). 3. Practitioners: (a) Practice a profession that may require to implement public policies, strategies, or measures to prevent or counter organised crime or terrorism (e.g. trained teachers or social workers who are in charge of implementing policies/legislation aimed at preventing radicalisation of segments of the population or school drop-outs; community policemen, industry specialists, prison workers, etc.). The field must have a clear connection to Takedown-relevant issues (to ensure subject-matter relevance); (b) Preferably, have certified professional experience in implementing policies, strategies or measures to prevent or counter organised crime or terrorism (to ensure expertise); (c) Be affiliated with a private or public...
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It has to be noted that few interviewees were selected via the “snowball sampling method” which requires asking perspective or actual interviewees to provide additional contacts. This method was adopted when first contacts with interviewees were made, and progressively implemented in order to generate additional contacts, beyond the initial contacts obtained through searches on the Web or partners’ contact lists.

Interviews were held with informants based in the following countries (see figure 1): Austria (6 interviews), Belgium (2), Bulgaria (9), Czech Republic (11), Germany (2), Israel (9), Italy (8), Poland (5), Romania (7), Slovakia (7), Spain (17), Switzerland (8), and the UK (8). On the institutional EU-level, 6 interviews with relevant experts were carried out. Few interviews (4) were conducted with policy makers and practitioners from further European countries than the ones represented in the Consortium. These interviews were held with individuals involved in the promotion and implementation of significant policy initiatives and measures aimed at preventing and countering OC and/or TN in their country or at the international level. Few more interviews (3) were conducted with researchers established in the surveyed countries but their expertise was not country focussed. They were experts on terrorism and organised crime in Europe in general. These interviews were clustered/labelled as “Europe/Miscellaneous”.

Figure 1. Distribution of experts per surveyed country or organisation.

When focusing on the specific category of interviewed experts (see table 1 below), researchers constitute the highest number of responders (53 interviews, 47.3 %), followed by practitioners (24 interviews, 21.4 %), while policy-makers add up to 13 interviews (11.6 %). These latter serve at the national level (members of national parliaments) while few of them operate at the local or international level. Responders labelled as practitioners often decided to hide their affiliation and name. Those who stated their affiliation had a variety of tasks: the sample included police officers,
people working for NGOs, working in prisons, working on counter-terrorism or organised crime within administrations as well as social workers/people working on prevention. Some responders are categorized with mixed-connotation labels (22 interviews, 19.6%): these responders are experts with multiple fields of activities, thereby allowing interviewers to gain interesting insights into multifaceted perspectives on issues related to OC and/or TN. More specifically, 2 interviews (1.8% of all interviews) were carried out with researcher/policy-makers, 9 interviews (8.0%) with policy-maker/practitioners, and 11 interviews (9.8%) with researcher/practitioners.

From a demographic standpoint (see table 2), the biggest group of responders falls into the age group of 30-39 years (36 responders, 32.1%), closely followed by 50-59 years (33 responders, 29.5%). There is only one responder (0.9%) older than 69 years, while 3 responders are younger than 30 (2.7%). The biggest group of researchers responding are 30-39 years old (20 responders, 37.8%). The same is true for practitioners (11 responders, 45.8%). Responding policy-makers are older, with the group of 50-59 years constituting the biggest group (6 responders, 46.2%). When looking at the average age of each category of responders, the numbers look as follows: researchers have an average age of 40-49 years, policy-makers 50-59 years, and practitioners 40-49 years.

Most responders are very experienced in their fields (see table 3). 76 responders (67.9%) stated that they have 10 and more years of experience, while 29 (25.9%) mention 5-10 years of experience. In fact, in all three responder categories, 10+ years of experience constitute the majority as well as the average (researchers: 33 responders, 62.3%; policy-makers: 9 responders, 69.2%; practitioners: 17 responders, 70.8%).
The responders have versatile educational backgrounds, ranging from Economics, Law, History, Criminology, Psychology, Religious Studies or Political Science, to more practice-oriented fields such as social work or education tracks at police academies. Unsurprisingly, most researchers have obtained a PhD degree (38 responders, 71.6 %) (see table 4). Among policy-makers and practitioners, on the other hand, only a marginal amount of responders have PhD degrees (policy-makers: 2 responders, 15.4 %; practitioners: 2 responders, 8.4 %). Across all stakeholder groups, responders with a PhD degree constitute 42.9 % (48 responders), just behind University graduates (59 responders, 52.7 %). Only one responder mentioned a college degree (0.9 %) as the highest obtained degree, while we did not receive any educational information on 4 responders (3.6 %).

Table 4. Responders' highest obtained educational degree.

With regard to responders’ areas of expertise (see figure x), half of them deals with terrorism (57 responders, 50.9%). A relatively small part of interviewed responders deals with organised crime specifically (18 responders, 16.1%), while other experts work on both terrorism and organised crime (37 responders, 33.0%).
The interviews were carried out face-to-face, by telephone, via Skype or similar media, or in written form. The information provided by interviewees is quite rich and diverse. It was collected from different typologies of responders (policy-makers, researchers, practitioners) who have different backgrounds and operate in different socio-cultural-economic environments. In many cases, information describes national and local realms in details and draws from responders’ concrete experiences in policy-making and implementation; in other cases, information refers to the EU as a supranational entity or addresses European States in general or Europe as a geographical region. In order to generate useful knowledge out of the collected information, data were analysed in a structured way. The pre-settled analytical goal was to understand the requirements, challenges, opportunities and obstacles regarding both the adoption and the implementation of policies that address Organised Crime and Terrorist Networks in the 13 States represented in the Takedown consortium plus the European Union as a supranational entity. With regard to the adopted methodology, information provided by each category of responders was reviewed separately (intra-category), put together in a structured way, and examined in order to draw on conclusions. The review focusses on the three main thematic sections/blocks the questions posed to informants consisted of and namely: policy-making, policy implementation, international cooperation. It contemplates both prevention and response to the phenomena under investigation. Collected information was read and interpreted also in light of the main results of the literature review. In conclusion, the analysis resulted in the identification of obstacles to the adoption and implementation of national and international policies aimed at tackling organised crime and terrorism; the recognition of good practices that could in principle be adapted and adopted across the EU; and the provision of few recommendations for enhancing the prevention of and response to these phenomena’s associated threats.

2.2. Quantitative survey

TAKEDOWN online survey gathered data on the practices and views of first-line practitioners and professionals, who are directly or indirectly helping to address the causes or effects associated with terrorism and/or organised crime.

Data collection for the survey took place from May 24, 2017 to September 16, 2017 by using the Qualtrics Online Survey tool. Generally, the response rate for online surveys is normally very low, and
especially without the use of monetary incentives (Pan et al., 2014; Deutskens et al., 2004; Cook et al., 2001; Wright & Schwager, 2008). Moreover, this is true when sampling from the general population. Thus, it must be noted that data collection for this survey was targeted at an extremely niche pool of respondents rather than the general population, which can further explain the sample size of 519 included in the analysis.

Regarding the demographics, more than 65% of the respondents are male and a majority is between 30 to 40 years old. The survey covers a total of 23 countries, 15 different professions that fall into the category of first-line-practitioners and 12 different areas of work within these professions.

Despite exhaustive survey recruitment efforts carried out by all of the TAKEDOWN partners, the actual number of people to have clicked on the link to and at least viewed the online survey was around 600. This broadly indicates an effective response rate of 85%, as the sample included in the analysis is 519, which included non-completed surveys with a 30% or higher level of completion. Of the 519 respondents included in the analysis, 379 completed the survey and 143 began taking the survey but did not complete it. This suggests an effective survey completion rate of 73%. The findings were generated via the use of SPSS software.

2.3. Focus groups

As part of the mixed methods empirical research in the TAKEDOWN project, 11 Focus Groups were organized in 8 countries across the European Union. The focus groups were engaging 107 law enforcement agents and front line practitioner organizations working on OC or TN. The Focus Groups have provide vital insight into the experiences, challenges, and lessons identified of practitioners on the ground on a range of key issues relating to OC and TN in Europe and, for some, the interface between the two. The topics of the Focus Groups were decided in an in-depth consultative process within the TAKEDOWN consortium drawing upon results and findings compiled through earlier work in the project. Depending on the topic and the invited participants, the responsible project partners developed the particular implementation along a common methodology working with open guiding questions in order to ensure that key insights and experiences of LEAs and front line practitioners can be identified for the project.

The following table provides an overview of the focus groups that were implemented (including the responsible partner, the theme, the date and the location):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Focus Group</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSEC</td>
<td>Cyber security tools in relation to FLP and OC/TN</td>
<td>04/05/2017</td>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSD</td>
<td>A multidisciplinary approach towards and Inter-institutional co-operation in investigating and prosecuting money laundering and cybercrime</td>
<td>12/09/2017</td>
<td>Sofia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSBM</td>
<td>Measuring police impact on OC &amp; Migration and OC in Slovakia</td>
<td>13/09/2017</td>
<td>Kosice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSBM</td>
<td>Illegal migration and Organized crime in Slovakia</td>
<td>13/09/2017</td>
<td>Kosice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLV</td>
<td>Networking multilevel and multi-stakeholder approach on CT and OC at local level. challenges, needs, good practices and proposals</td>
<td>19/09/2017</td>
<td>Valencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEI</td>
<td>Preventive measures. Challenges in the implementation of preventive measures against radicalization and extremism</td>
<td>20/09/2017</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGENFOR</td>
<td>Terrorism and organised crime in the prison environment</td>
<td>21/09/2017</td>
<td>Vicenza</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4. Workshops

As another strand of the empirical research, a set of TAKEDOWN Workshops was implemented, where solution providers, professionals and experts in the field of security were invited. Each workshop aimed to highlight current challenges, available solutions as well as possible societal and ethical issues. The findings and the insights gathered from the participants are used as possible reference guidelines for definition and development of the Open Information Hub as well as the Security Solution Platform (see also Deliverable D3.5).

Methodology

The organization of each workshop represented a complex task, because it required both technical and theoretical expertise. Furthermore, since it was necessary to interact with people that are not involved in the TAKEDOWN research project, a specific methodology has been defined and applied to guarantee the success of workshops. The reference methodology was organized in 7 macro phases, some of which were executed in parallel and others sequentially. In particular:

Phase 1. Definition of themes and topics of interest: In this phase, the topics to be investigated, were defined and prioritized, by considering the objectives of the TAKEDOWN.

Phase 2. Targeting the right audience: In this phase the attention was devoted to the identification of the audience by targeting professionals, experts and solution providers for each area of security, on the basis of the defined topics.

Phase 3. Selection Strategy and Sessions Organization: The aim of the Selection Strategy and Sessions Organization was to select the potential solution providers and professionals among those identified in phase 2. In this phase, the main criteria were to group them by considering the matching between their research field and the topics.

Phase 4. Workshops Organization: This phase focused on the organizational aspects for the definition of a “Call” for each workshop for defining the scope of each workshop, the identification of the right location, the definition of the date etc. This phase considered the defined topics, the potential participating experts and their availability for attending the workshop.

Phase 5. Invitation of the Solution providers and Professionals: This phase is based on the results coming from phase 4 as well as the results coming from phase 3. The output of this phase highlights: (i) which solution provider/professional has been invited to which workshop; (ii) which solution provider/professional attends the workshop; (iii) Which solution provider/professional declines the invitation.

Phase 6. Outline of the Schedule and Major Outcomes of the Workshop: This phase focused on the schedule/program of each workshop as well as on the major outcomes. In particular, a detailed

| PATRIR | Addressing Radicalisation, Violent Extremism & Terrorism: Practitioners Round Table on Strengthening Effective Prevention, Improving Coordination & Comprehensive Approaches | 27/09/2017 | London |
| PATRIR | Developing comprehensive approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism: learning from what works, what doesn’t and why | 13/10/2017 | Bucharest |
| FUNDEA | Community Action and Radicalisation | 24/10/2017 | Granada |
| WSPOL | The use of data mining technology for fighting new forms of organised crime | 24-25.10.2017 | Kaunas |
description of the participants, their organization, an overview of their talk terms research challenges, proposed or available solutions in terms of tools, technologies and approaches, along with a discussion on their ethical aspects, when possible, was produced.

**Phase 7. Workshop summary:** The methodology concludes with the Workshops summary phase, in which the outcomes of the workshop along with the main insights and feedback provided by each participants are gathered.

**Overview of the workshops**

According to the objectives of the TAKEDOWN projects 4 workshops were organized in 4 different European countries:

- **Spain** (Barcelona) – September the 18th 2017: The 3nd International Workshop - Ethical and legal issues in Security: ensuring data protection.

In particular, 31 talks related to security solutions in terms of models, methods, approaches, technologies and tools as well as current research challenges were provided by experts and professionals belonging to academia, industry and law enforcement agencies. As a consequence, three major perspectives were considered:

- **Technical perspective:** in this session, companies and solutions providers presented their solutions by highlighting the strengths of their solutions (software, models, methods, analysis techniques etc.) for a specific application context. Furthermore, possible ideas/perspectives (by extending or adapting them) were highlighted.
- **User perspective:** this session was mainly devoted to users, such as law enforcement agencies, lawyers etc. in order to share experiences of using available solutions as well as to highlight current lacks, limitations and users’ needs.
- **Research perspective:** in this session, the main research challenges, current efforts and possible future directions conducted by universities and research centers on OC and TN were presented and discussed.

Table 6 highlights the participants (i.e. name and affiliation), who provided a talk for the workshops.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workshop</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st International Workshop (Darmstadt, Germany)</td>
<td>Klaus von Lampe</td>
<td>Professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. City University of New York (NY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stephan Koloßa</td>
<td>Academic Researcher at the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Ruhr University Bochum (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Schweer</td>
<td>Manager Directors at IfmPt (Institute for Pattern-Based Prognosis Technology), (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Michael Schweer</td>
<td>Directors Marketing at IfmPt (Institute for Pattern-Based Prognosis Technology), (Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matthias Trier</td>
<td>Professor at Copenhagen Business School (Denamark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfredo Garro</td>
<td>Professor at University of Calabria (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Buccafurri</td>
<td>Professor at Mediterranea University of Reggio, Calabria (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walt Diggelmann</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer (CEO) &amp; Founder of the AI-One Company (Switzerland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Kopp</td>
<td>Director and Senior Consultant at the AI-One Company (Switzerland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaius Häggblom</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the QvarnLabs Ab (Finland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sascha Hauke</td>
<td>Professor at Hochschule Landshut (Germany)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefano Zatti</td>
<td>(European Space Agency) Security Office (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johann-Dietrich Woerner</td>
<td>ESA (European Space Agency) Director General, (Germany).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margherita di Giulio</td>
<td>Deputy Area Director of the CCSDS Cross Support Service Area (CSS) - ESOC/ESA, Darmstadt (Germany)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2nd International Workshop (Reggio Calabria, Italy)
| Wojciech Mazurczyk         | Warsaw University of Technology, Poland               |
| Christian Schlehuber       | Deutsche Bahn (DB), Germany                            |
| Mathias Fischer            | Hamburg University, Germany                            |

The 3rd International Workshop (Barcelona, Spain)
| Diana Alonso               | Head of the Data Protection Service, Eurojust         |
| Daniel Drewer              | Head of the Data Protection Function, Europol         |
| Monica Cappelletti         | Post-doc researcher at Dublin City University (DCU)   |
| Vicenç Torra               | Professor at the University of Skövde (Sweden)         |
| Louis de Koker             | La Trobe Law School as a Professor of Law              |

The 4th International Workshop (Brussels, Belgium)
| Ralf Benzmueller           | Head of Security Labs at G Data                       |
| Esmée van Tienhoven McFaul |                                                       |
| Thijmen Verburgh           | researcher at TNO                                     |
| Robrecht De Keersmaecker   | Attorney General of Antwerp                           |
| Eric Buggenhout            | Expert Advisory KPMG                                   |
| Remco Verhof               | Founder of the DutchSec                                |
| Tariq Elahi                | Researcher at KU Leuven department of electro engineering (ESAT) at COSIC |
| Christophe Landries        | DJSOC at Federal Computer Crime Unit, Belgium         |

Table 6: Speaker Affiliations and roles for each workshop
3. Key outcomes of the empirical research

3.1. Expert interviews

The results from the qualitative expert interviews suggest that there is a room for significantly improving counter-terrorism and organised crime policy-making and implementation, in particular, for adopting more effective measures. In general, policies should be based on a sound understanding of the phenomena at stake and their inherent dynamics, and endorse an objective, not-ideologically driven (especially in the case of terrorism) holistic approach to them. Policies should include both preventive and responsive measures. Among the preventive, “social measures” (e.g. educational programmes or campaigns aimed at spreading civic awareness among the individuals and groups at risks, or others) should play a greater role. This would require governments to allocate more budget to sustain these measures. Awareness-raising, social integration, educational campaigns, and support programmes should be accompanied by adequate information on how to obtain targeted individual assistance. Especially if they are promoted by public institutions, support programmes should be transparent if they are aimed at collecting information to be employed by law enforcement for the adoption of repressive measures. Transparency will foster community trust in public authorities. Policy impact should be assessed ex-ante and ex-post. This assessment should also include the evaluation of the human rights implications of enacted policies. Furthermore, tackling organised crime and terrorism requires improved coordination and cooperation among the agencies that are in charge of implementing adopted policies. At the international level, cooperation should be enhanced through the building of more solid trust among relevant actors and the harmonization of legal frameworks and procedures. The building of trust remains a challenge and a goal that takes a long time to be achieved. At the EU level, fostering further political integration among Member States could contribute to that goal.

The recommendations outlined above are general and common-sense. Overall, they add little more to the current debate on the policy-making and policy implementation processes concerning counter terrorism and organised crime. It is more interesting to understand what policies should be adopted and implemented to enhance the prevention and response to terrorism and organised crime in practical terms. Selected suggestions provided by the interviewees are presented below. These suggestions seem quite susceptible of/amenable to being operationalised.

Both in the case of terrorism and organised crime, policy making and policy implementation need to make wiser and more effective use of the knowledge, skills, and capabilities any relevant national or international stakeholder can contribute to. First of all, this implies channelling the existing or to-be-produced knowledge/experiences on both the phenomena into the policymaking process more systematically. In other words, it is important to capitalise on what is known about terrorism and organised crime and employ what already exists and works in tackling these threats. From this perspective, the “wheel should not be always reinvented”. Tools and lessons learned from experiences in dealing with organised crime and terrorism should be reviewed, assessed, contextualised with the goal of identifying good practices to be adopted to tackle contemporary forms of terrorism or crime. As per the former threat, experiences in countering left/right-wing (e.g. Red Brigades, Ordine Nuovo, Baader-Meinhof), separatist (e.g. ETA, IRA), Jihadist or other forms of terrorism should be shared. The same goes for tools and lessons-learned in fighting criminal organisations (e.g. Mafia, ’Ndrangeta). Furthermore, when looking at the terroristic or criminal challenges, it is important to look at the way similar security threats are/have been dealt with and
understand what can be replicated and to what extent this can work. For example, in order to deal with returning terrorist fighters one can draw on how the issue of reintegration of ex-combatants is handled in some countries. Witnesses or informers protection programmes that are adopted in the field of organised crime can be adapted and employed for counter terrorism purposes. In this respect, many experts call for the establishment of an EU comprehensive platform on policies and measures where Member States may share information, findings and good or bad practices. Several examples of related successful platforms are mentioned, such as the Directory of International Best Practices, Codes and Standards prepared by the United Nations Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (Resolutions 1373, 1624, 1963) or the OSCE United in Countering Violent Extremism campaign, which in the context of workshops allowed young volunteers from NGOs and the academia to share best practices from their respective countries.

Policies should also provide for incentives to coordinate collaboration among relevant stakeholders in tackling organised crime and terrorism. They should allocate clear responsibilities to all the agencies and organisations (private or non profit sector included) that can contribute to tackling crime and terrorism, provide them with clear mandates, funding, training, and submit their work and achievements to critical review. In order to reduce the adverse effects of cross-agencies/organisation’s extreme competition for merit, reputational, economic, professional incentives should be promoted.

Since organised crime and terrorism are not limited to single national States or even the EU, it is paramount for countries to operate across borders. On the national level, if every country introduced similar national offices for specific forms of organised crime and terrorism, it would improve the mutual coordination across countries and on the European level. For this to happen, it is important to discuss definitions of terrorism and forms of organised crime, standards of training, equipment, and technical assistance. Countries with more developed capabilities should help other countries catch up in this regard. The coordination itself could be managed from the European level, for example by European central desks for each subcategory of organised crime and terrorism. Furthermore, more steps should be taken to decrease cultural and language barriers between agencies involved in counter terrorism and organised crime: staff exchange programmes and the creation of common analytical taskforces (as Europol does) can help in developing inter-agencies (and personal) bonds.

As far as organised crime is concerned, more stringent regulations on financial crime and corruption should be adopted. Laws should provide for relevant authorities to “follow the money”, confiscate any possessions of illicit origin and pursue corruption more severely. One main issue arising with regard to the adoption of these measures concerns the lack of real support from policy makers and, in some cases, financial institutions and the society as a whole. It seems like there is not sufficient and fully shared motivation/commitment to enact severe and effective measures against these types of crime. Commitment or motivations are enhanced when large parts of the public opinion “challenges” policymakers.

With regard to terrorism (Jihadist, right/left wing, separatist etc.), more effort needs to be put into truly understanding motivations, as well as into creating viable alternatives able to effectively discourage radicalisation. This cannot possibly be realised without tight cooperation with relevant professionals, communities, religious authorities, political associations and, if possible, already deradicalised individuals.
Given the increasing threats posed by cyber-related activities (cyber-crime or the terroristic use of the Internet), policies should favour technological innovation and the development of specific expertise in the field to be employed by relevant agencies in charge of tackling the phenomena. They should provide for programmes aimed at informing the general population about the risks associated with the malevolent use of the cyber-domain and “educate” them on a more responsible approach to the Internet.

Programmes to tackle terrorism and organised crime should also include real gender mainstreaming at all levels. They should consider how women and men are involved differently in criminal and terrorist activities, understand which role they play, and provide for targeted actions and solutions based on a gender perspective.

Finally, private individuals, groups, and (religious, cultural, ethnic) communities should be more engaged in preventive and response initiatives. Especially for terrorism, they should systematically receive ad hoc information and training on how to prepare and react to terrorist threats and attacks, how to detect and report suspected behaviour or events to relevant organisations (e.g. law enforcement and security agencies, social care institutions, etc.) and the associated ethical implications, and how to collaborate more closely with institutions and relevant bodies dealing with the broad terrorist threat on daily basis. Governments should promote programmes aimed at sustaining individuals’ proactive participation in security. The goal is twofold: increase societal resilience to terror or criminal threats and establish a framework of “participatory security”.

### 3.2. Quantitative survey

#### 3.2.1. Summary of the descriptive analysis

As reported in D3.3, the initial descriptive analysis of the TAKEDOWN online survey data showed that regarding organised crime activities:

- The respondents mentioned that especially ‘human trafficking’, ‘drug production / trafficking’ and ‘cybercrime’ require more attention, effective prevention and response strategies.

- As for the drivers of organised crime, the respondents said that ‘being raised in a criminal environment’ has the strongest influence on increasing organised criminal activities including gang-related ones.

- The respondents also reported that ‘recruitment by a friend’ is the strongest recruitment pathway for organised crime.

- In terms of actions for decreasing organised crime, the majority of the respondents think that the ‘creation of special police / law enforcement units for tackling organised crime’ and ‘job creation / employment schemes targeting low-income / at risk communities’ would have the strongest effect.

On the other hand, the descriptive analysis of the activities related with terrorism indicated that:

- The respondents emphasize that ‘Islamist terrorism / violent extremism’ and ‘propaganda and recruitment’ require more effective prevention or response policies and strategies.
As for the drivers of terrorism, the majority of the respondents said that ‘being raised in a culture and family environment that promotes extreme ideological views and practices’ has the highest influence.

The most common pathway for recruitment happens – according to the respondents – through ‘religious centers / religious institutions; recruitment by religious leaders and activists’ as the most common.

According to the respondents, the most effective action for decreasing terrorism is the ‘cross-border cooperation between police and intelligence agencies to facilitate monitoring, arrest and disruption of terrorist activities’.

3.2.2. Analysis exploring group differences

The analysis presented in this document was gathered by the TAKEDOWN online survey, aimed at exploring the practices, beliefs and views of frontline practitioners and professionals, who are addressing the causes or effects associated with terrorism and/or organised crime. This includes a distinct division between civil servants and law enforcement related professions such as police officers and specialists; and civil society and non-law enforcement professionals such as educators and youth workers. This distinction is important to highlight early in this document as many of the analyses presented forthwith group participants by this feature.

In terms of the specific areas explored:

With regards to **organised crime**: Respondents were queried on specific areas requiring more attention, effective prevention and responses. The drivers of organised crime were also explored, as were recruitment methods and necessary future actions for decreasing organised crime.

In relation to **terrorism**: Respondents were queried on what elements of terrorism required more effective prevention or response policies and strategies. The drivers of terrorism were explored, as were pathways for recruitment. Suggestions for effective action needed for decreasing terrorism were also made.

Although particular recommendations were made for engaging with the data in terms of inferential analysis, there were difficulties in achieving meaningful statistical tests due to incomplete data and small subsamples size as was found with countries being differentially represented. In the future, it would be useful to perhaps group countries by geographical region, in order to improve upon the power of any tests undertaken.

**Organised Crime and ‘both’**

Figure 3 below illustrates the breakdown of the participants into three distinct subsamples, based on how they defined their own position of employment. The figure provides us with a breakdown of the sample recruited for this research. This is important when considering the subsequent findings, as not all participants were presented with the same sets of questions. Those participants responding to both were included in all question blocks associated with organised crime and terrorism respectively. Over 50 per cent of this subsample worked within the criminal justice system. This included positions within local law enforcement, police surveillance, evidence analysis, and the judicial system. The remaining half of the subsample saw a range of positions from youth and social work, psychological services, and community awareness within the third sector. For the analysis within this section, participants were drawn from the groups ‘organised crime’ and ‘both’.
When asked about the biggest illegal threats facing society, over half of the respondents stated that cybercrime and drug production/trafficking were critical threats, with just under half stating that money laundering was a problem. Comparing criminal justice professionals to non-criminal justice professionals shows no difference in this belief/view. Although not substantiated, this could be a good indicator of shared aims and objectives in combatting organised criminality across sectors and professions. Where beliefs of both those working directly with law enforcement and those more ancillary are similar, it may indicate good working partnerships are established and in place.

Participants were prompted to respond to a series of factors they believed influenced the genesis, propagation and stability of organised crime. Table 7 below shows where factors were seen to co-occur, which could assist practitioners in developing suitable prevention targets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Psychopathology</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Economic disadvantage</th>
<th>Poor economic infrastructure</th>
<th>Low social mobility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic disadvantage</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor economic infrastructure</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.50**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low social mobility</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal surroundings</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.19*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*) denotes significant association at the p<0.05 level; (**) denotes significant association at the p<0.01 level.

Table 7. Inter-related levels of influence perceived to effect the development and continuance of organised crime

Table 7 above provides us with the understanding of the associations seen by professionals working in combating organised crime or those working in both organised crime and counter-terrorism. We can see that from a psychological perspective, professionals only see this as a factor when linked to familial dysfunctionality. However, there are a series of moderate significant correlations amongst nearly all of the economic variables, suggesting that organised criminality is perceived to be less about mental health difficulties and instability, and more about a lack of opportunity and additional financial burdens both for individuals and within their communities and societies. Although not surprising, this is important for frontline staff to be aware of in terms of focusing resources, and developing additional prevention strategies and the possible multiple effects.

Exploring specific situational or environmental and institutional issues, an additional picture emerges. Table 8 demonstrates the links between a range of governmental processes and procedures. Towards the end of this analysis we will include a predictive outcome analysis that should isolate specific factors that play in predicting threats, training and need.
What becomes evident above are the associations—in particular those around lack of police enforcement tools/capabilities and its links with each of the other influences. Interestingly, police discriminatory practices seem to be the least associated, which may demonstrate a moving trend towards cyberspace and ICT use in carrying out organised criminality and financial linkages.

Considering entry into organised criminality, the participants were asked to rank the likelihood of pathways across four sources: family, friends, criminal syndicates and online recruitment. As is evident in figure 4 below, there is a relative amount of variation amongst the participant’s beliefs.

![Pathways into organised criminality](image)

**Figure 4: Percentage of participants reporting likelihood of pathway into organised criminality.**

Although there is some variation within each of the pathways prompted, two key findings are highlighted. Firstly, it seems that respondents believe that it is very common that family members recruit individuals into organised criminality. Secondly, it seems very unlikely that professionals perceive that online recruitment into organised criminality is occurring. This may again, as discussed above, begin to demonstrate a trend in a lack of understanding of cybercrime pathways. Recall that cybercrime is very common as reported by the respondents. As such, it would not be overly surprising to see online recruitment occurring more frequently.
For further analysis and as mentioned in the introduction, data was manipulated to collapse those participants working in criminal justice related fields (CJ professionals) and those working in other domains such as education and youth work (non-CJ professionals). Comparing criminal justice professionals to non-criminal justice professionals, we see a difference in where they believe reductions in criminality could occur, in table 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>CJ professionals %</th>
<th>Non-CJ professionals %</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>28 (63)</td>
<td>40 (36)</td>
<td>4.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job creation</td>
<td>48 (61)</td>
<td>53 (87)</td>
<td>0.81, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased policing</td>
<td>28 (33)</td>
<td>31 (47)</td>
<td>0.33, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentence enhancement</td>
<td>34 (41)</td>
<td>38 (60)</td>
<td>0.60, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased therapy</td>
<td>24 (30)</td>
<td>35 (55)</td>
<td>4.0*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*) denotes significant association at the p<0.05 level. The analysis illustrates those participants who responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect.

Table 9: Cross-tabulations of effect of actions for crime reduction across professional types

Two findings are highlighted which are worth attention. Firstly, respondents within both groups do not differ in how they see job creation and the two criminal justice approaches reducing organised criminality (increased policing and sentence enhancement). Surprisingly, the policing and criminal justice group do not necessarily see harder tactics working in prevention and reduction. Interestingly, more human-centred approaches such as a social welfarist economic approach into programmes, as well as a more tailored approach to mental health and psychological services do show a difference, with the non-criminal justice professionals reporting higher levels of moderate to high reductions if these approaches were to be taken. Further research would need to be undertaken to understand the specific connections and associations. If sample sizes per profession were larger, additional research could look more closely at these finite differences in opinion. Table 10 below explores an additional set of actions perceived as effective to reduce organised criminality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>CJ professionals %</th>
<th>Non-CJ professionals %</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased rehabilitation</td>
<td>33 (41)</td>
<td>38 (62)</td>
<td>0.77, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special units</td>
<td>51 (63)</td>
<td>49 (80)</td>
<td>0.17, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments schools</td>
<td>37 (46)</td>
<td>43 (67)</td>
<td>0.88, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legalise prostitution</td>
<td>18 (19)</td>
<td>18 (24)</td>
<td>0.02, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legalise drugs</td>
<td>20 (31)</td>
<td>27 (36)</td>
<td>0.24, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community policing</td>
<td>40 (50)</td>
<td>42 (67)</td>
<td>0.05, NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The analysis illustrates those participants who responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect.

Table 10: Cross-tabulations of effect of actions across reducing organised criminality

Table 10 above shows that there is no difference between the opinions of individuals within each professional category regarding the effects of each action on curbing/reducing organised criminality. As is evident, the percentages of each subsample, with the exception of the ‘creation of special policing units’, are all quite low, meaning that the majority of all participants, regardless of what they believe to be appropriate in tackling organised crime, do not think that these factors will have a great influence on crime reduction. A positive message to take away from this analysis is again the similar views of participants regardless of their community standing. Again, one would advocate for multidisciplinary partnership in tackling the issues of and surrounding organised crime bringing in a range of expertise (not just criminal justice).
**Terrorism and ‘both’**

The following section depicts findings from those participants indicating they either worked in combatting terrorism, or ‘both’ (organised crime and terrorism). Figure 3 below provides a breakdown of self-reported employment status.

Figure 5. Represents subsample who responded to working in the area of terrorism or ‘both’ on the survey (n=256)

Figure 5 shows a great deal of variation in terms of employment and profession of those respondents who either worked in terrorism or across the areas of terrorism or organised crime. Local law enforcement and education were the two most common areas of employment, comprising nearly two-fifths of the entire subsample. For the purpose of further analysis, the areas of work of family support, education, youth work, community engagement and psychology will be combined for the ‘non-CJS’ group; whereas special unit, policy making, cyber-security, intelligence, surveillance and judicial will be grouped as ‘CJS’.

This subsample was asked a similar question regarding what they saw to be the most significant forms of terrorist activities needing further attention. The three highest proportions included: Islamist terrorism/violent extremism (49%), terrorist financing (47%) and cyber-terrorism (46%). The remaining options were responded to in much lower proportions. It is promising to see that those working in this field are responding in similar ways. It is believed that many respondents may have only opted for one of the choices (as the response rates are falling below the half way point); however, definitions of ‘areas of work’ may be over-lapping and it is firmly believed that participants are in support of these criminal risk priorities.

Participants were then asked what they believed to be the primary drivers influencing involvement in terrorist activity. Table 11 below shows the significance of their responses in their associations to each other.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Alienation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychopathology</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*) denotes significant association at the p<0.05 level; (**) denotes significant association at the p<0.01 level.

Table 11. Inter-related levels of influence increasing terrorist activities

There is a great deal of information above on how respondents see the levels of influences on increasing terrorist activities. A few emerging points: Firstly, there is a strong association between economic exclusion and the sensation of isolation and alienation. This may contribute to individuals seeking groups that share both of these factors, and who identify with particular ideologies. Secondly, psychopathology and religiosity do not have a significant influence, which supports previous research showing that those individuals who undertake terrorist activities do not manifest the same risk factors as ‘traditional’ criminals or those engaging in deviant acts. Thirdly, political grievances seemingly transgress influences (denoted by more significant associations) than any other particular risk factor. It is interesting to consider this in light of a spate of recent Islamist extreme events in Europe over the last year, where politics are seen as a more complicated influencer than religion (please note that just because something is not identified across influencers, does not mean that it does not play a part in the threats facing European society).

Table 12 below provides another look at the links between influencers as responded to by participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Discrimination</th>
<th>Demonization</th>
<th>Norm of violence</th>
<th>Leadership figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm of violence</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership figures</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.44**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*) denotes significant association at the p<0.05 level; (**) denotes significant association at the p<0.01 level.

Table 12. Associations between influencers as linked to the experience of culture, discrimination and violence

Again, these influencers (unlike those previously considered) demonstrate some interesting associations amongst themselves that reveal the complexities of developing appropriate interventions and preventions. Firstly, there are strong links between the belief that individuals who interact with leadership figures also internalise or have experienced the acceptance of violent ideologies. This is not overly surprising, considering that many high profiles cases in the UK, US and elsewhere have illustrated the significance of figures of authority in supporting and advocating violent intentions. Leadership figures are also associated with the experience of discrimination, which psychologically could be seen as a risk factor as those who experience prejudice and discrimination may gravitate towards alternative views, ideologies and support systems. The strongest link we see in the above table is the influence of both discrimination by peers and one’s community and the effect of the media and ‘moral panics’ through demonization. Again, caution is urged when considering these links as we would need to understand the deeper occurrences and mechanisms. But it does speak to existing literature on in-groups, out-groups, media effects and one’s gravitation towards alternative support pathways.
Figure 6 provides insight into how professionals perceive individuals becoming involved with terrorist related activities. As becomes evident, there is a great deal of variation across each of the suggested pathways. For example, ‘direct’ or face to face pathways are seen as differentially by the various groups of participants with responses equal across all levels of the question. ‘Religious leaders’ demonstrate the highest level of agreement across the sample. ‘Family members’ have the highest level of agreement in terms of not being a common pathway into terrorist activities. Further analysis in the future is needed to disseminate perhaps why there is such disagreement. It is believed by the research team that this is due to differential experience, positions, and specialities across participants, employment and the country in which they work.

As in the previous section on organised crime and both, analysis was undertaken to explore whether there were any significant differences between professional standing and belief of effect in reducing individual’s involvement in terrorist activities. Table 13 speaks to each of these, and refers to the sample as a whole.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>CJ professionals %n</th>
<th>Non-CJ professionals %n</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>42 (25)</td>
<td>48 (41)</td>
<td>0.61, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>21 (12)</td>
<td>43 (32)</td>
<td>6.48**, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job creation</td>
<td>33 (19)</td>
<td>36 (29)</td>
<td>0.06, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased policing</td>
<td>33 (20)</td>
<td>35 (27)</td>
<td>0.50, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special police</td>
<td>53 (32)</td>
<td>49 (41)</td>
<td>0.21, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased therapy</td>
<td>34 (19)</td>
<td>33 (26)</td>
<td>0.02, NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (**) denotes significant association at the p<0.01 level. The analysis illustrates those participates who responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect.

Table 13. Cross-tabulations of effect of actions across professional types

None of the statistical tests undertaken (exploring the difference in beliefs around the reduction of terrorist activities or participation) were significant, with the exception of ‘social welfare’ approaches. Here, non-CJ professionals were twice more likely to believe that such approaches could work. We do note however that regardless of this, most of each subsample are below a majority (with the exception of CJ professionals seeing a moderate to strong effect in the inclusion of special police or units—and the non-CJS professionals were not significantly different in terms of representation or responses). This may demonstrate reluctance in the existing methods to curb
contemporary terrorism in Europe—and that new methods are needed should future intervention and prevention be successful. Of note is the fact that the non-CJ professionals see merit significantly more than their CJ counterparts as important in supporting work being done by civil society and the third sector in dealing with violent extremism and terrorism.

Table 14 provides additional information on potential actions that participants were queried on about reducing involvement in terrorist activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>CJ professionals %(n)</th>
<th>Non-CJ professionals %(n)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border cooperation</td>
<td>62 (37)</td>
<td>53 (45)</td>
<td>1.09, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving community</td>
<td>32 (18)</td>
<td>33 (27)</td>
<td>0.03, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border control</td>
<td>41 (24)</td>
<td>42 (34)</td>
<td>0.02, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intervention</td>
<td>37 (20)</td>
<td>51 (39)</td>
<td>2.60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community policing</td>
<td>47 (27)</td>
<td>43 (55)</td>
<td>0.21, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform education</td>
<td>36 (20)</td>
<td>31 (26)</td>
<td>0.44, NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*) denotes significant association at the p<0.05 level. The analysis illustrates those participates who responded to the question as either having a moderate or strong effect.

Table 14. Cross-tabulations of effect of actions across professional types

As with the analysis undertaken in Table 13, the factors and actions investigated in table 13 do not produce any significant results in terms of different views on how to reduce the participation in terrorist activities. One significant result—military intervention abroad—demonstrates that non-CJ professionals are more likely (more than half the subsample) than their CJ counterparts to believe that this will have a weak effect. It is worth noting that more than half of the subsample overall saw cross-border cooperation as being an improvement and having an effect on reducing participation in terrorist activities (however, the difference between the two groups of professionals was non-significant).

The above illustrates some promising findings. Firstly, all professionals seem to be in agreement that military action abroad, in predominantly Muslim countries, has a strong influence on recruitment and involvement in terrorism. The vast majority of participants across both profession types saw moderate to strong effects of Western intervention on catalysing involvement through military
tactics. Current preventive strategies and policies were seen to be appropriate, meaning that countries are doing the most they can with what they have. Again, there was no difference between professional types. Interestingly, there was a significant difference between how non-CJ and CJ professionals perceived that sufficient transnational cooperation was occurring between various agencies. The non-CJ professionals saw this as much more effective than their CJ professional counterparts—this may perhaps be because non-CJ organisations and professionals are more in the habit of working with various stakeholders in intervention and prevention than CJ professionals are.

Breaking this down further, specifically addressing the influence of military action, including bombing and drone strikes in largely Muslim countries, responses showed some differentiation. Figure 8 below shows the differences between different professional groups.

Figure 8. Terrorism or both responses to the effect military intervention abroad has on inciting involvement in terrorism. Please note that some of the professions highlighted have very small sample sizes.

Here we very clearly see a belief by participants that military intervention abroad has a strong to moderate influence on inciting recruitment and involvement with terrorist activities. There is some deviation between profession types but, for the most part, it is clear that many respondents find the effect of this type of foreign policy to interact directly with the development of threats facing Europe and the international community. For examples, 92% of teachers saw it as having a strong or moderate influence; 92% of national or international law enforcement; 80% of local law enforcement; and 100% of legal experts/lawyers saw it as moderate. However, for the sake of transparency, note that some profession subtypes have very small sample sizes.

A final series of analyses were undertaken to explore the entire group’s responses to questions regarding needs and capabilities. Significant associations between groups and the adequacy of available tools/capabilities were verified in two distinct manners. Firstly, we investigated the presence of significant differences between those working in organized crime, terrorism or both. We
then changed the group composition to look inclusively across all participants for associations between CJ professionals and non-CJ professionals. Table 15 below highlights the findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>CJ professionals % (n)</th>
<th>Non-CJ professionals % (n)</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Digital capabilities</td>
<td>36 (35)</td>
<td>48 (61)</td>
<td>3.51*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/tools</td>
<td>35 (34)</td>
<td>48 (61)</td>
<td>3.59*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of staff</td>
<td>30 (29)</td>
<td>27 (34)</td>
<td>0.34, NS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>25 (24)</td>
<td>25 (32)</td>
<td>0.01, NS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (*) denotes significant association at the p<0.0 level. The analysis illustrates participants divided by CJS relative work and not.

Table 15. Cross-tabulations of organisational adequacy by professional groups

Note that for two of the associations, digital capabilities and equipment/tools, there is a significant difference between CJ and non-CJ responses, with the non-CJ professionals significantly more likely to note that they have each of these elements within their organisations in undertaking their jobs. Of concern is that the CJ professionals working in the prevention and intervention report that they do not have digital capabilities and tools in place. It is also worth noting that across all the analyses, less than half of the entire sample is reporting that these are in place. With regards to staffing levels and funding, both sets of professionals disagree with this statement nearly 75% of the time. With regards to the alternative cross-tabulation analysis, the only significant associations were on the question related to the availability of equipment/tools. The terrorism only subsample was much more likely to report that this was in place versus the organised crime only subsample, and the ‘both’ subsample.

Analysis was then undertaken to explore whether participants felt that there were mechanisms to disseminate the findings/results of their own or their organisation’s impact and approaches in dealing with their particular crime across a range of bodies. Again, two alternative sets of analysis were undertaken (CJ vs. non-CJ; terrorism vs. organised crime vs. both). The majority of these analyses were non-significant, suggesting similar views across the division of participants. When divided by CJ relevance, it seems that participants are more likely to agree that these mechanisms are in place the more closely the dissemination audience is (e.g. within their department or their own institutions). As the distance between the organisation and the end sources grows (e.g. government and policy makers, other European institutions), the balance shifts, demonstrating a majority of respondents stating that they do not feel that they have the tools in place. This is interesting as it suggests considering the importance of multi-disciplinary partnerships and the inter-connections between the state, civil society and criminal justice. Many of these crimes are multifaceted and require clear and transparent communication between organisations. The only significant association was between crime types (organised crime vs. terrorism vs. both), where the subsample working uniquely in terrorism was significantly more likely to report that they did have mechanisms in place in disseminating to ‘other institutions’.

Figure 9 below investigates any associations between profession type and their agreement / disagreement across various levels of support they may or may not receive.
As is evident above, participants seem to feel that there are appropriate training mechanisms in place across the crime types, but are more in disagreement with the emotional/psychological support available to them. They express concerns to their institutions/governments about their capabilities and the level of information they receive from the government(s) regarding their work. Only the terrorism only subsample showed a significant difference between their agreements with expressing concern versus the other two groups.

### 3.3. Focus groups

#### 3.3.1. Collated findings regarding countering terrorist networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic / Field</th>
<th>Summary / Description of Key Point Raised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confusion between discourse on ‘Radicalisation’ and Violent Extremism</td>
<td>Radicalization and violent extremism are constantly interchangeable terms in the media and political rhetoric. Urgent need of a common definition of the concepts (violent extremism, radicalisation, terrorism) as well as institutional and social perceptions. Need to understand how it manifests (is it a phenomenon or isolated cases), who are the actors and the targets, as well as the triggers and modus operandi. There will be no improvement in the framework of the public discourse, as the topic is very emotional. Radicalized individuals have already experienced exclusion and joined radical groups in order to seek stability in their life. Young people who sympathize with radicals are looking for safety, transparency, comprehension and appreciation. Vulnerable young people experienced little family guidance and securesness. Any “frame” or narrative that social workers use to reach individuals at risk needs to be capable of connecting with these people otherwise the affected individuals will be overrun. How should social workers find/create the connection? Which are the narratives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary experiences and Radicalisation</td>
<td>Involve formers, community leaders, religious leaders, victims, families, etc to address radicalisation. Fostering relations of inclusion and increasing legitimacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reliability of a social worker’s constant presence in a radicalised / vulnerable person’s life can help to build trust between that person and the practitioner. This is important for the individual to trust authority.

In some cases, the educational system is not adequate. Punishment in education can sometimes create a rejection that can lead to feelings of isolation. It is necessary to integrate young people in these processes, make them participate and empower them to be individuals able to make decisions and have opinions of their own.

Those linkages still need to be better studied and developed. In Italy the OC phenomenon is widespread all over the country but particularly in southern regions. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, the sales of drugs are all factors which are now feeding into the problems faced by LEAs in tackling OC/TN, especially in Italy.

In Spain, there is a worrying lack of integration program for both the adult population and specifically the juvenile prison population. There is a need for understanding integration as a tool for prevention, such programs should be further encouraged.

There is generally good cooperation and information sharing among the different state institutions such as the judiciary, the intelligence services, and the police. However, when looking at Civil Society, they are not included in the discussions, there is willingness from the state to include them in the investigation process, but there is not an integrated approach to make them part of the solution from an early stage.

There is a clear lack of human resources in the field, in addition there is also significant the lack of training in the majority of cases of professionals who face new realities without the tools such as in prisons, where civil servants do not have specific training to work on juvenile prevention within prisons, such as in the case of Albolote prison (which is the prison of the province of Granada).

Important to have transparency around the baseline policy and what its true objectives are. This includes the accessibility of successful and implemented practices by not just government officials and public-sector workers, but also by other practitioners. This would allow for greater accountability and learning what works. Further examples are a clear and transparent definition of violent extremism and non-violent extremism, to avoid the prosecution / stigmatisation / alienation of non-criminals.

Need to exchange this information (for example) between policy makers and the people implementing the policies. The flow of information, both top-down and bottom-up, allows for greater (a) accountability of decision-making and implementation, (b) more effective and informed approaches being adopted and (c) more trust to be built between these two types of actors.

One reason for this could be that some actors are defensive of their boundaries – either because they are unwilling to share information, or because they see marked differences in the applications of different professions as necessary - so multiple departments and localities act without cooperation and act in competition with each other instead. This is particularly true with the sharing of information from law enforcement to practitioners.

Coaching, mentoring and guiding is especially important when working with youth. One-to-one guidance can lead to softer and more sensitive tactics being
used on vulnerable individuals rather than cold or ‘tough-love’ solutions. It is especially important that individuals are not ‘passed around’ or between counsellors and other practitioners and authorities (such as the police etc.), so that they may build up trust – thus enabling the guidance to be respected and be more effective.

### Participants’ Overall Evaluation: Positive / Good Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>“Elements” of Good Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychological support</td>
<td>Offer coaching and mentoring support to youth and other vulnerable groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Include training of all actors involved at social level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>Community policing is an essential element of effectively addressing terrorism and radicalisation and should receive greater support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of real voices</td>
<td>Families, formers, victims. This helps to gain access to certain communities’ due to legitimacy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Elements” of Bad Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor involvement of Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregation of communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on securitisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If civil society are not included in development of policies and practice it is a weakness and lost opportunity.

Programming which negatively targets and segregates communities or social, economic, educational and other conditions which reinforce segregation and division.

Too many “uniforms” sends the wrong message. Government needs to rely more on civil society and support agencies. By fostering this joined up approach the problem can be tackled together and without the fear of responses being entirely led by intelligence / law enforcement with the threat of arrest, criminalisation and / or stigmatisation for the targeted individuals.

### Practitioners: Main Challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Challenge</th>
<th>Significance / Importance: How it Impacts their work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity over legality and illegality of violent extremism</td>
<td>The front-line practitioners have a difficult and diffuse approach regarding the topic of Islamist Radicalisation in particular. It is difficult to classify in situ what are “radical actions”, which are violent-sympathetic, what is provocation, what is mere ideological sympathy or other phenomena.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rights especially those in prison</td>
<td>How should we deal with minority rights when questions of radicalisation arise? Discrimination and stigma will arise after conviction or when minors are sent through de-radicalisation processes. There is further a necessity to adapt the civil and penal legislation to new models. Minors are in juvenile prisons up to 24 years today. This is a central target for counter-terrorism strategies, if we analyze the profile of the perpetrators in Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of religiosity among youth workers</td>
<td>The lack of religiosity among youth workers becomes a problem because they are dealing with an enhanced &quot;religious&quot; youth. The gap widens, there is an increasing estrangement and alienation. Theoretical concepts need to be clearly defined. What means foreign, what means not foreign? What does “we” mean? What does “the others” mean? Definitions must be clearly stated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precise Terminology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lack of Information

In certain areas, there is a lack of information. It is not about education, but about the mediation of information and the correction of false or missing information.

Vulnerable young people experience little family guidance. Relationship building is highly important. Due to few temporal and financial resources, youth work cannot provide a serious work regarding relationship building.

Institutional weakness: there is a lack on case-oriented counsellors in the work with young people (individual assistance, “empathic authority”). Youth work is dealing with too many institutionalized counselling facilities. Clients use to say: “I have only bought friends”

Youth workers use to say: “I am there for you, but only for half an hour”

Relationship building fails due to lack of resources (time, funding, personnel).

Data protection regulations makes the work of social and youth workers even more difficult, especially when they need to get information through authorities.

### Practitioner Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Precise Terminology</td>
<td>Strongly positive and strongly negative thinking estranges the reality. The precise use of terminology (no using the common term of &quot;parallel societies&quot; but be more specific with the concept of &quot;problematic milieus&quot;) is therefore highly important. Building trust is also very important in social and youth work. “Helper conferences” for special cases are very effective. Helper conferences are a useful tool for clarifying the task and the context of the problem. Helper conferences are valuable in order to create a differentiated diagnosis and a more detailed help plan, as well as planning resources for a differentiated psychosocial diagnosis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native language</td>
<td>Preventive work should also be facilitated in the native language in order to reach all individuals at risk. Many involved people have migration background and do not speak the language of the host country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situational Prevention</td>
<td>Focus on situational prevention more than perpetrators, profiling, primary and secondary prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juveniles &amp; Minors</td>
<td>Juveniles and minors as a key area for the prevention of terrorism and OC. There should be a focus in this area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Women</td>
<td>Need to share positive, successful experiences in order to develop evidence based approaches. This should be done internationally but also nationally, across institutions, as to find a tailored approach for the reality of the country. Creation of an online EU Library of good practices for first line practitioners. Need for evaluation mechanisms (both internals and externals) in order to build upon effective practices and not “inventing the wheel” over and over again. Identified lessons learned, promote a feedback loop. States should take advantage of youth exchanges in the framework of European programs such as Erasmus KA2 to create a safe environment for dialogue, hold workshops for young people on the consequences and the dangers that sometimes involve the use of the internet for groups at risk Promote synergy between online and offline solutions. The online space is not only the place where much of the catalysing processes of radicalisation take place, but is also the most effective tool for accessing young people and their interactions. Good examples of these are the recent Counter-narrative initiatives such as #NotAnotherBrother and the ExitHate campaigns.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pay attention to the ‘Pre-crime’ space.

The fact is that the pre-crime space is where vulnerable individuals move from not committing damage or harm to indeed doing that. The pre-crime space has therefore been a place for law enforcement and police to ensure prevention of these crimes. However, more focus needs to be put on practitioners to prevent these crimes / support the vulnerable people, and far less focus needs to come from Law Enforcement and Intelligence in this area.

### 3.3.2. Collated findings regarding countering organized crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic / Field</th>
<th>Summary / Description of Key Point Raised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability of resources</td>
<td><strong>In the case of Bulgaria:</strong> Budget planning and allocation is centralised so they ‘manage with what they get’, without being consulted on their needs. Police representatives note lack of specific technical resources, for example equipment to extract data from mobile phones and other devices. The cybercrime unit is also not well equipped better to conduct cybercrime and other digital investigations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and qualification</td>
<td>There is a need of joint sessions that gather together all institutions within the entire criminal process from reporting to trial. Such operational trainings would allow for more fluent cooperation between the actors with different profiles – commercial banks, security, law enforcement, prosecution and court. Within Cyber-security, there is a lack of Cybersecurity knowledge, technical skills and expertise, and tools are not known by practitioners. The different actors throughout the criminal proceedings delay each other’s work as they need different aspects of the investigation that correspond to their prerogatives. As an example, when the prosecutor requests data that is suitable for evidence before court it may be perceived to hinder investigation by requiring time, for the police. In Bulgaria, participants outlined the practice of forming multi-institutional teams composed of tax services, customs agency, etc. as particularly successful for allowing teams’ members to quickly exchange operational information. Joint trainings among institutions and specialisation of officers within the different authorities were pointed out as the key to a swift and effective cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation at national level</td>
<td>Focus on the DarkWeb as a platform for OC activity. Practitioners and experts need to understand more the utility and use of the Darkweb, in order to better understand tools, materials available to terrorists and organised crime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Participants’ Overall Evaluation: Positive / Good Practice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>“Elements” of Good Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychological support</td>
<td>Offer coaching and mentoring support to youth and other vulnerable groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-institutional partnerships</td>
<td>Occasionally, depending on the character of the case, the practitioners are gathered in intra-institutional or international teams, with each team member having access to their institution’s capacity and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire to share and Intel Sharing</td>
<td>Where there is a positive attitude towards sharing expertise and best practices, an openness towards exchanging information, tools and intelligence, then agencies share more naturally, organically, nationally and internationally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar level of</td>
<td>In order to exchange information and tools and technologies, parties need to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expertise across Institutions, Agencies and organisations</td>
<td>able to build on the expertise of the other. In Cybersecurity, there can be situations whereby the complexity of the situation is not understood by the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example</strong></td>
<td>“Elements” of Bad Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor involvement of Civil society</strong></td>
<td>If civil society are not included in development of policies and practice it is a weakness and lost opportunity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lack of technical resources</strong></td>
<td>Police representatives noted lack of specific technical resources, for example equipment to extract data from mobile phones and other devices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lack of sufficient training</strong></td>
<td>The lack of sufficient knowledge on computer and communication technologies among prosecutors and judges sometimes poses a barrier to investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dogmatic approach to guaranteeing the secrecy of an investigation</strong></td>
<td>Due to the secrecy of investigations, there is a limitation in sharing information and intelligence, which leads to delays or non-interventions in what could be international incidents in OC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lack of trust</strong></td>
<td>There has to be a certain level of trust between organizations, first-line practitioners from anywhere, including law enforcement. This doesn’t have to be formalized, but having a “sense of belonging” to a group and “contributing” and “being able to share”, helps in establishing communities of trust.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Practitioners: Main Challenges**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of Challenge</th>
<th>Significance / Importance: How it Impacts their work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative barriers</strong></td>
<td>The present legislation hinders the investigation of both cybercrime and money laundering by not allowing in the case of cybercrime authorities to obtain traffic data in some cases. More appropriate data legislation allows for internet providers to give access to authorities to such an information only when it concerns serious offences, set by law to be punishable by more than five years of imprisonment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Challenges in gathering intel</strong></td>
<td>Organizations don’t know about the existence of intel sharing networks, don’t know how to operate them, don’t know how to use them. They sometimes don’t have access to them, although they want to have it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular exchange of information</strong></td>
<td>Cyclical exchange of information during practical workshops relating to new forms of crimes in cyberspace, especially those connected to tax policy of the EU and the theft of sensitive data and (trade) secrets of enterprises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trainings and guidance</strong></td>
<td>Participants recommend the planning of practical trainings involving all the levels of the criminal proceedings as well as additional stakeholders especially on analytical capacity and the technical means to obtain additional data on the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Building circles of trust
Police and judicial academies should review the existing case-law and provide recommendations and education about how different cases should be interpreted in court.
Participating in associations and expert groups, to learn from each other, but also to build relationships on personal level, that grow into operational relationships and national and international collaborations on the basis of trust.
Structuring and organizing platforms, to allow communities to participate.

Utilize available tools
A wide series of tools exist, but are unknown to many first-line practitioners. A best practice indication will help them to identify, understand their impact and implications, get them to route to operate faster and will facilitate in exchange of future information and expertise.

Creation of EU agenda – organized crime
Establishing of an agenda on the central EU level to fight organized crime in cyberspace especially relate to extortion of goods and services on the international arena.
Creation of a task team on the EU level which will have the possibilities to block websites located on EU servers as well as on servers beyond Europe.

3.4. Workshops
Downstream of the empirical research through the organization of the workshops diverse aspects emerged during the participants’ talks. Specifically, digital and not digital available solutions both in terms of methods, models, technologies as well as ethical aspects have been discussed. For example, the main issues in the EU context can be distinguishing between basic issues and cyber-issues.

In particular, the major issues are related to:

- **Low Level of Cooperation** trust among police forces, law enforcement agencies, as well as among national governments;
- **Weak Communication Mechanisms among authorizes** for preventing the risk of attacks as well as for reducing the effect of damage, especially in terms of loss of human lives;
- **Inconsistency among National and International Laws** due to lack of a uniform and coherent legislative system among member states, which often allow criminals to pursue their goals without too many troubles;
- **Absence of Citizens’ involvement**, which is still rarely considered.

Based on such inconsistencies, further problems emerge, especially favored by the use of the IT (Internet technology), the so called cyber-issues. Indeed, the main enabling factors, related to the IT growth, rely in:

- **Dematerialization of Illegal Activities**: thanks to the exploitation of the Internet, it is not necessary anymore to be physically present in a specific place to commit a crime, to threaten a person, to steal money, or to sell drugs or weapons;
- **Increased International Collaborations**: it is easier to get in touch with other people, to establish new contacts and relationships, as well as to organize illegal activities and to improve collaborations with foreign criminal organizations;
- **Online Anonymity**: it is highly exploited by criminal groups, and this puts them outside the reach of law enforcement and intelligence organizations. In fact, criminals are able to hide their identities by using encryption techniques to coordinate activities across borders (e.g. to send encrypted messages), which allows them not to expose themselves.
Furthermore, most of the current activities on OC & TN are focused on:

- the Social Network analysis, since the use of social networks has been “abused” in the last years for performing, disseminating and advertising illegal and terroristic activities.
- the exploitation and/or implementation of (semi-)automatic solutions able to cope with huge amount of data;
- the definition of solutions that comply with EU regulations in order to support the collaboration among the states members.

Indeed, a particular aspect, that has been pointed out, concerns:

- the need for a strong coordination, communication and alignment of national and international laws that are regulating the field of cyber-security, which are currently weekly correlated.
- the need for tools and services that facilitates the coordination and the communication process among states and LEAs will help to make investigations easier and improve convictions of translational cybercrime, such as...
offerings of criminal activities. Accessing the darkweb is relatively easy, because of tools and educational materials that are freely available on the freely accessible internet.

Various definitions exist, but the **darkweb** differs from the **darknet** and the **deepweb**:

- the **darknet** can be seen as the “physical” part of the internet, which has not been made commercially available by the Internet Services Providers, but could be accessed.
- the **deepweb** is the part of the internet which is available to anyone having the tools to accessing it, going further than the normal user behavior tools of utilizing search engine for public accessible websites.

The Deepweb contains access to information which was not always intended to be made publicly available by their authors or publishers. The Darkweb can be a combination of both Darknet and Deepweb, but is somehow restricted to be accessible only with explicit intent, either with specific technologies and tools or by getting specific directions to the available Darkweb platforms. The Darkwebmarket is not constraint by any business regulations, however its offerings are very commercially oriented with different retails levels on offer, utilizing traditional marketing models (e.g. promotion, discounting).

Various investigations have led to getting an idea of what can be found on the Darkweb such as Drugs, malware, weapons, hitmen and so on, that are on offer on the Darkweb. It is unclear whether these Darkweb offerings, darkweb markets are in any shape or form to be considered Organized Crime. Sometimes it is even questionable whether any of the offenders are older than 18 years of age.

Existing and ongoing research identifies some of the current **challenges of law enforcement**:

a) **intent**: in many cases offenders have transformed from playing online multiplayer games, or action games in their bedrooms into getting bored and getting into the Darkweb, just because they can. According to interviews with some offenders, the challenge was evolved, because “they could”, similar like playing a next level in a video game, supported by online fora providing for instructions and directions. In many cases they didn’t even understand the value of the property and goods they had stolen.

b) **motivation**: is in most cases very unclear. Just by the capability of doing it came first, where the financial motivation was at the very bottom of the list. For law enforcement, the clearest pathway out of cybercrime is by disrupting it. There clearly is some convergence between organized crime / terrorism and cybercrime, but there are no clear signs of it. It is unclear whether this is a conscious development and questionable whether a new “Crime-Terror Nexus” is emerging.

Since there are no business regulations on the Darkweb it is equally challenging to know upfront whether the Darkweb is for real, whether the offerings are to be connected to criminal activities. Due to its anonymity, purchasers will continue to be unsure until they receive the goods. Vendors will need to make efforts to convince the purchasers about their eligibility if they are financially motivated. From the perspective of disrupting the activities, this can be organized in various shapes. By following activities on the Darkweb, either through online fora or by utilizing various malware-alike techniques, both Darkweb platform suppliers and their customers can be tracked and monitored to some extent. This allows gathering sufficient intelligence about the intent and motivation to take further action. Such actions have led to intelligence likely avoiding criminal offence. Disruptiveness is in the use of anonymity to fight back. In most cases, Darkweb platforms offering goods and services have similar technical challenges as legitimate websites have. Some of
the vulnerabilities can be exploited in a similar way. Some simple mistakes can in this case be harmful for the Darkweb operators. Darkweb offerings can be created and promoted, with similar offerings lurking purchasers away from the real offerings, and utilizing the scam to discourage the purchasers from further actions on the Darkweb. Financial gains from these transactions are being used for the better good. It remains unclear what the actual legal ground would be for such actions, since they can be set up by anyone.

Another way to disrupt the activities on the Darkweb, is by taking over some of the existing Darkweb platforms. The Dutch High Tech Cybercrime unit and the FBI took over Hansa Market and AlphaBay in 2017, two major Darkweb platforms. The takeover consisted out of taking full control over the command and operations of the existing websites, while continuing its services. With such activities, the current legal system and law enforcement are being challenged: intelligence or evidence, cost of operations, waterbed / mole-ing effect, entrapment, agent provocateur, including the private sector.

In the case, the law enforcement agencies were challenged in trying to trace users, trying to follow their PGP keys, trying controlling the operations, following migration to new platforms and finally shutting it down. In these operations it continues to be difficult to differentiate innocent people and researchers from criminals. The platforms and their participants require a trust status to become really credible. Interesting is the use of the search Metadata such as the use of Grams as an intelligence tool.

These evolutions have to be considered in line with new technological evolutions taking place, such as the development of encryption schemes or the development of cryptocurrencies. In order to be two steps ahead, machine learning techniques should be applied in order to try to differentiate the small time criminals from the capital offenses and organized crime behavior.

**Cryptocurrencies** are subject to investigations for Organized Crime in the domain of Money Laundering. In addition to the legitimate use of Bitcoins, Zcash and other cryptocurrencies, the use of cryptocurrencies for criminal activities, increasingly cryptocurrencies are investigated for their use in Money Laundering schemes. Best practices are being developed and a new expert group on financial crime was set up (TIG NPM) involving 13 countries in Europe with a couple of experts per country working on cyber investigations. Trying to understand what to look for, gathering in depth intelligence on the operations of the developments, there is an actual need for ways to follow transactions that might lead to identifying criminal activities. Chainanalysis with existing exchange platforms are being investigated and developed. More complex schemes start to appear, making it harder to follow developments, such as Bitmixer facilitating exchanges between for instance Bitcoin and Ethereum. Equally as for Darkweb, it continues to be challenging to differentiate the real criminal activities from the legit, and to even identify whether anything is real or not.

Other tools and techniques such as Cobalt Strike allow to train and simulate adversary actions and red team operations. In such platforms different actions can be organized to simulate the activities of adverse attacks, to learn to understand the practice, understand their effects and identify steps and traces in use. It helps better identifying certain traffic patterns that can be related to attack patterns, or even patterns on the use of the tools by offenders.

The analysis of malware and tools for malicious behavior leads to understand that some tools are constantly evolving, some going back to over a decade and re-appearing in different shapes and forms in various new forms of malwares such as trojans or ransomware. Such works helps to understand the sense of understanding some of the used schemes and methods being used, in order
to be able to better identify them in specific cases and better detect evolutionary paths which could lead to identifying other criminal behavior.

Similar evolutions can be seen in the evolution of anonymization technologies. Many of the current state of the art systems are Mixnets, e-voting systems and privacy preserving techniques. New mechanisms are appearing, which are currently still under research but could be picked up quickly such as RIPE or UNI, as alternatives to TOR. From a privacy preserving perspective, continuously the challenge is ensure that from the experiences of loss of privacy in TOR and other tools, the further potential of identification of persons can be prohibited. Mechanisms such as verifiable shuffles, zero-knowledge are being added to the current mechanisms of mixnets or onion routing. This would allow not only ensuring anonymous communication, but further anonymizing the endpoints and users.

From the prosecutor side some limitations exist in terms of understanding the complexities and evolutions and ensuring this can be applied throughout across jurisdictions. There are limitations in resources equally from law enforcement, which are currently overwhelmed with cases related to Child Pornography. A major tool continues to be the fact that criminals will want to spend their money, on physical goods (cars, holidays, etc.). Brute force attacks, such as hacking back is possible, but not straightforward. The types of cases such as major take-overs are extremely challenging, both from a legal and an operational perspective. Groups and resources try to join forces in prevention and mitigation activities such as Nomoreransom² or in confiscating cryptocurrencies. There is an interest in getting external (non-prosecutor related) cybersecurity experts, in order to ensure capabilities on the latest available tools, getting access to intelligence feeds, international cooperation. Further action would be needed to setting up a public – private partnership, to directly include experts into investigations.

There are various forms of Cyber Intelligence, both freely available / open source and commercial. The intelligence tools are not providing a direct answer on who the threat actors are. Attribution continues to be very challenging. The various shapes of intelligence are different, how long for instance is a piece or strong of information, how long does it have to be. Existing platform are very mature, but closed. These databases with millions of historical information require additional levels of expertise in order to be able to collect the right information for the required search.

Sharing information is also a cultural challenge, organizations and people will need to change their attitudes in order to facilitate collaboration. Generating knowledge in order to prevent has not yet been proven. There is no point to do this for people doing investigations. There still needs to be a form of evidence of wrong doing, an evidence of crime. It is not possible to predict a cybercrime from happening.

Other tools exist to support people in better understanding Darkweb and other criminal behavior in the internet. EMPACT delivers a training on investigation on dark web and virtual currencies, created by law enforcement and endorsed to be made available to train the trainers and law enforcement agencies in Darkweb. It is being investigated whether this tool (intended for investigators from law enforcement) can be made available for other first line practitioners. It includes basic understanding of the structure of the internet, the concept and mechanisms behind encryption and anonymity, exploration of the Darkweb, the virtual / cryptocurrencies and some cases studies using OSINT. Next to this, another training on Darknet exists as well, from Interpol.

² https://www.nomoreransom.org/nl/index.html
Adding to the challenges related to the Darkweb, cryptocurrencies and existing malware and crypto-evolutions, the development of devices can be seen. The increased connectivity of devices to the internet is not only causing potential damage in the use and abuse of these devices in the context of a DDOS attack (Distributed Denial of Service) from the perspective of both using and abusing these resources for the cause of criminal behavior (eg targeted attacks or eavesdropping). In addition, there is also a reflection on some of these devices level of trustworthiness. Following recent developments of information on nation states intelligence gathering, and the way governments are abusing the internet motivated by security principles, can also be seen in appliances. Devices with backdoors can be put into action by Member States, or organizations that have intentionally (or unintentionally) build those in. Malicious users, criminals and organized crime getting access and control over such tools could also disrupt intelligence gathering, criminal behavior and law enforcement activities.

While there is a continued high level interest in further securing the citizen and the Member States, policy makers will continue to try to increase activities deemed necessary to prevent and protect from possible danger and harm. The recently proposed Counter Terror Package\(^3\) includes the identification of a shift in modus operandi from terrorists in behaving as lone wolves. At the same time, there is a continuous tension on the use of cryptographic algorithms and the way security practitioners need to deal with them. Increasing capabilities by Europol, establishing expertise, and building a toolbox of instruments (technical and legal) added to training, continued observation and supporting dialogues with private partners are key in this policy.

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4. Organised crime and terrorist networks – synthesis and interpretation

There was a sense that knowledge of the organized crime and terrorist phenomena is insufficient. This lack of knowledge was highlighted in the survey as well as in the qualitative research based on workshops, focus groups and interviews with experts. Among the experts interviewed the point was made that more cooperation between researchers and practitioners, along with less emotional attitudes on the part of public bodies, would contribute to a better understanding of both phenomena. Those interviewed also stressed the importance of collaborating with external experts, particularly in the relatively ‘unknown’ area of cybercrime. Only in a minority of national contexts was it felt that the activities of organized crime include forays into the licit world thanks to the partnership with, and the support or tolerance of, official political representatives and/or legitimate entrepreneurs. Interviews also brought to the fore the need for an international platform for the exchange of information. The majority of respondents, however, mentioned drug production/distribution and cybercrime, along with the smuggling of people, as the main activities of organized crime. In their view, these require more effective prevention or response policies and strategies. The lowest score was for ‘armed robbery’.

None of the respondents seemed to object to the inclusion of armed robbery among the forms in which organized crime presents itself. Or, we can speculate, the fact that it scored so low testifies to their reluctance to treat it as one such form.

Armed robbery, in fact, can be deemed ‘professional crime’, an illegal conduct in which there is a clear and mere technical division of labour. Professional crime is also described as ‘crime in association’ and is characterized by a horizontal structure in which agents operate as peers, planning schemes together, executing them, and sharing proceeds. Here, the division of labour is based on the specific skills possessed by participants (one may be in a good position to identify the target, one may be skilled in using firearms, one in driving a car at speed, one in breaking into a safe, and the other in hiding the money taken). By contrast, ‘crime in organization’ implies a distinction between planning and execution, a wage relationship between a patron and an agent, and a degree of invisibility: agents may ignore the motivations and the very identity of those recruiting them. In classical terms, the division of labour is in this case of a social nature (Ruggiero, 2000).

The activities carried out by organized crime in the official arena, which concerned some of the experts interviewed, were neglected by the majority of informants contacted through the quantitative as well as the qualitative research.

Organized criminal groups who gain access to the legitimate economy and the political apparatus seem to complete the evolution hypothesized by Peterson (1991), whereby this type of crime traverses a number of successive stages: a predatory, a parasitic, and finally a symbiotic stage. While some groups may fail to undergo a similar evolution, thus stagnating in conventional criminal markets, others may instead succeed, therefore straddling legality and illegality. The legal-illegal nexus has some structural implications and can be captured if organized crime is regarded as social organization, which refers to a network of the two following types of relational networks.

First, social organization can be viewed as an association, a network of individuals who form some sort of culturally homogenous group. Second, social organization can be seen as a series of transactions, namely a network of individuals involved in a common activity irrespective of their
social and cultural background. Transactions range from ad hoc to elaborate, rigid, and highly coordinated undertakings. Ultimately, if we view social organization in terms of association, we emphasize the internal structure and cohesiveness of groups. On the contrary, if we view social organization in terms of transactions we emphasize the structure and modality of joint activities.

Some scholars, but also investigators, choose the first route, thus describing the criminal groups as separate entities constituted by cohesive enclaves and characterized by specific cultural codes. Others opt for the second route, therefore focusing on the links the criminal group establishes with external, mainly official actors with whom joint activities are carried out (Arlacchi, 1983, 1994; Armao, 2000; Lodato and Scarpinato, 2008; Gouvev and Ruggiero, 2012).

Those who choose the second transactional route highlight the capacity of organized crime to polarize markets through the use of violence, thus implying that the ‘coercive’ aspects of this type of crime are still very important. Others look specifically at the alliances and partnerships between organized crime, the official economy and the political world, and therefore suggest that organized crime combines forms of conventional criminality with a variety of white-collar offences. This happens when proceeds from illicit activities are laundered in the official economy, where members of criminal groups ‘learn’ the techniques and the rationalizations of their white-collar counterparts. In this case, it is appropriate to talk about a number of exchanges and a mutual entrepreneurial promotion in which the different actors engage. Hence the suggestion that we are now faced with criminal networks rather than criminal organizations.

By focusing on conventional activities, many of our respondents overlooked the instances in which organized crime invests into the official economy, engages in the delivery of services and in the formation of partnerships with legitimate actors. Criminal networks, which facilitate such non-conventional activities, were also neglected.

The development of criminal networks is mainly associated with deregulated markets in which unorthodox practices already prevail, to the point that violations are the norm. In contexts in which political representatives and business operators act illegally, citizens and social groups of any composition may well follow suit, thus imitating the elite through illegal practices. In this respect, a ‘mafia method’ which is spreading among conventional criminals and white-collar criminals alike may be taking shape. Scholars who use this term imply that a series of principles, modalities and values are spreading from criminal organizations throughout the official world, and from the latter to the former, affecting the concepts of justice, morality and enterprise (Dino and Ruggiero, 2012).

In brief, our respondents focused their attention mainly on conventional criminal activities, namely on organized groups that remain confined to illicit markets.

4.1. Organised crime drivers

‘Being raised in a criminal environment’ scored very high among our respondents, whereas ‘Discriminatory police tactics against certain groups and individuals’ scored very low. Families were regarded as part of such criminal environment (see analysis of statistical data). Some participants in the focus groups claimed that legal restrictions on police work was a problem for those involved in the investigation of human smuggling, a problem also encountered in the identification of criminals due to data protection laws. The analysis of our quantitative data also shows that joining organized crime networks was perceived less to do with mental difficulties and instability than with lack of
opportunities. It is interesting to locate the responses received in our survey within the traditional and contemporary debate around the causes of organized crime.

From the perspective of the Positivist School of criminology, the variable ‘tradition’ plays a crucial role. For example, as Lombroso (1971: 389) argued:

‘It seems to me that the high persistence of some wicked associations such as the Mafia, the Camorra and brigandage depends first of all on their long-term existence, in that the continuous repetition of our acts transforms these acts into a custom and therefore into a norm’.

A range of subsequent interpretations follows into this path, associating organised crime with variables such as ‘backwardness’ or ‘archaism’. These are analyses that address organised crime from a ‘cultural’ perspective (among the most celebrated are Hess, 1973 and Hobsbawm, 1971). Belonging to the same cluster are contributions focusing on the perpetuation of organised forms of criminality, which is said to derive from the lack of popular stigma attached to those involved. Subcultural theorists, for instance, would argue that members of criminal organizations are not regarded as individuals belonging to a distant and censurable social universe, nor are they associated with immorality or elicit contempt (Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).

Our respondents, by emphasising the ‘learning process’ implied in being ‘raised in a criminal environment’, located their views in the tradition of subcultural theories.

In the anomic tradition, while limited levels of crime are deemed to reinforce the unity and cohesion of the law-abiding society, some forms of delinquency are regarded as dysfunctional. Although Durkheim never wrote about organised crime, we can assume that this type of delinquency is to be included among those forms of antisocial activity indicated by the author as causing damage that transcends the functional level.

Merton’s extension of anomic theory, however, includes organised crime among deviant adaptations of the ‘innovative’ type. He argues that the dominant culture makes incompatible demands upon those who occupy the lower strata of society.

‘On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of large wealth... and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally’ (Merton, 1968: 200).

Those who pursue the official goal of money and success but lack the institutional means to achieve them, therefore, ‘innovate’, in the sense that they adopt alternative illicit means. In Merton’s view, Al Capone represented the triumph of amorality over morally prescribed failure.

Causations based on ‘innovation’, triggered by conditions of disadvantage and inequality, were not considered by our respondents, although the analysis of our quantitative data does highlight ‘lack of opportunities’.

An important causative theory emerges from the Chicago School of Sociology, namely ‘social disorganization’ (Downes and Rock, 1988). This crucially attributes the emergence of organized crime to the decline of informal social control. According to this theory, the degree of organization of illegal structures (be they youth gangs, groups of pimps, gambling syndicates or others) is dependent on the degree of disorganization of society. In other words, their organization is a function of the distance that separates them from other social groups (Thrasher, 1927; Shaw, 1930). Sociological studies conducted in Chicago’s ‘delinquent areas’ unveiled micro-societies of immigrants that were perfectly
organized (Whyte, 1943). Deviance, in this perspective, endorses a surrogate social order, a vicarious system which is nevertheless a social system in its own right. In this system, it is perfectly logical that a gangster is not met with disapproval (Landesco, 1969). ‘He’ is a product of his surroundings in the same way in which the good citizen is a product of his environment. Therefore the problem, as indicated by Whyte, is not the lack of organization within those particular micro-societies, but the lack of meaningful relationships between these enclaves and society as a whole.

Research on organized crime has neglected the female components of organizations. And yet, looking at the prohibition-era, while most gangsters were male, a couple of examples of female participants do stand out: the infamous ‘Ma Barker’ who led her four-son family crime-gang, before being shot to death by the FBI in 1935 (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1989), and Bonnie Parker, of ‘Bonnie and Clyde’ fame, who died together in their car, in a hail of bullets in 1934 (Guinn, 2010). Most females involved seemed to have played the role of the subservient and patriarchal ‘gangster moll’ (Potter, 1995). Incidentally, it is only in the 1990s that specific studies of the involvement of women in organised crime began to develop (Siebert, 1996).

**Our respondents neglected the female component in criminal organisations.**

It is worth noting that the causes sketched so far revolve around the idea that criminal groups adopt deviant solutions to resolve their status problems. Such groups adhere to a delinquent subculture, learn techniques and justifications for their acts, and ultimately operate in contexts where legitimate opportunities are scant.

**Our respondents seemed to endorse this view, and their emphasis on ‘being raised in a criminal environment’ alludes to the mechanisms highlighted in criminology by learning and/or subcultural theorists. As for the role played by law enforcers, the classical literature does not concentrate on ‘discriminatory police tactics’ against certain individuals or groups, but on its contrary, namely the participation of law enforcers in organised criminality.**

In a memorable section of Landesco’s (ibid) research on organised crime in Chicago, the funeral of a crime boss is described. Landesco’s premise is that, if we are able to hide our friends when we are alive, we can hardly do that when we are dead. At the funeral, political representatives mourn alongside gangsters, lawyers chat with club owners and pimps, while a ‘sprinkle of police officers’ completes the mournful cortege.

Categories such as ‘low self-control’ have also been mobilised: these imply that there is no need to design a specific theory to account for organised crime, and that individuals lacking self-control are the major protagonists of illegal activity, of whatever nature this may be (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). By contrast, organized crime groups have been described as possessing a ‘high’ degree of self-control, which enables them to act as service-providing organisations (Mcintosh, 1975). Among the goods provided, trust and protection are singled out as paramount. These, which should be supplied by the state, may under certain circumstances become the preserve of private entrepreneurs, namely organized crime. Therefore, this type of crime is purported to be an industry for the supply of private protection and the distribution of trust to economic actors who would otherwise be unable to interact safely (Gambetta, 1992). In the case of the mafia, for example, its strength as an industry for the supply of protection and trust is deemed a consequence of traditional popular distrust of the official agencies, and foreign domination before them. Presumably, contexts characterised by low degrees of corruption will be devoid of protection activities (Frye and Schleifer, 1996). This line of analysis is also endorsed by Varese (2010), who proposes to consider the organised crime...
phenomenon as part of the broader category of governance. His suggestion is that a crucial distinction should be drawn between producers of goods and services, and suppliers of forms of regulation, protection and governance. The form of governance alluded to is one that usurps the functions of the state in societies where sovereign rule is inadequate, a form of governance from below which extends power ‘beyond the state and into the realms of civil society’ (Edwards and Levi, 2008: 379).

Having neglected the activities carried out by organized crime in the official arena, our respondents did not mention the variable ‘governance’ nor did they see, in the contexts in which they operate, the necessity for an alternative provision of ‘trust’.

Other authors have emphasized that organized criminal activity may be less the result of poverty, underdevelopment or lack of self-control than of its opposite: affluence, development and the control of resources. In other words, social disadvantage, lack of socialization, low self-control and so on are suitable analytical tools only when one tries to depict organized crime as a distinctive form of social pathology, that is to say as the result of a ‘deficit’. On the contrary, people may turn to organized crime as a consequence of affluence, which also brings a plethora of social ills, as obsessive and empty materialism leads to a soul-destroying pursuit of ‘things’ (James, 2007).

Our respondents, in this respect, did not link the prevalence of criminal subculture with the prevailing materialist culture.

To summarize, it is noticeable that the interpretation of organized crime shows an extraordinary continuity in time. For over a century its etiology has been based on categories such as tradition, absence of the state, pathology and lack of control, relative poverty, and delinquent subcultures. All these categories fall, to different degrees, within a paradigm of deficit whereby the causes of crime originate in a deficiency, be it one of control, of socialization, of opportunities, of rationality, and so on (Ruggiero, 1996).

Our respondents tended to locate themselves in this interpretative tradition.

However, the variables just listed fail to account for how, in order to reproduce itself, organized crime is bound to establish some external relationships with society at large. The nature and strength of these external relationships are now crucial for an understanding of the causes of organised crime (Scarpinato, 2004; Dino, 2008; Dino and Pepino, 2008). From this perspective, organised crime perpetuates itself while ‘dissolving’ within the dominant social structure and culture. And by doing so it is presented with an array of new opportunities.

Many of the controversial issues outlined so far stem from the difficulties met by organized crime scholars and law enforcers alike. As Block (1991) puts it, the study of organized crime has been fascinated by conspiracy theory, a fascination which leads to the depiction of monolithic, impenetrable, culturally hermetic groups of criminals. He also suggests that the term ‘organized crime’ should be abandoned altogether in favour of the term ‘illegal enterprises’. This approach is implicitly adopted by scholars analysing organized crime, and crime in general, as an economic activity (Becker, 1968; Andreano and Sigfried, 1980).

Authors also focus on macro-structural factors and political-economic contexts which are regarded as facilitators of the genesis of organized crime. Contemporary structural explanations of the causes of organized crime posit that the last three decades of rapid global market liberalization, privatization and financialization, coupled with welfare reform and austerity measures, have created destitute
areas across the world where organized criminal groups have developed and flourished (Chin and Godson, 2006; Mazzitelli, 2007; Shaw and Haysom, 2016; Campbell, 2011; Ferreira, 2016; Silverstone and Whittle, 2016). Put more succinctly, these macro political-economic processes, or what is in shorthand referred to as neoliberal globalization, have activated the:

‘Criminogenic potential of economic, political, legal, and cultural asymmetries, as well as [created] new such asymmetries [...]. These asymmetries cause crime by furnishing opportunities for misconduct, by generating motives for actors to take advantage, and by weakening social control’ (Passas, 2000: 17).

In brief, it is argued that neoliberal policies and their well-documented effects in increasing gross socioeconomic and political inequalities, along with the weakening government regulations and declining public services (Chang, 2001; Harvey, 2005; Chomsky, 2011; Ellwood, 2011), generate the conditions for criminal opportunities to emerge (Chin & Godson, 2006; Ferreira, 2016; Mazzitelli, 2007; Wang, 2013).

4.2. Measures against organized crime

Respondents mainly opted for the creation of special police/law enforcement units, while discarding the idea that new drug legislation would have an effect on the fight against organized crime. Very little attention was devoted to the potential of labour market reform and improved welfare provision. The analysis of our quantitative data reveals that the policing and criminal justice group of our informants did not necessarily see harder tactics as effective prevention tools. Participants in focus groups stressed the importance of integrating young people and empowering them, namely making them able to express their opinions and reach independent decisions. More involvement of civil society was advocated, along with more material resources and training for law enforcers and investigators. Interviews with experts revealed unsatisfactory feelings around the problem of agency cooperation and transnational coordination of responses. They also emphasized how institutional responses are often driven by emergency situations and determined by the search for political consensus. Some interviewees stressed the importance, in the fight against organized crime, of establishing proper protection for whistleblowers. The analysis of quantitative data shows a prevalence of non-criminal justice professionals favouring human and social approaches to reduce the incidence of organized crime. The analysis also reveals that aims and objectives in combatting this type of crime are shared across occupational roles. Some law enforcers involved in focus groups lamented the inadequacy of cybercrime units and the need to liaise with the private sector, particularly commercial banks. Respondents involved in workshops stressed the need for strong coordination, communication and alignment of national and international laws that regulate the field of cyber-security. Interviewees pointed to the need for more strategic, comprehensive, prevention measures, but also for techniques able to evaluate the effectiveness of such measures. But let us provide a general backdrop against which the responses we received might be better understood.

Measures against organized crime may possess a social or a technical character, although the two types may come in combined interventions. We now start with the former and attempt some general considerations around prevention.

Preventative social measures derived from subcultural perspectives would stress the importance of educational programmes aimed at spreading civic awareness among the individuals and groups at risk. Such programmes would help develop meaningful relationships between marginalized communities and society at large, encouraging inclusion rather than exclusion. If crime is a form of
deviant adaptation or ‘innovation’ (as Merton would put it) chosen by people who lack the institutional means to achieve a dignified life, preventative programmes should strive to provide a minimum of such means. On the other hand, it should also be acknowledged that many state programmes aimed at fighting poverty have in the past proven ineffective (Ellsworth and Ames, 1998).

In a similar vein, analyses emphasizing ‘social disorganization’, namely the existence of enclaves in which deviance and crime are perpetuated, prompt programmes which can dissolve such enclaves, also described as ‘delinquent areas’, into the womb of the law-abiding society. Where ‘delinquent areas’ are closely connected to markets providing illicit goods and services, prevention could opt for the following:

- tackle demand through informative educational/public health campaigns;
- tackle supply by providing viable economic alternatives to those involved;
- legalize/decriminalize some of the illicit goods supplied.

Analyses of organized crime hinging on the variables trust and protection would prompt the obvious measures leading these to be provided by state agencies. The enhanced presence of institutions as guarantors of social interactions would ensue, in a process shaping forms of non-coercive governance.

Some research conducted by institutional agencies and independent investigators alike depicts organized crime as ‘employer’ attracting individuals who find no suitable occupation in the official labour market. With legitimate occupations being increasingly characterized by precarious conditions and poor wages, organized crime may well appear as a more appealing labour recruiter. Social prevention, in this respect, should make legitimate work competitive, in ethical and material terms, with work available in illicit economies.

As mentioned above, our respondents showed little interest in social prevention based around labour market reform and improved welfare provision. However, some did appreciate strategies aimed at the integration of young people and their empowerment, accompanied by sustained involvement of civil society. Among the experts interviewed, however, ‘soft’ forms of preventative action were advocated, although an overestimation of the effects of social measures was also remarked.

Moving on to what we have termed technical measures, it may be useful to start with a concise list of such measures or policies introduced in the US and later exported into Europe. Since the early 1970s the FBI and the US Department of Justice have been launching repeated offensives against organized crime. Limited resources, however, have made their action selective, as certain historical criminal groups have been prioritized while emergent ones have been partly neglected (Jacobs and Wyman, 2015). With law enforcement resources increasingly shifting towards terrorism, institutional action against organized crime is now confined to routine intervention based on electronic surveillance, informants and undercover policing. Witness Protection Programmes have been in place for decades, when the code of omertà began to break down and turncoats were rewarded with lenient sentences. Prosecutions for tax offenses and asset confiscation have also been widely used. From the procedural point of view, although the US does not criminalize mere membership of organized criminal groups, ‘aggressive use of conspiracy and racketeering laws come close to achieving the same result’ (ibid: 536). All of these technical and judicial measures are an emanation of those stipulated by the 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Critics, however, would doubt the efficacy of these measures, arguing that US governments have frequently created environments
favourable to the growth of organized crime (for example, during the prohibition era), or have established collaborative links with narco-trafficking cartels as an anti-Communist strategy (for example, in South America) (Woodiwiss, 2000).

In more general terms, the most common strategies employed by governments have aimed at

> ‘dismantling criminal organizations by dismantling their leadership structures in order to fragment them into minor and more manageable groups’ (Ferreira, 2016: 43).

These have commonly included a mixture of undercover operations, raids, privacy-piercing approaches, freezing and seizing of assets, such as the UK’s Proceeds of Crime Act (Legislation.gov.uk, 2002) and, increasingly, collaboration with intelligence services and international policing agencies. However, these measures have been largely ineffective in developed countries, while in developing countries they have tended to

> ‘intensify pre-existing conflicts, turf wars, and generate smaller, less predictable and more violent groups fighting fiercely for smaller turfs’ (Ferreira, 2016: 43).

In this respect, some of the literature suggests that

> ‘efforts to eradicate organized crime should focus on the alteration of institutional incentive structures and the stimulation of competing rights-enforcement agents rather than on traditional crime-control activities’ (Milhaupt and West, 2000: 41).

Hence the broad structural suggestions emanating from the European Parliament:

- increasing public funding for social schemes in underdeveloped regions, as well as for the development of state sanctioned rights enforcement institutions and training of information agents to enhance legal private ordering i.e., ‘the sharing of regulatory authority with private actors’ (Schwarz, 2002:319).
- implementing economic growth strategies with a view to social integration;
- enforcing and strengthening regulations governing the activities of national and international financial institutions;
- prosecuting money-laundering enablers (financial institutions and executives) according to criminal statutes instead of civil statutes;

The views of our respondents were only partly in line with these European directives. While the importance of international coordination was indeed singled out, the creation of national special units for the fight of organized crime seemed to be prioritized. Attention was therefore devoted less to the roots of the social problem being tackled than to the ability and expertise of institutional agents to tackle it. And while the European Parliament advocates the allocation of funds to problematic regions, our respondents called for more material resources and training for law enforcers and investigators. Interviews with experts, at least in some limited cases, revealed a preference for patrimonial measures, which might undermine the economic power of organizations. They also pointed to the unwillingness of some governments to sever the links between organized crime and the official world.

It is very difficult to evaluate the success of anti-organized crime measures, particularly when such measures mainly target criminal groups as closed enclaves of socially and culturally homogenous
individuals. Following the distinction proposed above, the focus of the technical measures summarily listed seems to address organized crime as ‘association’. But assuming, as we have seen, that such associations do not cease their operations when some of their members are incarcerated or die, assessing how these measures affect the ‘transactions’ criminal groups establish with the official world is even more difficult. This notwithstanding, the impact of US organized crime policies on foreign jurisdictions is undeniable, if highly controversial.

Many European countries have introduced institutional reforms, created new police units, made recourse to informers, treated turncoats leniently, made membership of criminal association an offense and enacted asset confiscation (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2005; Beare and Woodiwiss, 2015). For our purposes, a detailed presentation of the measures introduced in individual European countries is unnecessary, therefore the following is limited to providing an overview of the institutional and technical policies in the EU as a region.

The Maastricht Treaty (1992) includes articles concerning police cooperation, and although none of them refer to organized crime as such, they do deal with drugs trafficking and other serious forms of international crime (Fijnaut, 2015). The concern of the EU about organized crime has grown incessantly alongside the process of integration. First regarded as an issue to be tackled under the Third Pillar (the intergovernmental pillar), the fight against organized crime gave rise to police and judicial cooperation and new systems and procedures to improve the sharing of information. In 1990 member states stipulated the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, which was turned by the Council into a directive in 1991. Under the directive, states were forced to implement legislation against money laundering,

‘but also to ensure that their financial institutions would register and report unusual and suspect transactions to the competent authorities’ (ibid: 574).

Cooperation among member states stepped up in the aftermath of the assassination of Palermo investigative judges Falcone and Borsellino in 1992, and resulted in the establishment of Europol in 1995. European concerns around organized crime were also intensified by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the threat of new forms of criminal activity emanating from its former satellite states in Eastern Europe (Dunn, 1996).

An Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime was produced in 1997 under the banner of the Treaty of Amsterdam, instructing member states to integrate prevention, investigation and prosecution and harmonize their legislations. In a cumulative process, policies and strategies were devised under the successive presidencies of the European Council, and in 1999 Erojust was created, namely a multinational European team of national prosecutors and police officers. A European Police College was founded while a Financial Intelligence Unit tasked with information sharing about money laundering was set up (Fijnaut, 2015).

Our respondents may be right in calling for the creation of special police/law enforcement units, because at the European level response strategies seem to confine themselves mainly to the enunciation of general principles and goals.

For example, in a document issued by the Justice and Home Affairs Council, the priorities for the period 2011-13 were identified as follows:

- weaken the capacity of organized crime groups active or based in West Africa to traffic cocaine and heroin to and within the EU;
- mitigate the role of the western Balkans as a logistical centre for organized crime groups;
- reduce the production and distribution in the EU of synthetic drugs;
- combat all trafficking in human beings and human smuggling by targeting the organized groups conducting such criminal activities;
- reduce the general capabilities of mobile (itinerant) organized groups to engage in criminal activities;
- step up the fight against cybercrime and the criminal misuse of the Internet (Fijnaut, 2015: 586).

Neither our respondents nor representatives of institutional agencies engaged in the fight against organized crime appear to promote the severing of the links between this type of crime and the official world as a strategy to temper its impact. Only some experts interviewed did mention such an option, lamenting however the relative unwillingness, in some contexts, on the part of institutional agencies to do so.

4.3. Terrorism activities

The majority of our respondents stressed that propaganda and recruitment require more effective prevention. In the focus groups, however, it was argued that common definitions of violent extremism, radicalization and terrorism are needed, and that the emotional public reaction to such phenomena hampers their understanding. The analysis of our data shows a generalized concern among our respondents about terrorism financing and cyber terrorism. Some interviewees lamented that expertise in this area is underused by official agencies. It is interesting to compare this concern with research findings on this specific issue and other aspects of terrorism.

Working closely with Islamic fundamentalists, Sageman (2017) gained an intimate understanding of the development and shape of their networks. Focusing on the global Salafi jihad, he refutes the explanation that factors such as poverty, trauma, madness or ignorance drive people to terrorism. He highlights, instead, the crucial role of social networks in the transformation of socially isolated individuals into warriors. Biographical data on some two hundred participants in jihad reveal that, for the vast majority, social bonds predated ideological commitment, and that these bonds inspired alienated young Muslim to join the jihad. Affiliation is shown to be a bottom-up process, with young people volunteering to join the organization, and friendship and kinship bonds emerge as key factors in shaping the networks. Sageman dismantles the view that terrorist networks resemble mafia families and that the tactics used against organized crime will somehow work against terror. A point that is reinforced by the organizational structure of the worldwide Caliphate, proclaimed in 2014 by ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Warrick, 2015).

Looking at the formation of terrorist networks, the point has been made that the invasion of a country may be followed by organized violent resistance, and that invasions may destabilize regimes and trigger sectarian attacks. The example of Libya, after the successful foreign intervention to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, is germane here. The country rapidly descended into factional chaos, riven by competing militias and led by two rival governments (Ismael and Ismael, 2013). The disintegration of Gaddafi’s coast-guard and navy, moreover, gave unprecedented impetus to people smuggling across the Mediterranean.

On another front, it is estimated that over thirty per cent of the founders of ISIS were former members of the Ba’athist secret services of Iraq, who enact a form of revenge, responding to the invasion of their country with indiscriminate attacks (Gerges, 2015; Lynch, 2015). This imitative dynamic echoes aspects of symbolic interactionism. In a similar vein, scholars have focused on
criminalization, labeling processes and phobias which enhance rather than decelerate the radicalization of those who find themselves on the receiving end (Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Ahmed, 2015; Abbas and Awan, 2015; Khan, 2016; Ruggiero, 2017a).

Research conducted on this aspect reveals that soft targets are ‘dominant and increasing, while particularly well-protected targets are almost totally avoided’ (Hemmingby, 2017: 25). In other words, the general public is more exposed than high-ranking individuals or highly symbolic buildings or premises such as parliaments, governmental institutions or business headquarters. This is particularly the case when the choice of targets is not decided by the core leadership of the terrorist group but left to the direct perpetrators, who have local knowledge and run limited risk of detection during the preparatory stage.

Propaganda and recruitment, which were the main concern of our respondents, are closely linked with the motivations leading individuals to join terrorist networks. The following section focuses on such motivations.

4.4. Terrorism drivers

In the West, terrorism has been examined as a corollary of social exclusion: extremists are said to come from the poorest and rundown parts of cities, where youth are raised in large housing estates and where trouble flares up periodically. Accounts illustrate the fractured lives of young second-generation migrants, their alienation, exclusion, family size, poverty and disrupted upbringings. Some traverse the pathways from home to care and from crime to prison, struggle within the education system, and display all the ‘predictors of criminal behaviour’ (Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 337).

Radicalization of young people may be generated by individual psychological factors, but also by collective animosity against injustice and power. From the area of psychology, for instance, research studies have focused on the processes leading to terrorism, conceptualizing the terrorist act as the final step on a narrowing staircase (Moghaddam, 2005). These processes are said to involve individuals who believe they have no voice in society, and in cases of suicidal terrorism to be encouraged by a ‘significance quest’ accompanied by various ideological reasons (Victoroff and Kruglanski et al, 2009). One of the causes identified in the literature is the feeling of ‘weakness, irrelevance, marginalization and subordination experienced by Muslim people’, combined with the memory of the glorious past of a great transnational civilization (Toscano, 2016: 123). The ‘reactionary utopia’ of the Caliphate is explained in these terms, namely as the result of frustration determined by the gap between expectations and achievement. The frustration thesis seems to
apply to both prevailing models of terrorism: ‘the fanatic who is outside any appeal to rationality, and the calculating actor who lacks any capacity for human empathy’ (McDonald, 2013: 11).

Authors advocating the ‘new terrorism’ model emphasize its pathological aspects, arguing that participants suffer from personality disorder and mental unbalance. On the other hand, terror has also been associated with the search for redemption, with protagonists neither ‘fanatic’ nor ‘calculating’, but just enacting redemptive violence that transforms and ‘saves’ at the same time (Weisbrod, 2002).

Our respondents excluded from their explanatory effort the role of mental disorder or any other pathological element, basing their causation on purely ideological factors (being raised in a culture that promotes extreme ideological views). The variable exclusion was mentioned, thus pinpointing structural social conditions characterized by lack of stability and parental guidance.

However, purely structural approaches to the issue may be insufficient to explain the process: ‘It is erroneous to presume that material deprivation works in a simple and/or straightforward manner in relation to the propensity to commit violence’ (Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 338). True, radicalization takes place when a considerable cultural and relational distance, along with severe forms of inequality and injustice, exist between the parties involved. But to claim that inequality and social injustice are the main causes of terrorism neglects the fact that there is no terrorism in the fifty countries listed by the United Nations as the poorest, least developed, most unjust and unequal. As Sen (2015: 165) has argued, ‘The simple thesis linking poverty with violence is empirically much too crude, both because the linkage of poverty and crime is far from universally observed, and because there are other social factors... Calcutta is not only one of the poorest cities in India – and indeed in the world – it so happens that it also has a very low crime rate’ (ibid: 165).

The young immigrants do not join terrorist networks out of existential vacuum or mere marginalization, but from resentment born of the humiliation suffered by people to which they feel close. It is argued that, while their parents chose where to live and partly maintained the culture of their country of origin, the young distanced themselves from that culture without acquiring a new one: ‘the danger that ruins life in the poor districts is not Islam or multiculturalism... it is deculturation’ (Todorov, 2014: 168). Becoming extremist, moreover, amounts to ‘pure and simple regression that offers a mixture of sacrificial and criminal heroism’ (Badiou, 2016: 56).

Scholars in the area of theology, however, have attempted to find in sacred texts the cause of contemporary terrorism. For example, charting the history of the Islamic State since its first incarnation in the seventh century, the following Hadith (a prophesy emanating from Muhammad) has been highlighted. Widely accepted among Sunni Islamists, the prophecy states that the history of the Umma (the Muslim international community) will go through five phases: first, the Prophet himself will rule; then Caliphs will rule according to the Prophet’s teachings; then force will be necessary for those teachings to spread; later, coercive rules will be established; finally, the time of the caliphate will return and usher in the end of the world (Kennedy, 2016; Small, 2016). The Caliph, it should be specified, is not only the representative of the Prophet but also of God: he is God on earth (Adonis, 2016). Radical Islam, according to this reading, constantly recycles the remains of the past because it is in the past that its future is believed to lie. This notion of ‘frozen time’, or yearning for a lost mythical utopia set in the seventh century Islamic theocracy, finds ideal reception in traditional mindsets, characterized by ‘following’ rather than ‘questioning’: believers, in other words, are asked to simply repeat and reproduce the truths of revelation. Radical critics contend that,
historically, Islam was founded on tribalism, anger for conquest and the power of money. It was imposed by force, therefore violence was its original major component.

‘In the foundational text, those who disbelieve in the communications of Allah shall have a severe chastisement... We shall make them enter fire; so oft as their skins are thoroughly burned’ (ibid: 39).

Prayers may solicit God to erase unbelievers from the earth, so that murder, inevitably, becomes sacred. A certain reading of the Revelation conveys the notion that the Prophet of the Muslims is the ultimate prophet, that he speaks definitive truths, and that humans have nothing more to say or to add. In turn, ‘God has nothing more to say or to add to what He has already formulated because He has said His last word to His last Prophet’ (ibid: 57).

Challenging causations derived from foundational texts, other scholars have underlined how the Quran is replete with suggestions around dialogue, peace and the development of harmonious interfaith relationships. There are many passages in the Quran, according to other authors, that destroy the idea, propagated by some, that non-Muslims are infidels and must be eliminated (Horkuc, 2009; Wills, 2016). Finally, the argument has been made that not Islam, but religion in general has always played a role in war and terrorist violence, even in advanced secular countries (Buc, 2015; Sacks, 2015; Hassner, 2016). International conflict in general is being ‘theologized’, as wars and military interventions, led by the Judeo-Christian West in the name of noble causes, are also, from a certain perspective, wars of religion (Derrida, 2002). A state of affairs exacerbated by US President George W. Bush’s use of the emotive word ‘Crusade’ in his speech to announce the war against terrorism shortly after the 9/11 attack in 2001 (Carroll, 2004).

In his unceremonious analysis, Badiou’s (2016: 42) sees in contemporary terrorism ‘fascist armed gangs with a religious tinge’, arguing that religion has always provided a rhetorical cover for violent gangs: Franco’s Falangist thugs were blessed by priests, and even the mafia ‘professes a punctilious Catholicism’ (ibid: 43). It could also be added that Blair’s warmongering was one of the outcomes of his relentless flirting with the Catholic Church. Religion, death and sacrifice have often developed into the cult of martyrdom, and contemporary suicide bombers are just the latest example of this development originating from political or religious beliefs (Barlow, 2016). On the other hand, joining terrorist networks, whether through religious belief or not, is the final stage of the construction of a nihilist subjectivity, prompted by the desire for revenge and destruction and coupled with subtle alienated imitation. Nihilist subjectivities, in Badiou’s view, incorporate a

‘desire for the West: the desire to possess, to share in what is represented, what is vaunted everywhere as the luxury of the West’ (Badiou, 2016: 48-49).

Revenge and destruction, however, are formalized through the mythology of tradition, as it is often the case in liberation struggles. The parallel may be illuminating. The history of anti-colonization gives several examples of how national struggles aim at liberating peoples from external oppressors as well as from the internal effects of that oppression. Traditional local elites in colonies were formed of individuals who mediated foreign rule, negotiated or accommodated demands, ‘making the best of a difficult and often humiliating relationship’ (Walzer, 2015: 2).

These elites offering liberation were likely to be regarded with suspicion, and forced to accept nationalist claims.

‘Even Gandhi was deeply opposed to many aspects of Hindu culture, especially the fate of the untouchables. He was assassinated by someone committed to a more literal, or more traditional, or perhaps more radically nationalist version of Hinduism’ (ibid: 4).
Liberation entails forms of traditionalism, and the achievement of independence may witness the growth of anti-modernization sentiments as a weapon against the oppressor. While Fanon (1965) was celebrating the birth of the ‘new Algerian’, fundamentalism was already beginning its political counterrevolution. Religion was used by leaders as a tool for their immediate purpose: creating political unity in the anticolonial struggle, but resentment brewed among groups of people who disliked ‘those secularizing and modernizing elites, with their foreign ideas, their patronizing attitudes, and their big projects’ (Walzer, 2015: 26). Real liberators, in sum, were expected to set past and future glory against present humiliation, and to display their ‘alterity’ from the enemy in the form of the martyrdom they were prepared to endure. The struggle, therefore, was not simply inspired by the desire of independence, but also by the necessity to destroy the ancient enemy, the invader, members of alien faiths, and the infidels. The type of violence ascribed to radicalized Islam, however, contains some additional, original elements.

The formation of nihilist networks today, while pursuing the destruction of ancient enemies, aims at constructing commercial power: ISIS sells petrol, gas supplies, artworks, cotton, arms, slaves, and women (Badiou, 2016; Adonis, 2016). That all organizations, including non-state entities, engage in commercial initiatives should not be surprising in a world that preaches unfettered freedom of enterprise and the accumulation of profits. When organizations resort to acts of terror, however, we may presume they feel that they have no space left for peaceful interaction. For example, the invasion of a country may be followed by resistance in the form of terrorist acts, while terrorist acts may determine responses of a terrorist (extra legem) nature by states. We have already highlighted this mimetic dynamic, which leads us to other considerations.

If the context in which political violence is performed is itself violent, an escalating process allows the parties involved to devise increasingly violent practices. Such practices take on the nature of terrorism when violence becomes random and organizations using it adopt a concept of collective liability applied to the groups against which they fight. Targets are not precise actors whose conduct is deemed wrongful, but general populations defined by nationality, ethnicity, religious or political creed. Terrorism as ‘pure’ violence contains elements of what is known as hate crime, that is a perception that the victims are representatives of specific communities, and that they are not attacked in their capacity as individuals, but as individuals belonging to a real or imagined alien group. Both terrorism and counter-terrorism may choose ‘pure’ forms of violence, in an imitative process that rapidly becomes war-like (Witte, 1996; Black, 2004; Ruggiero, 2006).

Terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism are linked in this causal chain that exhibits feud-like elements of vengeance, each side answering random violence with random violence. This causal chain is also detectable in the very structure that organizations are assuming. In other words, responding to random violence with random violence not only causes the proliferation and higher intensity of attacks, but also shapes the organizational structure through which these are carried out.

Non-state violent organizations must, by definition, adopt clandestine structures, although the model with which they present themselves may vary according to contexts and in response to institutional action (Beck, 2015). In situations where popular support is widespread, terrorist groups may set up dual structures composed of an official, legitimate layer of activists and a hidden nucleus of combatants waging armed attacks. This dual structure seems to survive as far as terrorist organizations maintain strong links with social movements and perceive themselves as representatives of aggrieved groups (Combs, 2013; Martin, 2010). Lack of support from such groups who express their contentious politics through visible social movement activity often determines the
collapse of terrorist groups (Ruggiero, 2010). On the other hand, repression of social movements weakens the tempering function such movements may exercise, leading to spiraling and senseless violence. For example, the major upturn in IRA membership and terrorist activities in Northern Ireland followed the introduction of internment in 1971 (Spjut, 1986).

Radicalized Islamic groups have evolved over the last two decades following international events and the intensification of institutional responses. In the 1990s, for instance, hard-core militants prevailed in organizations which displayed a high degree of professionalism and role differentiation. The distance between leaders and adherents was kept to a minimum, and all participants were tasked with specific operations that they were well able to carry out due to expertise and appropriate skills. Recruitment was selective and based, among other things, on proven ideological loyalty, military expertise, possession of resources, range of reliable followers, status and available key contacts. The prevailing model was, therefore, one that echoed the old international political organizations, with a central committee dictating the ‘line’, establishing the goals, identifying possible allies and drawing a short-term as well as a long-term strategy. This, of course, was the attainment of power, pursued through the building of strong links among participants, supporting social groups and their allies.

This structure, which hosted members operating according to the principles of ‘authoritarian centralism’, was slowly supplemented by the creation of cellular units more or less coordinated among themselves and with increasingly weaker links with the central structure. Prevailing anti-terrorism strategies contributed to this evolution, as the ‘enemy’ was isolated and kept at increasing distance from civil society and its contentious expressions. The increase in social and relational distance from collective feelings and aggrieved groups forced organizations into the interstices of discontent, in an attempt to gather the ‘detritus’ left behind by social, cultural and political polarization. Violence is less destructive where the adversaries are closer in social space, a principle of which democracies may be aware but prefer to exploit with the aim of turning more or less defensible causes into delirious destruction. Drastic ruptures were created, and enemies were forced to redefine themselves and radically reshape their strategy. This process is similar to that accompanying the criminalization of social movements, that leads in equal measure to some participants abandoning the fight and some choosing clandestine action. A scale shift was produced, whereby ascending violence was met with harsher exemplary punishments and spectacular retaliation. In response, violent groups launched yet higher levels of threats and deployed more spectacular violence (Tilly, 2004).

Attacks by scattered cells started to follow a ‘logic’ rather than an established ‘programme’, with copycat action being conducted in contexts which were diverse and isolated from one another. Communication among terrorist cells, in brief, began to revolve around the symbolic nature of the destructive act, a form of signature indicating a common identity. Such terrorist cells, which are still operating now, are devoid of an international reach, but become international thanks to the images they furnish, the imagination they stimulate and the repetitions they encourage. ‘Violence increasingly seeks excess and rupture rather than organization and programme’ (McDonald, 2013: 168).

Such a view is substantiated by the wave of ‘low tech’ attacks carried out in recent years across Europe. In London alone, two men ran down Trooper Lee Rigby near Woolwich Arsenal Barracks, then stabbed him to death. An attack in March 2017 led to four people killed after being run down by a van, then the perpetrator stabbing a police officer to death at the gates of the Palace of Westminster. In the following month, eight people were killed and 48 seriously injured, when three
male terrorists ran down pedestrians on London Bridge, then ran into Borough Market with knives, before being shot dead by police. In Nice, 87 were killed by a terrorist truck driver who mowed down pedestrians out celebrating Bastille Day 2016, and a similar attack occurred at the Berlin Christmas Market in December 2016, killing 12 and injuring 56 (Harris, 2017).

However, there is here more than ‘excess and rupture’: when the choice of targets can no longer be justified by the specific social goal pursued, it is given a transcendental justification that can be termed historical. Some political conflicts emphasize history, while others emphasize humanity. The emphasis on history destroys all limits to human action, because history itself will be the supreme judge of the morality of that action (Camus, 1965). It should be noted that democracies at times mobilize the same sort of historical justification, as they too claim that the future will vindicate the legitimacy of their limitless and randomized anti-terrorism violence (Ruggiero, 2006).

In the current phase, the development of ‘networks of cells’ seems to constitute the prevailing trend. The core structure, of course, remains and is now located in specific territories acquired by a military force, while peripheral entities are scattered and offer their support in a variety of fashions. ISIS is said to adopt Mao’s revolutionary warfare strategy, based on the formation of an irregular army. But while for Mao this army relied mainly on peasants, for ISIS it avails itself of the expertise of jihadists from previous conflicts mixed with professional soldiers and intelligence personnel (Whiteside, 2016). ISIS has conducted dozens of prison breaks, freeing thousands of veterans, while some 20,000 inmates were released between 2008-2010 in rudderless countries afflicted by civil war, like Iraq. Again, with supreme irony, the future self-declared Caliph of the worldwide Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was released from detainment in Iraq by ISIS forces (Warrick, 2015). Prisoners, in brief, constitute perhaps a major pool of potential recruits, an army born of chaos held by those in command through a vertical apparatus and functional bureaus. This organizational form is copied largely from al Qaeda, is financially self-sufficient, media savvy, and kept together by a strong leadership.

At the same time, small groups of individuals may just plan and execute attacks which seem to be consistent with the strategy of the core organization, with or without the prior assent or a post-facto endorsement by that organization. Recruitment may spread and attract also young women who are prepared to become spouses of combatants in the regions where the organization rules. New combatants, moreover, may be recruited from the large repository of aggrieved Muslims resident in most western countries, as we have seen. In brief, it no longer seems that terrorism can be imputed to a single, however loosely, organized group. Along with hierarchical organizations, there are bands of followers who act outside formal structures and

‘are motivated by feelings and beliefs widely shared among millions of Muslims worldwide…. The independence of the attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Mumbai (2008) from Al Qaeda control or direction is a vivid demonstration’ (Blum and Heymann, 2010: 162).

At times, anti-radicalization strategies and the radicalized others activate their respective hidden networks and tools, the former choosing illegal forms of annihilation of the enemy, the latter mobilizing the fragmented groups and identities forced to a clandestine existence. Repression may push dissent underground, but may fail to destroy the informal networks and the social relationships through which identities are structured. Extreme repression, moreover, reduces the variety of points of reference for aggrieved groups, selecting the most extreme among them. This is when state agents can blend elements of warfare with those of criminal justice, thus responding to the radicalization they have created. Although at times radical violence may appear to be an unpredictable outburst or
unexplainable explosion, it possesses a ‘geometrical precision’. It occurs when the social geometry of a conflict is violent.

‘Every form of violence has its own structure, whether a beating structure, dueling structure, lynching structure, feuding structure, genocide structure – or terrorist structure. Structures kill and maim, not individuals or collectivities’ (Black, 2004: 15).

In sum, our respondents overstressed social and structural factors as causes of terrorism, although they also highlighted the ‘search for stability’ that encourages young people to join terrorist networks. In the extant literature, however, such search is not fostered by a ‘culture that promotes extreme ideological views’, but rather by a process of ‘deculturation’ leading to nihilism. This process, explored in many research projects, appears to be the outcome of interactions between state agents and non-state agents, who condition each other’s initiatives and perpetuate mutual, blind violence. It is from these interactions (neglected by our respondents) that the evolution of terrorist networks, their structure and modus operandi appear to derive.

4.5. Measures to decrease terrorism

The majority of respondents thought that cross-border cooperation between police and intelligence agencies to facilitate monitoring, arrest and disruption would have the strongest effect, and that military action abroad to target terrorist leaders and infrastructure has no effect. Opinions collected in focus groups addressed the issue of legal documentation for young migrants who otherwise ‘get lost in the system’. New comers, it was stressed, should receive appropriate support and guidance. Social workers, it was noted, needed to be properly trained in order to ‘connect’ with young people at risk. Often, their lack of religiosity was regarded as an obstacle preventing such connection. Other actors to be involved in the preventative process, it was remarked, include community leaders, religious leaders, victims and families. One problem raised during the course of interviews with experts was that preventative and other measures are commonly the result of mere public pressure. Preventative work should also take place in prison institutions, it was remarked. Interviews stressed, at the same time, that policy-making processes should be evidence-based and that a wider involvement of Muslim communities is necessary. Let us interrogate academic research on these points.

It seems that only after the events of 9/11 did criminology resume any specific interest in political violence, at least in its variant commonly termed terrorism (random violence against civilians) (Freilich and LaFree, 2015). For example, there are scholars who advocate the application of criminological theories of ‘common’ violence to the analysis of political violence, arguing that both types of violence are directed to the achievement of goals. Both aim at extracting something from someone; moreover, at least by perpetrators, both are presented as the outcome of provocation by the victims (Ruggiero, 2006).

In terms of policies, the suggestion has been made that the principles of situational crime prevention should also be applied to terrorism. According to this view, after identifying and removing the opportunities that violent groups exploit to mount their attacks, situational measures implemented through partnerships among a wide range of public and private agencies will assist with this task. An array of preventive social measures has been implemented, to which we now turn in the following selective overview.

A form of Cyber propaganda is being used in Canada that addresses civil society and delivers messages and narratives opposed to those circulated by violent organizations. ‘Cyber vigilantes’ are
in operation exposing suspicious accounts of jihadi sympathizers and encouraging other users to report material that violates the law. Mock sympathizers are used to attract individuals seeking contacts with insurgents. Such social measures are meant to create obstacles to the process of radicalization which revolves around the rejection of western culture, blind submission to religious authority, claims of absolute truth and obsessive perceived injustice (Victoroff and Kruglanski, 2009). Counter-narratives that challenge this motivational process are the main product of such initiatives.

Prevention is also pursued through targeting families, both those affected by the radicalization of one or more of their members and those who feel the need to protect their offspring from the radicalization process. In the UK, FAST (Families Against Stress & Trauma) is one such initiative, engaged in making people aware of the risks of the Internet and exposure of young people to violent messages. Although more controversial, the ‘Prevent’ programme, launched in the UK in 2003 as one of the four elements of CONTEST, the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, is inspired by similar aims, mobilizing in particular teachers and lecturers in the detection of embryonic signs of radicalization.

‘Agenfor Media’ is also engaged in preventing radical escalation, and produces videos and printed documents. These explain how to deal with vulnerable groups and individuals of Muslim faith from an Islamic perspective. The area of radicalization in prison is covered, while an informative social media channel is provided dealing with wars and insurgents in several regions. In its mission statement:

‘Agenfor Media is a not for profit network aiming to work in the overlapping contexts of development, humanitarian crises and human rights. Our goal is to ensure security through a better protection of human rights and socio-political participation with a particular focus on minorities, prisoners and other vulnerable groups. We are active in the field of counter-radicalization with training courses and research activities addressing the needs of first-line practitioners from the public and private sectors all around Europe’ (http://www.agenformedia.com/dossier/preventing-radical-escalations).

Community-led (or social media) initiatives also take the form of testimonies and life stories of individuals affected by radicalization aiming to reduce the appeal of terrorist organizations.

The ‘Viennese Network Deradicalization and Prevention’ is active in the Austrian capital and operates in the field of education. The network elaborates and assesses policies and strategies, addresses social inequality and vulnerable groups, focusing, among other things, on gender and sexism (information gathered through focus groups).

In Spain, ‘Women without Borders’ address mothers in the attempt to raise their awareness of extremist ideologies, aiming at the creation of a future without fear and violence (information gathered through focus groups).

A UK programme named ‘Channel’ also aims at preventing at-risk young people from becoming radicalized, although critics argue that the government is doing little to promote learning and there is little transparency about how effective the programme is. Interventions in schools are variously delivered by psychologists, youth workers or former young radicals, with no evaluation to determine what might work best in different circumstances.

Finally, some research proves that certain forms of community policing can promote Muslims’ willingness to cooperate with investigators in terrorist prevention. While intrusive counterterrorism policies and practices alienate the communities being addressed, perceptions of police legitimacy
and fair policing appear to have a strong bearing on Muslims’ behaviour. Cooperation with the police, in such cases, takes place despite ‘the salience of identity within the current political discourse about terrorism and Islam’ (Madon, Murphy and Cherney, 2017: 1144).

Our respondents proposed measures that share some components with these initiatives. For instance, when advocating the legal documentation and identification of young migrants (lest they ‘get lost in the system’), support is given to control systems based on community forms of policing. These would encourage the willingness of ordinary people and groups to cooperate in the preventive process, favouring at the same time the provision of support and guidance to youth. Included in similar social initiatives, were actors such as social workers, community leaders, religious leaders, victims and families, namely all figures, professional or not, involved in the projects described above.

Technical preventative measures adopted within the EU include exchange of DNA data, which is also carried out in the fight against cross-border crime in the EU (Santos and Machado, 2016), along with the introduction of new counter-terrorism legislation in most member states. Glorification and incitement are now widely criminalized.

Some of these initiatives have raised considerable controversy. For instance, some terrorism prevention schemes have been located within the ‘pre-crime’ strategies adopted in many western countries. These strategies are said to centre state action on sheer suspicion, whereby individuals and groups are targeted without a specific charge being formulated. Anticipating risk, in this sense, tends to integrate national security into criminal justice, to the detriment of civil and political rights (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009). Anti-terrorism, from this perspective, becomes a threat to democracy (Wolfendale, 2007; Zedner, 2000). For example, in the UK the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016 has been dubbed ‘the snoopers charter’ as it gives Government Communication Headquarters the right to examine the metadata of mobile phone and internet use by citizens (Travis, 2016).

Other forms of prevention fall into the arena of finance and address the legitimate or illegitimate acts through which terrorist organizations support their propaganda, attacks and the reproduction of their own networks (Hamm, 2007).

Waging war and assassinations are, finally, a recurrent form of counter-terrorism. The American military experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria is recounted in many books and articles, but only rarely is it ‘glorified’ (Williams, 2016). Similarly, most available literature oscillates between suggestions to deal with terrorism through the rule of law and deprecation for unnecessary military intervention. For example, the UK parliament voted against Prime Minister David Cameron’s wish to intervene in the civil war in Syria in August 2013 (The Economist, 2013). Let us see some more examples.

EU citizens overwhelming believe that institutional action against terrorism and radicalization is insufficient (European Parliament, 2016). On the other hand, politicians are said to feed on people’s anxieties and offer palliative medication that reinforces paranoia and promotes xenophobia. ISIS, it is remarked, benefits from the same reservoir of anxiety and fear. States reacting with pure military force are said to imitate the illusions and delusions of those groups or individuals they are trying to combat (English, 2016). Pre-emptive intelligence is advocated, as a light touch alternative to the ‘bludgeon’ of state power. There are in the literature also accounts that underplay the threat of terrorism to an extent that the whole phenomenon is described as a ‘moral panic’, a craze similar to the worst historical examples of witch hunting (Mueller and Stewart, 2016; Ramadan and Shantz, 2016)). But many contributions highlight the dangers of what is termed a ‘forever war’.

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A book published by Mark Danner (2016), a US top military officer, has warned that ‘a perpetual war through drones or special forces or troop deployments will prove self-defeating and alter our country in troubling ways’ (Ignatieff, 2016: 86). In Danner’s view, the self-proclaimed ‘exceptional nation’ now finds itself trapped in a permanent state of exception, a spiral of self-defeating policies that are carrying the US away from its initial purpose: the reduction of terrorism.

Danner’s argument is echoed by authors who, before him, attempted to prove empirically the failure of counter-terrorism policies, which are described as mere ‘fruitful spectacles’ (de Lint and Kassa, 2015). In the UK a study has examined the emotional impact of counter-terrorist strategies on Muslim communities, while several authors have focused on how such strategies increase fear and encourage suspicion and racism (Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Ahmed, 2015; Abbas and Awan, 2015). Finally, counter-terrorist wars have also been judged as serious obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid (Gill, 2016). It should be added that, when there is a disconnect between the depiction of terrorist threat as presented by official agencies and the perception of large sectors of the public, responses to terror attacks fail to gain the support they would need (Smith et al, 2016). The disconnect is likely to widen, at least in the UK, after the publication of the Chilcot Report, showing the disastrous outcome of the institutional deceit leading to the invasion of Iraq (Chilcot, 2016; Wheatcroft, 2016).

Analyses of the unintended consequences of policy interventions and strategic tactics suggest that ‘sometimes these interventions have created backlash effects that led to greater numbers of crimes’ (Chermak, Freilich and Caspi, 2010: 139). As an alternative, participation of extremists (or those they purportedly represent) in policymaking is advocated:

‘States that allow participation of individuals and groups in formal politics will reduce grievances or strain and thus willingness to use terrorism as a useful tactic’ (Dugan and Young, 2010: 164).

‘Say the word “war” and the rule of law often implodes, with courts frequently employing sophistry to avoid any interference with governmental conduct’ (Rakoff, 2016: 80). This is the view, among others, of distinguished law experts, who find themselves in disagreement when the judiciary avoids to scrutinize anything ‘embarrassing’ from far-reaching surveillance to torture or the use of drones (Todorov, 2009; Fiss, 2016). Equal controversy surrounds the use of ‘disposition matrix’ or ‘kill lists’ that spell out who has to be hit by a long-distance unmanned missile (Hayden, 2016). And drones, indeed, are the ultimate area of controversy surrounding institutional responses to terrorism. Regarded by some as an attempt to shift towards a cheaper method of targeted assassinations, drones are depicted by others as the ultimate examples of summary executions to which any democracy should never resort (Cockburn, 2015; Cortwright et al, 2015; Scahill, 2016; Bergen and Rothenberg, 2016).

The majority of our respondents concurred that military action abroad has no effect, although details regarding the backlash of such action were not captured in the research process. Similarly, cross-border cooperation between police and intelligence agencies was advocated, but the danger of adopting a pre-crime strategy and targeting individuals and groups on mere suspicion was not reckoned with. In other words, no potential unintended consequences of increased ‘monitoring, arrest and disruption’ were anticipated.
4.6. Hybrids

Most respondents took the existence of hybrids, namely groups simultaneously engaged in organized criminality and terrorist activity, for granted. Only some experts interviewed remarked the ambiguity of such groups and of the very term describing them. The most concerning activity carried out by such groups was said to be human trafficking/smuggling, indicated by respondents as requiring more effective prevention or response policies. Also high was the concern around terrorist financing and cyber terrorism. The following is a summary of research findings around hybrids.

An enduring distinction connotes the criminological field. Organized crime appears to be motivated by the accumulation of wealth:

‘Though the evasion or neutering of state control and the corruption of officials may assist in the criminal enterprise, the generation of profit and the control of illicit markets is the primary focus of organized crime rather than any grasping of power for political ends’ (Campbell, 2014: 230).

Terrorism, on the other hand, remains characterized as violence motivated by political, ideological, or philosophical considerations, aimed at civilians to ‘generate fear and cause damage, and to coerce a government to act in a particular manner’ (ibid).

In other contributions the point is put forward that conventional crime is characterized by tensions and dynamics that also underpin many forms of terrorism. Issues of shame, esteem, loss, and repressed anger, alongside the pursuit of pride and self or collective respect, which provide important tools to criminological analysis, may also help establish a taxonomy of terrorism.

We have mentioned how organizations develop the features of networks: this process may be followed by conventional criminal groups as well as by terrorist groups. The difference, however, is that organized crime networks imply the alliance between highly heterogeneous groups and individuals, each with a distinctive cultural and ethnic background, who may establish common goals on an occasional or long-term basis. Actors operating in conventional criminal networks are socially ‘fuzzy’, in the sense that their exploits and careers overlap with those of others who are apparently radically different from them. Such networks shape grey areas where licit, semi-licit and overtly illicit economies overlap (Ruggiero, 2017a).

Terrorist networks, by contrast, require a substantial degree of homogeneity among participants, who may ‘offer’ what they can, from donations to logistical support. Of course, participants may also offer ‘action’ and their own life, when they engage in missions inspired by the terrorist group with which they ideologically identify. However, while conventional criminal networks imply a form of collective behaviour, terrorist networks show signs of collective identity. The latter, inevitably, brings to the fore a concept of social movement, of contentious politics, an idea of social change inscribed in a specific teleology or imagined finalism.

While our respondents found the existence of hybrids unquestionable, the following overview would indicate that the overlap between terrorism and organised crime is, at the very least, controversial and, at times, merely prompted by the strong disapproval or revulsion they both elicit. Similarities and differences between the two forms of criminality are highlighted, as is the ambiguity of the very notion of ‘crime-terror nexus’.

A notion of hybrid, combining conventional with political criminality, emerges in some etiologies focused on excluded and marginalized groups. For example, the processes leading to involvement in
organized crime groups or/and in terrorist networks, from some analytical perspectives, appear to be very similar. Such processes are said to stem from severe forms of inequality or from the resentment and humiliation suffered by the young components of minority groups. As we have seen, exclusion may cause destruction and encourage revenge, which is formalized through the mythology of tradition or the cult of the swaggering outlaw.

Overarching etiologies based on relative deprivation, already critiqued above, neglect the substantial differences between terrorism and organized crime. Organized crime groups may use violence as a supplementary tool for negotiating their presence on markets, or with the system. Violent political groups, on the contrary, use violence as a signal of their unwillingness to negotiate with a system they would rather demolish. Their action transcends the immediate result they achieve, and prefigures, realistically or not, a different set of achievements which will be valued in a future, rather than in the current society.

Another overarching theory revolves around the techniques of neutralization identified in criminological research, and may well describe the ideological process whereby organized crime groups as well as violent political groups come to terms with the effects of their acts. The ‘denial of the victim’ is operated through the perception of the victims as wrongdoers, the ‘condemnation of the condemners’ through their association with immorality, and finally the ‘appeal to higher loyalties’ through the appropriation of the ideals and practices of one’s subculture, one’s political or religious creed. Techniques of neutralization, however, seem to belong to an ex post repertoire of motivations mobilized by offenders in order to fill the moral void they presumably experience. They are, in sum, a defensive device that may temper moral disorientation. In this sense, terrorism and conventional or organized crime display very similar characteristics, although such similarity may be insufficient to give rise to hybrids of the two (Ruggiero, 2017b; 2018).

Violent political groups, however, may pursue material gain as a means to reproduce and enhance their military apparatus and to acquire growing symbolic status, namely a capacity to step up their propaganda and hence their visibility. Along with offences aimed at the material reproduction of their organization, contemporary terrorists, who appear to ignore the ethical boundaries often respected by their counterparts of the 1970s and 1980s, are said to engage in crimes that their predecessors would find revolting: espionage, drug smuggling, gun running, money laundering, cell phone and credit card theft, immigration violations, extortion and prostitution (Hamm, 2007). Moreover, some contemporary perpetrators of terrorist acts are drawn from the offender population, although they do not consider themselves common criminals. Instead, they often see themselves as freedom fighters whose unlawful acts are motivated by a just cause and not by personal gain (Hoffman, 2006).

With the purpose of reproducing themselves, terrorist groups may acquire expertise in conventional criminality and through this pursue a form of ‘empire-building’ that transcends their original political goal. Violent political groups who cease their operations, moreover, may find at their disposal not only unlawful expertise and skills, but also arms and infrastructures, and after the dismissal of their organization may use what they possess to start a career in criminal markets. Looking at ‘terrorism as crime’ from a particular angle, organized forms of criminality have been described as ‘lifeblood of terrorist groups’, and include all forms of acquisitive offences that mafia-type organizations would perpetrate (Hamm, 2007).

The growing dimension of transnational crime activities is regarded as a contributing factor to the blurring of the two phenomena, expressed through the development of alliances, the sharing of
methods, and ultimately the merging of groups (Makarenko, 2004). Some authors see the evidence in the European Union of linkages between crime and terror as immense, ‘although the scholarly literature has shied away from these associations’ (Makarenko and Mesquita, 2014: 259). Specific elements characterizing the crime-terror nexus are detected when criminals and terrorists engage in similar activity, or ‘relate symbiotically, as when they exchange drugs for weapons’ (Grabosky and Stohl, 2010). The two appear to have developed networked organizational forms and technological skills that enhance their capacity and resilience. The interface between organized crime and terrorist groups, as suggested by Grabosky and Stohl, reflects the need of the latter to support themselves and their operations, but also the politicization of ordinary criminals who eventually join terrorist groups. The reverse process is also possible, with individuals turning from fighters into criminals after the continuing exchange between the two parties of information, knowledge and assets for mutual benefit. Involvement in cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting by terrorist groups has been revealed (Shelley and Melzer, 2011; Capparico, Irrera and Tupman, 2014), while hybrids have been detected in the Islamic Maghreb, where crime groups and terrorists respond to specific material and political demands from local populations (Rosato, 2016). Terrorist groups are also attributed the power to control large enterprises, such as the gas fields in Eastern Algeria, close to the Libyan border. The case prompts the conclusion that the ‘interaction of crime, corruption, and terrorism is having a tremendous impact on both security and the global economy’ (Shelley, 2014: 1). Among the victims of such hybrids, or entangled criminal entities, the following are listed: ‘economic growth, employment, security, development, and the sustainability of the planet’ (ibid: 4-5).

Analysts do emphasize that criminals are motivated by a broad spectrum of reasons, like personal enrichment, passion or revenge, while terrorists are led by what they believe is a higher cause (Foster, 2012). And yet, the separation of the two groups is sometimes deemed difficult. Of course, the presence of former criminals in terrorist groups is not unprecedented. But the phenomenon is now described as more pronounced and more visible. Research conducted by the ICSR (International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence) suggests that in many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign fighters are former offenders. The findings of this study, however, do not confirm the merging of criminals and terrorists in distinct organizations, but the proximity of their social networks and environments.

‘Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalize and operate. This is what we call the new crime-terror nexus’ (ICSR, 2016: 3).

Whether new or old, the nexus is particularly emphasized by law enforcement agencies, which include within their remit the support of member states in preventing and combating all forms of serious international crime through the exchange of criminal intelligence. Perhaps the concern and focus on ‘serious international crime’, inevitably, leads agencies to adopt a joint approach to the two. The British National Crime Agency (NCA) follows the same route, providing a general definition that embraces a considerable range of groups and activities, some of which could be labeled organized crime groups while some others terrorist organizations. It is from the perspective of legal prosecution and law enforcement that the borders between terrorism and conventional and/or organized crime continue to be regarded as particularly blurred.

Other empirical studies do show that terrorist organizations may, when convenient, procure the services of criminal groups to further their political goals (Gallagher, 2016; Picarelli, 2006; Roth and Sever, 2006). In the recent past, among the hybrid organizations simultaneously pursuing material
and political gain Colombian narco-terrorism appeared to be outstanding: ‘The number of assassinations and bombings generated by the cartels was very substantial… [so that] a categorical exclusion of the criminal motivation from a definition of terrorism does not seem to be warranted’ (Schmid, 2011: 66). Yet another case-study of narco-terrorism in Colombia by Bibes (2001) indicates that, over the past thirty years, leftist guerilla groups and right-wing paramilitaries have largely depended on drug cartels to help finance their political objectives. Bibes also describes instances where cartel leaders have in turn hired terrorist groups to carry out violent acts to achieve their own goals. Similarly, a study of Mali’s Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) proves that this terrorist organization, while principally aiming at disposing of the Mali government and establishing a caliphate, does act in conjunction with narco-traffickers (Boeke, 2016).

Suggestions are also made that formerly politically motivated terrorist groups can develop conventional economically motivated organized crime syndicates (Hausken and Gupta, 2016). This development, however, is said to take place when terrorist organizations cease to be funded by benefactors and donors. Thus, following an end of hostilities with the state, members of the Colombian FARC and the Provisional IRA, it is assumed, have turned into purely profit-seeking organizations, relying on their terrorist skills to accumulate wealth (Byrne, 2009).

Ultimately, the crime-terror nexus is found in the shared skills that terrorists and criminals may have developed in outmaneuvering law enforcement and the techniques acquired in committing property offences.

‘Jihadists not only condone the use of “ordinary” criminality to raise funds, they have argued that doing so is the ideologically correct way of waging jihad. Combined with large numbers of former criminals in their ranks, this will make financing attacks through crime not only possible and legitimate but, increasingly, their first choice’ (ICSR, 2016: 4).

It is time to bring more controversial aspects of the debate to the fore.

While the word ‘terrorism’ is not even mentioned in the detailed index of a recent important handbook on organized crime (Paoli, 2014), the phrase ‘organized crime’ recurs in many contemporary contributions on political violence and terrorism. This may be because both forms of crime are analyzed against the variables offered by the sociology of organizations, which offers useful conceptualizations for the understanding of collective behaviour in delimited structures. Terrorism and organized crime, in this respect, may be similar because both deploy an organizational layout. An objection, in this respect, could be that any group of people acting in concert can be viewed as a social organization, therefore, it is not only organized crime and terrorism that lend themselves to a joint analysis, but also any couple of aggregations of individuals who perform collective action. As a way of overcoming this ambiguity, the following explanation referring to organized crime groups as opposed to terrorism has been offered: ‘Their primary motivation is usually financial gain’ (Holmes, 2016). However, if the focus is on illegal structures rather than illegal activities, the concern is how organizations relate to states.

Attempts to influence state officials are commonly made by organized criminals, who mainly pursue impunity for their offences and, when engaged in the official economy, seek contracts to carry out some form of state-funded public work (Abadinsky, 2013) The goal is, in such cases, of an economic rather than a political nature.
‘Commonly, the lack of political goals is seen as a defining characteristic of organized crime that distinguishes it from ideologically and religiously motivated terrorist and insurgent groups’ (von Lampe, 2016: 263).

The controversy around motivation accompanies the debate on hybrids, with some authors underlining the divine or political command obeyed by terrorists as opposed to greed commanding organized crime groups. In an attempt to identify differences and similarities, the suggestion has been made that the association of terrorism with organized crime mitigates the hideous and noxious operations of the former and that, comparatively, the latter rank higher. Among the similarities, characteristics such as secrecy, ruthlessness, intimidation and the use of front organizations are mentioned. Among the differences, motivations, the nature of the relationship with governments and the media and the type of victimization are enumerated (Schmid, 1996, 2011).

There is, in sum, disagreement around the nexus between organized crime and terrorism, its nature and scope, with some commentators arguing that such nexus amounts to nothing more than temporary marriages of convenience. While generalizable statements are unhelpful, distinctions are identified that might clarify the issue. The proliferation of hybrids, it is felt, may be likely in certain contexts more than in others, for instance in areas experiencing armed conflicts. On the other hand, lack of trust between the two types of membership may hamper collaboration, which entails added risk to groups inured to avoiding risk. For this reason, new types of organizations, distinct from both organized crime groups and terrorist groups, may be springing up which service both criminals and terrorists with illicit services. These new groups may well be sponsored by legitimate states. In other words, the explanatory power of the crime-terror nexus is questioned, as it is considered to be based on insufficient evidence (Carrapico, Irrera and Tupman, 2014). Rather than focusing on the linkages between organized crime and terrorist groups, which are regarded as sporadic and short-lived, some propose to reorient attention on the links between criminal organizations and the state.

‘A research agenda that prioritizes the local dynamics of interactions between criminal networks, militant ideologies, society and the state is likely to produce more nuanced analyses than an over-reliance on these binary approaches’ (Lewis, 2014: 337).

A further distinction pertains to sovereign-bound groups as opposed to sovereign-free groups, the former ‘defined by their goal of establishing a new and separate state’ (Picarelli, 2006: 13), and the latter

‘concerned with profits and authority in illicit markets rather than sovereignty and authority over neighbourhoods and regions’ (ibid: 15).

There remains a feeling that the debate on hybrids belies an attempt to group under the same rubric all conducts most human beings would find repellent, hence the widespread attempts to carry out joint analyses of such conducts. In this respect Europol (2015), responding to hyperbolic depictions of the hybrid phenomenon, stresses that, at least in the EU, the nexus between organized crime and terrorism remains limited:

‘In light of the available evidence, convergence between organized crime and terrorism in the EU seems a limited phenomenon. Terrorist and organized crime groups have learned to adapt to changing circumstances such as governmental interventions or changed environments. This makes their structure, activities and methods opportunistic in nature [...] Based on the cases available in the Europol databases, it can be concluded that convergence often consists of isolated incidents’ (ibid: 9).
Whether hybrids are rare or frequent, it is the heuristic value of joint analyses of organized crime and terrorism that could be questioned. Terrorism, like other forms of political violence, combines defensive and offensive strategies, a combination without which action could hardly be triggered. Such strategies may include ways of overcoming a presumed moral disorientation, but must provide, at the same time, strong, unequivocal guidance for individuals and groups to act. This combination of strategies coalesce in the form of collective identity, which transcends pure role or group identity, in that it refers to shared self-definitions and common efforts towards the production of social change. Collective identity offers orientation in a moral space and gives rise to a sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy; it also prompts what is worth doing and what is not in organizational terms, leading individuals to appreciate their capacity to change the surrounding environment. The cause pursued may not be ‘higher’, but it is certainly ‘different’.

Political violence, therefore, is one of the outcomes of organized identity, and entails high degrees of subjectivity, so that some features of social life are no longer seen as part of misfortune, but of injustice. Along with techniques of neutralization, political violence needs to elaborate an interpretive ‘frame alignment’ with the activists it intends to mobilize. The potential recruits possess a coherent body of knowledge about past experiences that can be utilized for the interpretation of the present. This constitutes a schema or ‘frame’ with which terrorist groups must align in order to attract sympathizers and adherents (Snow et al, 1986; Ruggiero, 2010). Moreover, violent political groups draw on their specific repertoires of action accumulated through long periods of conflict. Such repertoires consist of a legacy, made of cultural and political resources: they contain sets of action and identity derived from shared understandings and meanings, they are cultural creations that take shape in social and political conflict.

In brief, the existing literature on hybrids displays, in more or less equal measure, certainties and uncertainties around their very existence. Such literature is usually very nuanced in respect of the characteristics, activities and ultimate motivations of organized crime and terrorism respectively. The unequivocal views expressed by the majority of our respondents may be due to their specific occupational role, as the prevalence of law enforcers among them may have determined the perception that organized crime and terrorism pose an equal and ‘joint’ threat to societies. When both are included under the rubric of ‘serious crime’, distinctions as to the way of combating them become superfluous.

4.7. Measures to decrease organized crime and terrorism

Respondents thought that job creation and employment schemes targeting low-income and at-risk communities would have the strongest effect. However, by assuming the widespread presence of hybrids, they ended up reiterating the centrality of policies and strategies already advocated to combat organized crime and terrorism respectively. Cross-border cooperation was regarded as paramount, while participants in the focus groups advocated the formation of an entity responsible for the protection of the EU external borders. Little consideration was given to social measures such as welfare reform, psycho-social support, rehabilitation programmes, education, cultural and community initiatives to improve relations between groups and faiths. Some participants in the focus groups were concerned by the lack of transparency in the fight against organized crime and terrorism and called for the sharing of information and the circulation of successful practices. Institutional agencies, it was felt, should increase cooperation and avoid competition. It was also noted that the procedure for the identification of and follow-up measures against suspects was too lengthy. Participants in the workshops called for better tools to be utilized in the identification of suspicious
users of the web, regarded as the main means of communication for illegal activities. Some argued that malicious behavioural patterns had to be understood and a model built for the prediction of potential attacks. Let us examine other contributions on the subject matter.

Every expression of political violence seeks to represent a contentious political issue, and to speak not only to the authorities but to social movements from which it claims to emanate. It is this purported (and at times real) link with social discontent and 'anger' that makes terrorism a distinct violent manifestation. It is also its righteousness, be that religious or secular that makes it different from other expressions of criminality. Terrorists fight for what they think will be a future system, their justification is ‘transcendental’ and 'historical', as we have seen, in the sense that only history, in their view, will judge on the morality of their action. Terrorist violence is, in the view of those using it, a foundational force that is expected to create a new system and designate a new authority. It is norm-oriented, in that it is meant to create new norms in the name of generalized beliefs.

This has significant implications for prevention and institutional responses. Successful organised crime groups are normally emboldened by alliances with complicit or complacent establishment actors, while violent political groups normally rely on the supposed ideological advocacy of anti-establishment groups. When the latter groups distance themselves from those who, through the exercise of terror, claim to represent them, the perpetrators of terror start losing their imagined justification and find themselves fighting a private war, one that only exists in their head. Terrorist groups of the past have declined when social movements have radically severed the symbolic and material links on which such groups believed they could rely. Anti-establishment non-violent forces expressing contentious political views were (and still are) more effective in fighting terrorism than action emanating from the establishment. By contrast, the weakening of organised crime may occur when efforts are made to sever the links between crime groups and the actors of the establishment who are associated with them, whether due to subjective choice or by virtue of objective shared interests. Organised crime, in other words, may decline when the elite (politicians and business people) will distance themselves from it. In brief, prevention of organised crime may temper the phenomenon when the higher strata of the institutions are targeted, while prevention of terrorism has a possibility of success when it originates from relatively ‘lower’ strata of society. The difference is notable, and joint analyses of the two may hamper and meddle with the identification of potentially effective policies (Ruggiero, 2018).
5. Conclusion

Organized crime

In the survey, a high concern was expressed for organized crime activities such as drug production and distribution and cybercrime. Participants in the qualitative strands of our research concurred, although they tended to emphasize the general lack of knowledge and the ineffective flow of information characterizing the issue. Drug crime and cybercrime, it was felt, require robust responses and strategies to both discourage their uptake, and arrest the perpetrators currently involved in them.

Very few respondents, mainly participants in the qualitative research groups, identified organized criminal networks that had made their way into the licit economy/political apparatus.

As to the drivers which push/pull new recruits into the milieu of organized crime, the quantitative and qualitative research both showed a preponderance for the belief that people are born into such a life. Their socio-economic status and cultural heritage was deemed to exert a powerful influence over their ‘choice’ to become members of an organized crime group. The respondents’ views on the causes of organized crime membership also fit neatly with subcultural theories, including the views of the Chicago School of Sociology, which propounded that ‘social disorganization’ in urban areas allows illicit activities to flourish.

One major commonality between our respondents’ views and existing sociological and criminological research is that the origins of criminal involvement in organized gangs are perceived to be due to the person being ‘deficient’ of some element: either socialization, culture, job, money or the absence of effective law and order forces in the locale.

In response to organized crime, most respondents advocated the enhancement of police activities and enforcement measures, rather than tackling the many social and economic causes of illegal behaviour. Consequently, improving housing, neighbourhoods, and providing better paid jobs etc. were all neglected.

From a governmental perspective, organized crime could be tackled in two ways. Firstly, through a cultural approach, whereby education, public health and information are used as counter-propaganda, in order to dissipate the atmosphere in which organized crime prospers. Secondly, through the exercise of technical legal measures against criminal organizations and their members, such as surveillance, arrests and asset seizures. This also entails a decapitation approach: trying to lop-off the heads of the hydra-like organization, in the hope of eviscerating its potency. Our respondents espoused this second approach.

Terrorism

Many respondents believed that the most effective tools for dealing with terrorism would be counteracting their propaganda, and blocking their recruitment activities.

As for the main cause of people becoming involved in terrorist activities, this was seen, like the respondents’ views on the drivers of membership of organized crime, to be largely the result of their cultural heritage, although this was intrinsically linked to the socio-economic status of those groups too. Individual pathology was, consequently, largely discounted as one of the etiological sources of terrorist recruitment. The greatest danger of terrorism in modern Europe, it was felt, comes from
Islamic fundamentalist extremists, and their theocratic regressive yearnings may spring from fury over perceived injustices over their religious freedom, economic situation or cultural marginalization.

Respondents believed that the best way to weaken terrorist networks was to promote cross-border police co-operation and actions, and that foreign interventions against such organizations were otiose. In the qualitative strand of our research the need to involve Muslim communities in preventative projects was highlighted.

In a similar vein, to ways to weaken organized crime, two main approaches for the dilution of terrorist activities were highlighted. Governmental ‘technical’ ones, or ‘hard’ measures, whereby laws, the state’s agencies of law and order and surveillance measures, are all fortified to tackle the problem. Alternatively, there is the ‘soft’ method, whereby public information dissemination, safety advice and educational and cultural techniques are deployed to undermine support for terrorism in ‘at risk’ communities, as evidenced by the UK’s ‘Prevent’ and ‘CONTEST’ programs. Our respondents stressed the importance of both approaches.

**Hybrids**

As for so-called ‘hybrid’ organizational entities, that combine elements of organized crime and terrorist networks, the survey revealed a widespread acceptance of their existence, while the qualitative part of the research revealed skepticism about the subject matter. Our findings were compared with previous research contributions, depicting a nuanced situation and focusing on the ambiguity of the crime-terror nexus.
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