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TAKEDOWN

Identify . Prevent . Respond



UNDERSTAND THE DIMENSIONS OF ORGANISED CRIME AND TERRORIST NETWORKS FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR FIRST-LINE-PRACTITIONERS AND PROFESSIONALS

Deliverable D4.4

Initial practitioners-toolkits and policy recommendations



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Table of Content

Executive Summary	5
1. Introduction: The historical evolution of crime prevention	7
1.1. Models on early prevention	7
1.2. Models on sociological prevention.....	9
1.3. The culture of control: From Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) to Situational Prevention of Terrorism (SPT)	12
1.4. Current prevention: Deideologisation of securitisation models towards the control of social intervention.....	17
1.5. Limitations of the current European prevention strategies.....	24
2. Guidelines for prevention.....	31
2.1. Seven guidelines for prevention towards the cube model	32
3. Handbook on the cube model	44
3.1. Be very crime specific: from ‘why’ to ‘how’	44
3.2. A new way to say CHEERS: In which cases should the cube be used?	49
3.3. We break the law of the frame: liquid owners, stakeholders and first-line practitioners....	55
3.4. From the triangle to the cube	60
3.5. The Cube factors, parameters and variables – extending the initial matrix	62
4. Conclusion: Towards the toolkits implementation	68
4.1. SCP-aligned case categorization matrix	68
4.2. Digital first-line-practitioners toolkit (FLP-Toolkit).....	72
4.3. Digital law enforcement toolkit (LEA-Toolkit)	73
Bibliography.....	74

Executive Summary

Crime prevention and the development of respective models is a major field of criminology. Early approaches mainly focussed on attempts to change the attitude of offenders by examining the profiles and the biographies. Hence, prevention was centred on the push factors and the aimed at challenging the 'roots' in order to counter the effects of deviant behaviour. Sociology-based prevention models in contrast focussed more on the social environment and the milieu in order to understand the criminal pull-factors. This approach is known as '*defiance*' in current criminology.

Over time and due to advances in profiling and mass control technologies, the sociological-psychological began to merge with the situational and the following elements are currently characterizing the debate on prevention: The models focus on the area of 'pre-crime'; there are substantial differences between the legal perspective and the police approach; police and Intelligence agencies play new roles in 'pre-criminal' prevention as an integral part of their mission and operations; and individuals and civil society play are crucial for the multiple governance of security.

Based on the analysis, a set of guidelines can be defined for setting the frame of the TAKEDOWN toolkits. First, it is crucial to acknowledge the variety of players, their interests and their logics in the field. Second, there is not one unique prevention police work model. Third, Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) should be implemented. Fourth, different aspects of information sharing need to be considered. Fifth, communication is a prevention tool. Sixth, SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment) provides options for analysis. Seventh, prevention results need to be assessed in order to prioritise future choices.

Based on the guidelines, several lessons for the actual toolkits handbook can be derived.

- Lesson 1: We must proceed from WHY to HOW. The starting hypothesis of the prevention model represented by the 'Cube' is that crimes must be absolutely specific, avoiding classifications that are too generic and 'ideological', often even beyond legal qualifications.
- Lesson 2: For the purposes of preventive analysis and response options to acts of serious crime, be it terrorism or organised crime, the description of the weapons used and their logistics, due to the MURDEROUS scheme, is a determining factor.
- Lesson 3: Narratives are not motivations. Narratives are poly-semantic and can be exploited and manipulated by all actors, while motivations are rational needs which find a path to their targets through opportunity factors.
- Lesson 4: What determines the urgency of a preventive action is the degree of readiness and the consequent perception of immediate danger. What we demand from prevention is that it should identify this degree by examining the concrete manner in which crimes are committed. 'Readiness' is also vested with extreme legal importance when defending preventive actions in the courtroom.
- Lesson 5: The security space is liquid and not static, as in any competitive contest for the control of tangible and intangible resources. All the players in that space are interoperable and their 'strength' varies according to context.
- Lesson 6: Owners, Stakeholders and First-line Practitioners are liquid spaces in the security space and comprise much more than you think.

The TAKEDOWN toolkits are structured along five main factors and each of them takes into account several variables for structuring actual cases. The toolkits cover the many different ENVIRONMENTS, where crime and terror can happen. It also covers all ACTORS or players that are relevant in the context

of a case. Furthermore, they also cover FACILITATING CONDITIONS as well as MURDEROUS WEAPONS AND TOOLS. Finally, of course also the TARGETS need to be taken into account.

The adapted case analysis matrix, which provides the analytical basis for the toolkits, is aligned with the SCP approach. It consists of the definition of the domain and 5 main factors, which are divided into 36 parameters. These parameters are structured into 121 variables, which allow a detailed structuring of individual cases as a basis for the model-based decision support toolkits for both first-line-practitioners (FLP) and the law enforcement agencies (LEA).

The FLP-Toolkit aims at providing context knowledge for particular incidents by highlighting the similarities and variations with well-documented cases. This should help FLP to detect a problem or a case and get more information on what the FLP should focus on, and it suggests response options in a given situation. The LEA-Toolkit is conceptualized as a decision support tool especially for authorized users only and provides more complex methods for the in-depth case analysis and the assessment of responses by building on the operational activities defined in the SARA approach: Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment.

1. Introduction: The historical evolution of crime prevention

The history of criminology has seen various prevention models. Despite the extensive criminological taxonomy on the subject, crime prevention can still be summarised under two major categories: the first addresses attempts to change the attitude of offenders and the alleged root causes of criminal phenomena; the second examines the reduction of opportunities available to persons at risk of committing crimes.

These two major prevention categories encompass diverse global theories and truly distinct epistemological and philosophical models, which involve the concept of humankind in its entirety, but whose cores conserve a simple but unanswered common question:

What drives a minority of individuals towards violence or crime and what needs to be done to prevent its violent escalation?

To understand the formal theory behind the 'Cube Model' presented in D4.1, which we have adopted as a prevention model, we must explore various aspects of these two prevention macro-theories, which also envisage a number of police prevention models.

The main goal of this first part of the work, therefore, is to provide knowledge precisely in the specific field of Police Prevention (Chapter 1). The second part (Chapter 2) highlights the learnings from the analysis and puts it into seven guidelines as a major framework for the toolkits. In the third part (Chapter 3), the operational toolkits are outlined by using a handbook approach, renewing previous policies and practices, within an operational framework of situational prevention devoid of profiling-related elements. In the final part (Chapter 4), the roadmap towards the programming model-based toolkits is presented.

1.1. Models on early prevention

The question of what leads to violence is ancient and in the pre-modern era, from the Greeks to St. Augustine, the answer was formulated around the concepts of 'good' and 'bad'. It was the era in which justice was administered by means of the ordeal, applying the principle 'this is God's wish', and crime was synonymous with sin.

In the modern age, from the Enlightenment onwards, the schools of thought encompassing those who aim to change the core attitudes of human beings, their behaviours and their ideas, have become secular in outlook. Today, the preference is to talk about 'risk factors and prevention' as central themes in criminal phenomena. The fundamental question, however, remains the idea of improving humankind and the world as fundamental components of criminal prevention.

Since the late 1970s, especially thanks to the longitudinal studies of criminologists such as Joan McCord (1959) and Cathy Widom (1989, 1999), criminology has introduced the concept of 'cycle of violence and abuse' to highlight the existence of 'root causes' in escalations of violence. Prevention was centred on the idea of eradicating the 'roots' in order to counter the effects of deviant behaviour.

These criminological theories, which tended to search for the 'push factors' of criminal evolution in childhood, in the family or in society, gave rise to the first major *Early Prevention* projects. These were widescale prevention trials, carried out mainly in the USA and in northern European countries, which we can group under three model classifications: *universal*, i.e. targeting entire population segments; *selected*, i.e. target groups chosen based on the intensity of the risk factors; and finally *indicated*, i.e. aimed at treating groups of individuals who were considered as having already indulged in antisocial

behaviour and for whom prevention would have to consist of either re-socialisation or prevention of chronic degeneration. Another method of classification adopted in modern criminology schools is to subdivide these prevention models into *primary, secondary and tertiary types* (Brantingham and Faust, 1976, p.290).

In summary, these criminological models tend to explore the biographies and profiles of perpetrators, their environment, their families, their behaviours or their ideas, in order to capture 'signals' or 'indicators' of this power escalation, before it manifests itself in the form of a crime.

Ultimately, as we shall see later, this is one of the fundamental components of current European doctrines addressing the prevention of terrorism and organised crime even today. It is this component that gave life to that vast contemporary effort in social profiling, which is considered to be an essential part of prevention strategy.

In the period between the 1930s and the 1970s, the intense debate among sociologists, psychologists, criminologists and politicians on the theme of 'root causes' of violence and crime actually generated some notable criminal prevention experiments; these have been the subject of careful assessments aimed at evaluating the impact and effectiveness of the theories themselves.

The Early Childhood Nurse Home Visitation Program, started by David Olds in the USA in the 1970s, is one of the first major projects in primary prevention. It was intended to help poor, very young and inexperienced mothers, by mobilising professional nurses specially trained for this purpose and capable of rebuilding social networks around the mothers and providing them with knowledge and skills for raising children. 15 years after the intervention, it was revealed how those who had benefited from the intervention emerged as having fewer criminal records, less anti-social behaviour (e.g. running away from home), higher IQs and even lower rates of alcohol and tobacco addiction. Other famous historical programmes in this field of 'early prevention' are the *High Scope Perry Preschool Project*, of the 1960s; the *Montreal Longitudinal Experimental Study*, which intervened on minors from disadvantaged socio-economic conditions with aggressive behaviour and high risk of delinquency; and the *Seattle Social Development Project*, which worked on integrating students with difficulties at school into ordinary classes thanks to modified teaching programmes and self-learning paths for teachers.

However, not all programmes of this type have provided positive results on the strictly criminological level, especially when the longitudinal analysis has been carried out with a certain continuity and consistency and has focused on criminal prevention. For example, in the 1970s, Joan McCord¹ tracked down the ex-participants of the famous *Cambridge Somerville Youth Study*, which had been commissioned in 1936 by Dr Richard Cabot, to assess the effects of early intervention on juvenile delinquency. McCord's conclusions were very critical of the effective outcomes of the project, in which significant tangible and intangible resources had been invested and which was considered one of the flagship initiatives of its kind:

¹ Joan McCord and William McCord, *A Follow-Up Report on the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study*, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 322, Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Mar., 1959), pp. 89-96

The programme had no impact on juvenile arrest rates measured by official or unofficial records. The program also had no impact on adult arrest rates. There were no differences between the two groups in the number of serious crimes committed, age at when a first crime was committed, age when first committing a serious crime, or age after no serious crime was committed. A larger proportion of criminals from the treatment group went on to commit more crimes than their counterparts in the control group.²

According to this renowned criminologist, the programme actually appeared to have had negative effects (*the 'boomerang effect'*, which today we would more properly term '*Defiance*'), provoking a conflict between the original values of the individuals subjected to the experiment and certain induced values, external to the family of origin, artificially introduced by the operators on the basis of theoretical behaviourist models.

Furthermore, McCord recalls Durkheim's *anomie* theory, according to which deviant behaviour emerges as the consequence of an imbalance between the goals proposed by society (success, performance, models) and those legitimate means which society actually makes available for the achievement of these goals. For McCord, the Cambridge-Sommerville project appears to have raised the expectations of young people, who were then destined to clash with reality, thus inducing that unlawful behaviour necessary to achieve the success upheld by artificially induced values.

Finally, a conclusive result of McCord's ex post analysis caused a sensation with respect to prevention models aimed at modifying the behaviour and ideas of vulnerable adolescent groups: of the 506 Massachusetts youngsters between the ages of 5 and 13 who had participated in the programme, 125 had participated in the Summer Camps and community activities many times. McCord has pointed out that in this period, after 40 years, the most negative outcomes had been recorded in terms of crime, early death or mental illness. The results of this control group were negative, especially when compared with the other peer control group not subjected to any therapy in the same time period. According to McCord, this negative outcome depended on the influence resulting from the insertion of young deviants into impressionable peer groups. The ascendancy of the young offenders appears to have surpassed that of the mentors who, as often happens in adolescents, among other things had been proposing values and goals that proved unattainable over time.

More recently, a study by RAND³, one of the many following McCord's lead on the negative emulation effect, has brought to light similar concepts in relation to anti-smoking campaigns: exposure to negative models can become an incentive for certain vulnerable groups.

1.2. Models on sociological prevention

Alongside the preventive strategies of psychologists and psychiatrists, criminology has been experimenting with sociology-based prevention models since the 1930s. Indeed, since the nineteenth century, sociology had been advancing ideas on the close correlation between environment and crime; to the extent that in 1829, the French statistician Guerry and the Venetian geographer Balbi published

² Joan McCord, *A thirty-year follow-up of treatment effects*, Crime And Family: Selected Essays Of Joan McCord, Temple University Press, 2007

³ *Placing Antismoking Graphic Warning Posters at Retail Point-of-Sale Locations Increases Some Adolescents' Susceptibility to Future Smoking*, Nicotine & Tobacco Research, ntx239, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ntr/ntx239>
Published: 13 December 2017

examples of 'criminal cartography' at the same time as Adolphe Quetelet was exploring social factors related to crime in Belgium.

As we will see later, also the geography of crime will return in a new guise in modern studies with the work of the 'situational' school on crime mapping.

In the 1930s in America, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay carried out systematic research on the relationship between crime and socio-environmental conditions. The work of the Chicago school came to the conclusion that social contradictions, the lack of ties, new mobility-related logistics and the concentration of economic and social problems in certain neighbourhoods, favoured juvenile delinquency because they reduced legitimate social control mechanisms and opened spaces to unlawful alternatives, often governed by criminal gangs. In 1932, Shaw transformed these theoretical models into the first major social prevention intervention in Chicago which, despite many changes and adaptations, has remained standing to the present day.

The intention of the *Chicago Area Project* was to activate social resources present on the ground, encouraging conditions under which young people with problems could be taken into care, with the aim of reintegrating them into the community. Local 'committees' established by the communities themselves were central to the project; their role was to identify and propose strategies for the re-socialisation of young people considered at risk, through access to general services or the creation of new services, where lacking.

Similar projects were undertaken in New York during the years of the Johnson Presidency and within the framework of the programme to combat poverty; one of these was the "*Mobilization for Youth*" project which involved 67 blocks in the Lower East Side, areas of high immigration density.

However, the most advanced model of these large-scale social experiments remains the "*Comprehensive Community Initiatives*" which, beginning in the 1990s, spread throughout the US, Canada, Great Britain and many northern European countries, starting with Sweden. The key elements of the CCI, as they are called today, are the global integration of services, public and private sector collaboration, together with a holistic approach that incorporates all services and initiatives into a unified framework. This model also contributed to shaping current doctrines throughout Europe and specific practices in certain Member States now contrasting organised crime and terrorism.

In fact, while these projects have shown some positive social results, from school drop-out rates to alcoholism, their outcomes in terms of crime prevention are still quite uncertain. As Malcolm Klein has clearly shown⁴, it was frequently the case that preventive interventions strengthened the street gangs rather than contrasting them, since they encouraged 'negative' group cohesion dynamics and structures. This phenomenon is known as '*defiance*' in current criminology.

If we analyse the studies of Klein and McCord and observe the evolution of criminal phenomena over time, we realise that crime is very resistant and resilient and is in some way ingrained in humankind and in the sphere of social dynamics.

⁴ Malcolm W. Klein, Cheryl L. Maxson, *Street Gang Patterns and Policies*, Oxford University Press, 2010

As Ekblom brilliantly demonstrated⁵, crime has an astonishing resilience and capacity for adaptation, and this can also include its ability to adapt to prevention scenarios by exploiting its mechanisms.

Ironically, the 'golden years' of large-scale widespread prevention projects also coincided with the maximum spread of gang crime and with the exponential dissemination of synthetic drugs; elements we shall later define as 'chemical facilitators' in the set of Cube toolkit variables. As an example, it was precisely in the latter context of drug addiction, addressed by preventive interventions in schools, managed by experts and teachers who provided information on illicit substances and their effects, which contributed to inducing increased drug use among the children involved in the initiatives.

Since then, many researchers have pointed to a number of systemic risks underlying these programmes.

The first concerns so-called pre-criminal profiling, i.e. the basis on which, as still happens today, potentially criminal subjects were identified before they actually committed any crime. Thus a class of 'good-natured' psychologists and sociologists gave rise to the current category of 'pre-crime suspects', i.e. one of the fundamental elements of current mass surveillance doctrines.

The topic of social dangerousness indicators is still hotly debated today in politics, in criminology but, above all, in juridical circles. Indeed, just recently, numerous rulings by Member States and the Strasbourg Court Of Human Rights have again addressed this subject, while political activists have highlighted its intrinsic dangers.

Already 20 years ago, the academic world had noted how interventions aimed at defining some people as 'potential criminals' or treating them as needing preventive care, could produce effects of individual or collective stigma, which are themselves a criminal vector. In this sense, labels such as 'radical', 'violent', 'extremist', or 'mafia', can have a detrimental influence on the same subjects that we would wish to help, as well as on the first-line practitioners and stakeholders, pushing stigmatised individuals towards an escalation that identifies them with the negative model itself, often far beyond contextual reality. These preventive models risk generating complex social role-playing games that generate misguided behaviour and negative emulation phenomena, rather than preventing violence.

Barbagli and Gatti (2005) have also noted how predictive profiling techniques involve a high level of false negatives and/or false positives. In the first case, programmes are not activated on deserving subjects; in the second, which is much more serious, personality-changing prevention and psycho-social intervention programmes are activated on individuals who do not need them. In short, these interventions risk provoking the boomerang effect already analysed by McCord.

Finally, it is evident today that these techniques are open to a high degree of manipulation by governments, with all the consequences that this may entail. In several countries, re-education or personality-modification programmes have become mandatory for individuals suspected of radicalisation, violence or exposure to risk factors. Various forms of counselling, therapy, training, indoctrination in presumed national values ('*British values*') or adaptation to mainstream social norms are imposed, also without prior consent of the suspects, under the guise of 'social safeguards'.

The contemporary risk is twofold: on the one hand, prevention campaigns, financed with public funds, can evolve into phenomena of criminalisation of minorities, be they ethnic or political, individuals or groups; on the other hand, the governance of security may become privatised, leaving the decision to

⁵ Paul Ekblom, *Gearing up Against Crime: a Dynamic Framework to Help Designers Keep up with Adaptive Criminal in a Changing World*, in International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention, 2, 1997, pg. 249-265

private individuals as to what is legal and not. The formula used today by Europol to strike against online content judged to be extremist, without subjecting cases to the scrutiny of the judiciary, is just this:

The final removal of the referred material is a voluntary activity by the concerned social media platforms, taking into consideration their own terms and conditions.

1.3. The culture of control: From Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) to Situational Prevention of Terrorism (SPT)

Despite substantial investment in these initiatives, the statistics of most Western countries indicated that crime grew steadily in the 1960s and 1990s, creating serious political and social problems.

In Europe, those were the toughest years of political terrorism. In the USA, these were the years of street gangs, while France experienced ethnic crime, the *blusons noirs*, precursors of what we would come to know as the *banlieues*. The 1970s also saw peaks in the numbers of victims of the Irish conflict, which reverberated strongly throughout Europe due to the political and religious implications of that terrible conflict.

Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland by year and status ⁶						
Year	Civilian	British Security	Republican Paramilitary	Loyalist Paramilitary	Irish Security	Totals
1969	12	2	1	1		16
1970	17	2	6		1	26
1971	89	60	20	2		171
1972	249	148	70	11	1	479
1973	119	82	37	15		253
1974	191	73	23	7		294
1975	174	35	24	27		260
1976	207	61	17	9	1	295
1977	49	50	6	6		111
1978	40	35	7			82
1979	38	76	7			121

In general, throughout the world, these were also years characterised by the massive spread of narcotics, trailing its wake of related crimes. Finally, precisely in those years, the advancement of globalisation in social, political and communication contexts facilitated new transnational profiles in crime which became highly mobile and capable of exploiting new technologies and consequent degrees of freedom. Communication became global and local or national events took on geopolitical

⁶ <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/index.html>

significance, such as the Iranian revolution of 1979, which rapidly spread throughout those parts of the world with Muslim majorities, often crossing national boundaries and the traditional Shia-Sunni divide.

Above all, the field of security, a traditionally closed stronghold of police and intelligence forces, saw the infiltration of new social actors such as the media, NGOs and politicians. Therefore, in addition to factual crime data, the technical and political decision-makers were forced to start dealing with other new factors, such as the perception of criminal phenomena and the expectations of the voting population.

As noted by Newman & Clarke⁷

“Fear of crime increased steadily in the 2 decades beginning in the mid 1980s, while reported crime declined steadily. Those who are most fearful of crime- the elderly, for example-are often the least likely to be victimized. In fact, most people do not judge their risk of falling victim to crime and terrorism (or any other calamity) on the basis of statistical data; instead, they are more likely to be influenced by newspaper and television coverage of terrifying events. (...) This fear can lead the country to spend untold billions of dollars on protective measures, to restrict important liberties, and to make changes in foreign policies.”

A new stakeholder stormed its way into the crime prevention arena: the media. As we will see later, this stakeholder plays a central role both in the perception of public opinion, which influences political decision-makers, but also in the choices of first-line practitioners, who must define the priorities of their interventions, up to the identification of probable terrorist targets, who pursue fear as their primary goal. Ironically, in many cases the press involuntary became the main ally of the terrorists and in some cases became a weapon in the hands of foreign governments and proxies engaged in destabilising states.

David Garland (2001), argued that the 1970s marked a profound change in prevention models.

“ As recently as 1979, those involved in the business of crime control shared a common set of assumptions about the framework that shaped criminal justice and penal practices. There was a relatively settled, self-conscious, institutional field and the debates and disagreements that occurred operated within well-established boundaries. (...) Today, for better or for worse, we lack any such agreement, any settled culture, or any clear sense of the big picture. Policy development appears highly volatile, with an unprecedented amount of legislative activity, much dissension in the rank of practitioner groups, and a good deal of conflict between experts and politicians (...) Private prisons, victim impact statements, community notification laws, sentencing guidelines, electronic monitoring, punishment in the community, ‘quality of life’ policing, restorative justice- these and dozens of other developments lead us into unfamiliar territory where the ideological lines are far from clear and where the old assumptions are an unreliable guide.” (Garland, 2001, pg.4)

The criminology theories of the welfare state era, those in vogue from the 1930s onwards, were grounded in the assumption of the existence of a 'perfectible subject', an idea of crime as a measure of an inadequate socialisation process, and the concept of the state as an institution for the assistance of economically, socially and psychologically disadvantaged people. According to Garland, new prevention models evolved between the 1970s and the 1980s. Based on the theories of control, these

⁷ Graeme R. Newman & Ronald V. Clarke, *Policing Terrorism: An Executives's Guide*, U.S. Department of Justice, Office for Community Oriented Policing Services, 2008, Brief 3

implied a different interpretation of the human condition, in a more negative or perhaps more realistic sense.

In this study, however, we analyse the modern theories of control founded on the ideas of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), as an evolution of the welfarist theories in the light of new principles, which saw further politicisation of security.

While Garland analyse the developments from the perspective of the dichotomy welfare/control, we prefer to consider the unbalanced evolution of institutional bodies in the light of the relations between executive powers/judicial powers/civil society or private sector. In our opinion, the real change from the seventieth is represented by

the disproportionate role which politician assigned to executive agencies, like intelligence and LEAs, at the expenses of judges and prosecutors;

- (1) the extension of the security 'field' (as defined by Garland) to sectors, traditionally not considered as part of the security competences;
- (2) the intrusion of private actors into the security scene.

These relevant changes occurred within legal and institutional frameworks which maintained a certain degree of stability, therefore generating contradictions, procedural conflicts, inhomogeneous practices and policies and, last but not least, conflicts among citizens. To summarize, security became a battle field for politicians and media, with all the related consequences on the public opinion.

What Garland defines as the new culture of control is not only a phenomenon resulting from the removal of security from the welfarist theories, but rather their merging with the advanced models of SCP in the form of prevention of terrorism.

In 1983, Ronald Clarke defined 'situational crime prevention' (SCP) as that set of "*measures directed at highly specific forms of crime that involve management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in a systematic and permanent way*" (Clarke, 1983, pg. 225).

At the heart of every crime, for SCP, there are three epistemological theories: routine activity theory, rational choice theory, and crime pattern theory.

SCP is based upon the idea that crime is a rational decision (SCP theorists will then advance the concept of 'rationality of irrationality' or 'bounded rationality'), designed to weigh the risks and benefits for the offender, and how in the absence of effective controls, offenders will focus on suitable targets. Routine activity theory relies on the occurrence of three key characteristics: a motivated offender, a suitable victim, and a lack of control. Crime Pattern Theory, as developed by Pat and Paul Brantingham⁸, is a complex way of explaining why crimes are committed in certain areas.

The resulting prevention techniques are thus aimed at decreasing the number of suitable victims and increasing the presence of control and guardians at all times. Clarke (1980) also argues under

⁸ Brantinghams, *Environment, Routine, and Situation: Toward a Pattern Theory of Crime*, In Routine Activity and Rational Choice, Advances in Criminological Theory, Vol. 5, 1993, edited by Ronald Clarke and Marcus Felson. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. They introduced central concepts such as *nodes, paths, buffer zones, edges*, and *hot spots* with their *crime generators, attractors and enablers*. See also Marcus Felson (2002) *Crime and Everyday Life*, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 2002 and Paul Wiles and Andrew Costello, *The 'Road to Nowhere': The Evidence for Travelling Criminals*, London, Home Office Research Study 207, 2000

situational crime prevention that crime can be prevented when the circumstances of the situation change, and this will be a key concept of our 'Cube Model'.

To prevent crime, the approach focuses on the near causes of crime, thus avoiding traditional theories based on 'root causes'.

*"Many factors come together to create an act of terrorism. Some, such as the economic background and family upbringing of the terrorist, occur at a great distance from the actual terror act; other, such as the availability of targets and weapons, occur in close proximity to the terrorism act."*⁹

A near cause of crime is some sort of opportunity present in a particular location that allows an offender to commit a crime. Specific crimes can be prevented by altering the most immediate, or near, causes of the crime. In order to determine which factors in a situation should be changed, it must be determined how the crime is being committed. Possible solutions include both hard and soft techniques. Situational prevention is usually more effective when a variety of measures are implemented (Clarke, 2008). By concentrating on situational elements, SCP ascertains techniques and policies which may reduce the opportunity for criminals in specific hot spots.

So far, SCP has certainly innovated the welfarist models, as asserted by Garland. The theories of control, however, also have another dimension, which continues typically welfarist preventive modelling: they provide new types of controllers, the surveillance functions that were previously the exclusive preserve of law enforcement: from *capable guardians* (family members, friends, neighbours and co-workers), to *handlers* (someone who knows the offender well and who is in a position to exert some control over his or her actions. Handlers include parents, siblings, teachers, friends and spouses), up to the *place managers* (persons who have some responsibility for controlling behaviour in the specific location such as a bus conductor or teacher in a school)¹⁰.

In this context, "situational" theories encounter traditional socio-psychological prevention practices, albeit with different methods and purposes.

Whereas the criminology of the past focused almost exclusively on intervention and assistance to counteract root causes, the most recent approach emphasises the importance of exercising close controls and maintaining preventive discipline. In clear opposition to the welfarist criminology, grounded in the premise that crime was a deviation from normal and civil conduct, explainable in terms of individual pathology, poor socialisation or social dysfunction, these new criminology theories propose the interpretation of criminal behaviour as a manifestation in direct continuity with normal social interactions, and they believe they can explain it by referencing specific 'situational' elements.

Both, however, envisage new social actors in the 'field' of security, traditionally the prerogative of the police, the army and intelligence agencies.

The difference lies in the fact that welfarist theories view criminals as "deviant" subjects, while "situational" contemporary criminology is increasingly inclined to consider crime as a routine phenomenon widespread in modern society, committed by subjects who are perfectly normal under all points of view.

⁹ Graeme R. Newman & Ronald V. Clarke, *Policing Terrorism: An Executives's Guide*, U.S. Department of Justice, Office for Community Oriented Policing Services, 2008, Brief 11

¹⁰ For these theories see John Eck, *Police Problems: The Complexity of Problem Theory, Research and Evaluation*, In Problem Oriented Policing: From Innovation to Mainstream. Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 15, 2003 edited by Johannes Knutsson. Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press.

Both, however, expand the role of the private sector in security matters and expand the role of security far beyond the traditional boundaries.

By defining crime perpetrators as rational subjects, totally responsible for their criminal conduct and capable of responding positively to disincentive factors, this "situational" concept has contributed to supporting both retributive and deterrent policies, but also preventive policies, contrary to what is expounded by Garland.

A significant aspect of this new approach is that it requires shifting intervention focus from crime and the offender to preventing criminal action itself. Thus, while prevention remains the primary concern for all schools of thought, the welfarists focus on the perpetrators and their conditions, while the 'situationists' focus on the environments which foster crime, as well as its goals and operational methods.

Attention is now focused on criminal opportunities and the existence of "criminogenic situations", which repeatedly arise in the absence of forms of control and given attractive targets, regardless of whether individuals have a "criminal predisposition" (on which, however, it is in any case difficult to intervene). The interest, therefore, should be concentrated not so much on individuals as on social interaction, on environmental conditions and on the structure of controls and disincentives.

New political convictions exhort focusing on how to reduce opportunities, how to increase situational and social controls as well as changing daily habits. Hence, assisting needy social groups or attending to the needs of maladjusted individuals takes second place.

SCP has performed well in many criminal fields, especially those of petty crime and organised crime. Much less for terrorism, where the first complete study was performed only in 2006¹¹, when Clarke & Newman (2006) advanced their EVIL DONE theory on the vulnerability of potential targets.

The framework evolved further with the works presented by Joseph Clare and Frank Morgan¹² at the 2007 Perth conference, later re-elaborated in the context of the publications of the 17th Annual Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis of July 2008. Thence, emphasis shifted from SCP to SPT, an acronym for Situational Prevention of Terrorism.

From this turning point, the traditional discipline of SCP starts a fusion process with Rose's (1992, 2001) preventive epidemiological studies, combined with Brantingham and Faust's (1976) conceptual model and Moghaddam's (2005, 2009) stair case metaphor.

What comes out from this fusion process is the modern surveillance system adopted in several Member States, which laid the basis of the 2005 EU strategy against terrorism and organized crime.

Rose developed an epidemiological model of disease prevention and reduction that separates interventions into *high-risk and population approaches*. Utilizing screening procedures of epidemiological nature and with a focus on individuals within a population, the high-risk approach to disease prevention seeks to identify those individuals who have high levels of risk with respect to disease outcomes, thus recalling old socio-psychological theories of the 'welfarists'.

¹¹ R.V. Clarke and G. Newman, *Outsmarting the terrorists*, Westport, Conn., Praeger Securiyu International, 2006. See also J.D. Freilich and Graeme R. Newman, *Reducing Terrorism Through Situational Crime Prevention*, Monsey, N.Y., Crime Prevention Studie, n. 25, 2009

¹² Joseph Clare and Frank Morgan, *Exploring Parallels between Situational Prevention and non-Criminological Theories for Reducing Terrorist Risk*, in *Crime Prevention Studies*, Vol. 25, (2009), oo. 207-227

Parallel to Rose, Brantingham and Faust, two SCP theorists, defined a classification of the population based upon three levels of crime prevention: primary, secondary and tertiary.

Primary crime prevention identifies conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for precipitate criminal acts. Here the objective of intervention is to alter those conditions so that crimes cannot occur. Secondary crime prevention engages in early identification of potential offenders and seeks to intervene in their lives in such a way that they never commit criminal violations. Tertiary crime prevention deals with actual offenders and involves intervention in their lives in such a fashion that they will not commit further offences. (Brantingham and Faust, 1976, p.290)¹³

In this framework SCP evolved towards SPT, thus expanding the scope of prevention to include techniques to instigate massive population surveillance, profiling and change, even though population techniques offered little short-term or immediate benefit.

In 2008 the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing published then the first guidelines, '*Policing Terrorism: An Executive's Guide*' authored by Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke. In this Guide the new SPT tendency to exploit themes connected to psychological manipulation, and mass profiling emerged strongly. This paved the way to the post-modern preventive surveillance model.

1.4. Current prevention: Deideologisation of securitisation models towards the control of social intervention

In the following section, we briefly retrace the path that led to contemporary prevention doctrines in order to understand the innovative scope of the 'Cube Model' and how it differs from current models. As we have seen above, early control models took on a social dimension which was politically justified precisely by the welfarist ideologies inherited from the 1930s. Under the pressure of new security campaigns, in the 1970s, these social control models moved from university lecture rooms to government ministries and from there to the police stations. The consequences were to prove significant far beyond the realm of security, since these changes were to have repercussions on the institutional frameworks of various countries, on their justice systems and on individual freedoms.

New functionally preventive mass surveillance models emerged, rooted in the 1970s, but whose development can only be fully understood today, as we have seen from the evolution of SCP techniques towards the SPT approach.

The demands of western public opinion, which previously, as today, tended to invoke greater safety against the 'feeling of insecurity' spread by the media, started to influence new models incorporated into government policies on security and prevention. This was attested by the *Peyrefitte report on*

¹³ Australian counter-terrorism policies played a relevant role in the evolution of SPT theories. Joseph Clare and Frank Morgan wrote: "*This High risk approach to managing terrorist threat is consistent with one version of a risk-based criminal justice model termed actuarial justice (e.g., Feeley & Simon, 1992, 1994). This model is supported by a number of assumptions, including: (a) offenders can be sentenced according to future risk of offending rather than past deeds; (b) statistical methods can be used to assess risk prediction; (c) the potential risks posed by unsentenced prisoners must be assessed prior to trial; and, (d) the incapacitative benefits of detention should be emphasized relative to other justice aims, such as rehabilitation, proportionality, or deterrence. Historically, actuarial strategies to crime reduction have been applied within contexts that maintain a belief that section of the population exist (and necessarily always will) for whom traditional techniques for deterrence will not work. (...). One specific example of the scope for this legislation in Australia is the ability of authorities to detain without trial non-suspects who may give information about terrorist activities*" (2008, pg. 214).

violence (1977), commissioned by the French authorities, in one of the most extensive government inquiries on the theme of prevention. The report, in addition to the traditional strengthening of surveillance in risk-prone neighbourhoods and the increase of security contingents, called for a greater involvement of the police and the various administration bodies in the prevention of violence, particularly in municipalities and local communities.

This report is interesting because, on the one hand, it was drafted in the wake of old socialist sociological policies, yet, on the other hand, it encourages the introduction of the first inter-institutional collaboration models, as theorised by the situational prevention approach. Indeed, it is not the first time in the history of police forces that the best intentions were followed by unexpected results



In 1982, another French document, the *Bonnemaïson report*, resulting from the work of the *Commission des maires sur la sécurité*, introduced American and British sociological models based on cooperation between the state, police and local communities, into a security system governed as a typical state apparatus. The *Conseil national de la prévention de la délinquance* an inter- was formed, an inter-ministerial body, which aims to tackle the social roots of delinquency, in line with the political guidelines of the socialist governments of the time. Over the years, the French prevention model expanded from the centre to the periphery and hundreds of *Conseils communaux de la prévention de la délinquance*, were established, presided over by mayors and with an interdisciplinary composition. Over time, these bodies were to finance hundreds of projects aimed at integrating preventive security policies with the social actions of municipal administrations.

In the 1990s, these policies brought local security contracts to France. They were signed by prefects representing the central state and local authorities, with the aim of analysing and defining priorities for preventing and combating crime, expanding the tasks of the municipal police and establishing the section of the *adjoints de sécurité* to the national police, assisted by thousands of local mediators.

Italy, which has a security administrative structure similar to that of France, started the "Safe Cities" project in 1994. It was based on its French predecessor, but with of a markedly more security-oriented nature and with greater role differentiation, albeit in respect of the necessary inter-institutional collaboration. From 2017, the "safe suburbs" operations joined their "safe cities" counterparts, implemented via a myriad of "Pacts for Urban Security" between regions, mayors and the Ministry of the Interior.

In English-speaking countries, where police forces are rooted in the civil society and the justice system is based on 'adversarial' and 'common law' models, counter-terrorism and anti-organised crime models had been launched in the 1970s. They were based on 'community police', public-private collaboration in preventive security, information exchange and massive communication campaigns by police and intelligence agencies.

Not surprisingly, the UK and the USA were the countries where the sociological prevention theories merged with the SCP models, giving rise to new surveillance models based on profiling and control.



The network of agreements between various institutions and public and private subjects, developed in Great Britain by request of the Home Office, and in the United States, particularly on the initiative of private enterprise and driven by local administrations, was set up to promote crime prevention and security at the community level, optimally exploiting the involvement of the community.

The Neighbourhood Watch Project

Crime prevention groups were organised around a block, defined neighbourhood, or business district and served as “eyes and ears” for law enforcement; they helped establish/reclaim informal control of an area by observation, visibility, and increased social interaction. Success is measured through crime reduction and improved quality of life for neighbourhood residents

Over time, the two traditional preventive approaches, the sociological-psychological and the situational, began to converge, thanks to advances in profiling and mass control technologies.

Community police programmes have gradually integrated with commissions for crime prevention in the broadest sense, urban security projects, urban planning programmes aimed at prevention, following in the footsteps of the first experiences in Chicago and New York, industrial districts, neighbourhood surveillance programmes, local administrative committees, research and surveillance technologies (above all CCTV and Fingerprints, then DNA, Facial Recognition, etc.), recognition and control through the use of artificial intelligence and the manipulation of 'big data'.


All these activities, often confused and without coordination, which intersect and blend together, have had the overall effect of giving rise to a new system of crime control, whose practices are inspired by the new criminology affecting everyday life, but which combines sociological models with behavioural ones and with situational prevention in a strongly integrated and technological perspective.

Theoretically, these preventive security models should have pointed to a set of goals and priorities based on the prevention-safety-reduction cycle of fear-related harm-containment, i.e. a security model different from traditional repressive versions, usually aimed at prosecuting crimes, punishment and restoration of justice. In fact, the opposite is the case.

Indeed, the terrorism-media-political circuit has contributed to linking these participatory models to the predominance of police forces and intelligence agencies in prevention, often excluding criminal justice institutions, and overturning the starting motivations once again. In place of a socialisation of deviance, we saw the introduction of a securitisation of society, often in administrative and grassroots form, where procedural guarantees were skipped in many cases.

In the 1970s, public demand for greater security, combined with socio-psychological "preventive ideologies" inherited from the 1930s, and integrated with the new control doctrines, gradually led to a dual phenomenon, which is the basis of current European prevention policies and practices: on the one hand, a gradual change in the profile and role of police forces in some countries; on the other, a marked process of 'secularisation' of social prevention.

The police were now presenting themselves as more of a public service available to citizens, with the aim of containing fear, disorder and incivility, rather than as a force committed to fighting crime, and in asserting their mission they declared themselves to be attentive to the community spirit. Police and intelligence agencies were assigned the task of identifying and pursuing 'dangerous social behaviour' in the area of pre-crime, without clearly defining what these behaviours were, therefore with a very high level of discretion and poor legal 'predictability'.



The culmination of these two trends was to take place in our day. Under the pressure of terrorism, the European Union will adopt the policing models of the English-speaking world as a preventive security doctrine, but under the regimen of anti-terrorist policies and practices. In essence, states will take over prevention policies within the context of a national security function.

In the 1970s, in fact, another important evolution occurred in the EU as the Trevi Group was formed within its institutions (the European Council meeting in Rome on 1 December 1975). Its inception introduced security issues into European decision-making processes for the first time. Here too we see the gradual transformation of the European Union, from a sectoral and functional body based on the economy and commerce, substantially devoid of security systems and doctrines, to the internal and

external globally integrated security player it has become today under the Lisbon process, the 2016 'Global Strategy' and PESCO in 2017. Very significant resources were to be shifted from welfare to security over the coming years, within the various frameworks and as treaties evolved.

The opening of the continental borders implemented at Schengen highlighted the emergence of new threats. The awareness of this new evolution brought about the Schengen Implementation Agreement (SIA) and at the first Convention of Dublin, policies of cooperation were reinforced in the ambits of justice and security alongside policies of immigration control in the 'Schengen Area'. The policies of a functional type, well embodied by the free circulation, began to extend themselves timidly towards the judiciary (Art 39-47 & Art 67-69 SIA), the fight against organised crime (drug trafficking (Art 70-76 SIA), and new forms of border control (Art 38 SIA), the coordination of policies of asylum and visas (Art 9-27 SIA) and the adoption of the first operative instruments of surveillance and control, like in the Schengen Information System (SIS), a centralised database of 'people and objects', (Art 92-119). ..

From the beginning of the seventies, different European countries were exposed to dramatic terrorist attacks, which started with the bloody Munich massacre at the Olympia stadium and continued to plague Europe up to the end of the eighties, with the shooting down of the Pan Am Flight 103 on 21 December 1988, destroyed by a bomb on the skies of Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew, and 11 more people on the ground.

The Lockerbie massacre also prompted an international reaction because of the large number of nationalities involved. Of the 270 total fatalities, 189 were American citizens and 43 were British citizens. Twenty-one other nationalities were represented, with four or fewer passengers per country. With 189 Americans killed, the bombing was the deadliest act of terrorism against the U.S. prior to the Oklahoma City bombing and the September 11, 2001 attacks. US pressure on Europe to assume a hard line was tangible.

Within this framework, in the 70s Europe made the decision to create its own technical structure to define a strategic response to terrorism and organised crime."

We have described this process towards the new European securitisation models in the Report "Documentation of the OC/TN response approaches and policies" (D.2.4, Bianchi 2017), from which the above citation is taken.

This new 'liquid' approach, where jurisdictional lines among different institutions are blurred, may be interpreted from two perspectives: as a model of social participation, in form of 'participative security', or, contrary to this, as the world of panopticon, theorised by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in his 1975 book *Discipline and Punish*¹⁴, used as a way to illustrate the proclivity of powers to subjugate its citizens, the so-called 'Liquid Surveillance', as suggested by Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon¹⁵.

A substantial role in this evolutive process was played by the UK. The policing philosophy, inherited from the 9 principles of Sir Robert Peel, the inspiring father of the 'Bobby', influenced other Northern European Police forces from the 80s, like the Swedish, Dutch and Danish police and today, thanks to a myriad of EU projects and the massive support of EU networks, became a sort of European standard for preventive activities, often outside the traditional procedural rights and in absence of well-grounded theoretical and procedural frameworks.


¹⁴ Foucault, M., *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, New York, Random House, 1975.

¹⁵ Bauman Z., Lyon D., *Liquid Surveillance. A Conversation*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013.

This process has been facilitated by the fact that judicial cooperation has been activated less slowly than police cooperation throughout the European institutional system. Furthermore, the preventive measures were judged by the European courts as being different in nature with respect to sentencing scenarios, and therefore, in many cases, administrative approaches were favoured rather than judicial means.

In this context, the emergence of a large number of hybrid entities having police and intelligence functions and the exploitation of civil society took place as agencies and projects were established, creating quite a few clashes with the jurisdictional mechanisms in force in the various Member States, where typical procedural logic mindsets still prevail in constitutional systems.

The principle of the EU preventive strategy, copied from the British policing model, rests on two fundamental beliefs: firstly, that law-abiding citizens in the community have the responsibility to participate in the police process. Secondly, it also rests on the belief that solutions to today's complex and diverse community problems demand freeing both community residents and law enforcement to explore creative ways to address neighbourhood concerns *beyond a narrow focus on individual crimes*.



In the United Kingdom the principle of Police primacy means that the Police will be the organisation in ultimate charge of the incident, over the other organisations that may attend. A limited exception to this occurs if the incident involves a fire or other dangerous hazard, in which case the fire service will have overall charge of the area inside the inner cordon where fire fighting or rescue is taking place.

A Gold - Silver - Bronze command structure is used by emergency services of the United Kingdom to establish a hierarchical framework for the command and control of major and critical incidents. The structure was created by the UK Metropolitan Police in 1985 directly after a serious riot in North London on the evening of 6 October where Police Constable Keith Blakelock was murdered. The Gold Commander is in overall control of their organisation's resources at the incident. They will not be on site, but at a distant control room, Gold Command, where they will formulate the strategy for dealing with the incident.

The Silver Commander is the senior member of the organisation at the scene, in charge of all their resources. They decide how to utilise these resources to achieve the strategic aims of the Gold Commander; they determine the tactics used.

A Bronze Commander directly controls the organisations resources at the incident and will be found with their staff working on scene.

In the U.S. a similar system is in place which combines National Incident Management System (NIMS) with incident command system (ICS) and has in the Police its core.

This policy produced in Europe several practices of public-private cooperation, mainly through ‘dual’ legislation (Directives) or grassroots initiatives and networks, in the area of prevention, accompanied by a number of public services, like ‘hotlines’, participative meetings, exchange of information or tools to detect alleged a-social behaviours with the pious intention to predict their potential evolution towards violence and terrorism and large communication campaigns through social media. In all these preventive activities the police took the lead.

This has consequences in some key aspects of the ongoing prevention, particularly on the public-private partnership and the role of the civil society within the preventive activities. The relevance of administrative measures in contrast to judiciary approach is another element inherited from the central European community models. Like in the old ‘Early Prevention Projects’ of the ‘30th’, today citizens, police and intelligence try to detect ‘early signs of radicalisation or criminality’, but contrary to the projects of the old times, today they take repressive measures in form of ‘safeguard’ against potential perpetrators before they are supposed to commit their crimes and therefore LEAs and Intelligence activate protective operations in the absence of jurisdictionalized procedures and lacking a clear definition of *what is a social danger* and *how it can be understood and perceived by potential perpetrators and stakeholders*. Proportionality of the measures and clear definition and predictability of the dangerous social behaviours remain vague and pave the way for potentially arbitrary and unrestrained administrative decisions, in presence of high numbers of false positive and negatives and a dangerous stigmatisation of individuals and whole communities.

These elements have contributed to transforming public-private collaboration from an element of socio-psychological prevention, as it was at the beginning, into an extended surveillance system. Rather than having the private social sphere penetrate police mechanisms, the ‘fruit salad solutions’ have encouraged the enlargement of intelligence and police activities within the private domain. Security and surveillance have become two central issues of general policy, through which we try to control collective behaviour and ideas, and to forge local and international political alliances.

As in the United States, China, Russia and Israel, in Europe these preventive models based on control have led to the development of new models of security governance, with an increasingly greater role for private companies in the management and development of control and security, outside of legal procedures, and widening the distance between citizens and institutions.

The EU Internet Forum, and the European Union Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU), in connection with the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) are good examples of how the deregulated models of security management operate in the new global society:

“on a very delicate topic, like freedom of thought, opinions and press, a forum is created and then accompanied by a well-funded network. One of the first results of this ‘Forum’ is the joint database of hashes, established and managed by private companies, but as part of the counter-terrorism activities of the Commission. This system appeals to partnership with the private societies managing the main mass media and to their company codes, with the support of agencies such as Europol. It decides which contents can be published or which to cut, considered terrorist or radical, based upon opaque criteria, related to individual ideas on hate speech, radicalisation, or terrorism, but always without a trial or judiciary procedure. Therefore, the right to defence, according to these multi-national systems far away from the citizen, is largely reduced and the arbitrators multiply. All this in the name of abstract ideas upon what is more or less radical, more or less hate speech.” (Sergio Bianchi, 2017)

Also in this field the UK played a pivotal role. The European model is the exact copy of the Home Office departments Extremism Analysis Unit (EAU) and the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU). EAU and RICU are the governmental propaganda arms of the British government to shape the “hearts and minds” of their citizens on the vague concept of ‘British values’, a typical instrumentation of the Cold War propaganda units, which uses today the Terms and Conditions of the private social media platforms or their communications agreements to contrast anti-government as well as extremist propaganda (opposition) of any sort, in the total absence of procedural rights.

In order to implement this type of ‘preventive’ measures against *pre-crime social behaviours*, based upon simplistic evolutive scales (like the Moghaddam scale) or the ‘conveyor belt’ theory, ‘Information Sharing Agreements’ (ISA) have been introduced into the legal framework and the practices, to allow the gathering and exchange of sensible information concerning natural persons between public and private bodies without involving judiciary authorities and outside legal procedural frameworks. Some countries, like Denmark, have changed their law, while others, like Slovakia, changed even the Constitution to follow the abstract theories on the radicalisation process, in absence of a real scientific model of radicalisation, or in some cases even in absence of threats or attacks or victims.

Recently, the ‘Prevent’ program in education was under the scrutiny of the British justice¹⁶, which left open the very critical point concerning the ‘predictability’ of behaviours and the applicability of ‘Prevent’ within the educational sector.

1.5. Limitations of the current European prevention strategies

The analysis of current critical issues is important in order to understand the reasons for the Preventive Police Guidelines, which are the subject of the next chapter.

Indeed, there are strong doubts on the effectiveness of current prevention models, all of which refer to the psychological philosophies in vogue in the 1930s combined with instruments of ‘situational prevention’, but that do not take into account the limitations experienced by their precursors in the 1970s and over time, nor the impact that these contemporary choices have today on the socio-political system in the broadest sense, on the level of rights and political legitimacy, in a narrower sense, and above all on the real prevention of crime in its various forms.

Recently, some reports and assessments have highlighted numerous critical issues of the ‘Prevent’ model, which has inspired European strategy since 2005¹⁷, related to the confusion of roles between public and private sectors (*the fruit salad*) and on the transformation of civil society into *‘the eyes and ears of the police’*, as recalled in the writings of Ronald V. Clarke & John Eck¹⁸, citing the catch-phrase of the British forces.

¹⁶<http://www.brickcourt.co.uk/news/pdf/high-court-rules-on-prevent-duty-guidance-issued-to-higher-education-institutions> and two recent sentences concerning data retention by police forces *R (Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and ACPO* and *R (T) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis*

¹⁷ Council of the European Union, Doc. 14469/04/05

¹⁸Ronald Clarke & John Eck, *Become a Problem Solving Crime Analyst in 55 Steps*, Italian version Università di Trento, 2008, Ch. 6 (original version London, Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, University College, 2003)

More recently, the Prevent Strategy of 2011, as incorporated in the Security Act 2015, has raised strong criticism on the part of UK public opinion¹⁹. The accusation is that these models are inefficient, produce social polarisation and conflict within the community and violate fundamental principles²⁰.

The theoretical background of Prevent and the whole strategy against the so-called 'radicalisation' have been independently contested because they risk creating an unwieldy surveillance model in schools, hospitals, and other social public contexts, not on the basis of relevant information or investigations, but rather the shadow of a new anti-Muslim McCarthyism.

*"The Government's proposals rest on the assumption that there is an escalator that starts with religious conservatism and ends with support for violent jihadism, and that violence is therefore best tackled by curtailing or placing restrictions on religious conservatism. However, it is by no means proven or agreed that religious conservatism, in itself, correlates with support for violent jihadism. The aim should be to tackle extremism that leads to violence, not to suppress views with which the Government disagrees."*²¹

These concerns at an institutional level are today all the more current because, as the campaigns against 'radicalism' evolve into those against 'polarisation', they risk impacting groups of citizens and dissent movements with manipulative techniques (the 'population approach' evolved from epiteiological to security campaigns), typical of counter-insurgency in war zones, but applied to our peaceful societies, where ideas cannot be compared to diseases and forms of opposition are not necessarily a threat. The use of mass psychological manipulation techniques applied to civil society is very risky. On the other hand, it would not be the first time that psychiatrists and sociologists lend themselves to psychological warfare to conquer 'hearts and minds' - and in some cases even the bodies - of those who do not submit to power.

A similar concept was expressed by a large group of academics known as 'CAGE', which published a very critical assessment on the theoretical basis of 'Prevent' in 2016. In the report *'The Science of Pre-Crime: The secret 'radicalisation' study underpinning prevent'*²² the NGO highlighted how the limited research of 2010 of Monica Lloyd and Christopher Dean (later classified as secret),

"were incorporated into the UK government's PREVENT and CHANNEL programmes. This secret study formed the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+) – a tool that would eventually be used by professionals in order to assess the pathways to 'radicalisation' that individuals take. In the summer of 2015, the government placed PREVENT and CHANNEL on a statutory footing through the CounterTerrorism and Security Act 2015, and with it, the 'radicalisation' factors and pathways developed through the ERG22+ also attained statutory significance. (...) Until the publication of the journal piece by Lloyd and Dean, there had been no scrutiny of the ERG22+ process, methodology or 'science'. Our conclusions rest on three main themes: 1. The authors have not provided sufficient evidence to support the ERG22+'s 'science'. 2. The study's conclusions have been implemented far beyond the original intention. 3. A process that should have only ever been used by experts in a limited circumstance has been opened up to the entire public sector."

¹⁹ <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CDP-2017-0036/CDP-2017-0036.pdf>

²⁰ House of Lords-House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Extremism, Second Report of Session 2016-2017, HL paper 39, HC

²¹ <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/105/105.pdf>

²² <https://cage.ngo/publication/the-science-of-pre-crime/>

In reality, the criticisms of the 'Prevent' model, and indirectly of the whole of the current European strategy, go much deeper. In some respects, they recall the findings of criminologists such as McCord on behaviourist theories in vogue between the 1930s and 1970s; for others they touch the core of the relationship between the rule of the law and surveillance; finally, for others, they culminate in political criticism.

The limitations of these modern prevention models can be summarised in the following points, which the Cube takes into account in its modelling approach:

A. The Rule of Law

The stigmatisation of specific social groups is not only wrong because it responds to false stereotypes (Devine, 1995; Levine & Moreland, 1995), but above all, because it creates or nurtures the phenomenon we want to fight, it alienates groups citizens from the rights of citizenship, subjecting them to forms of control, surveillance and social pressure based on their ideas, beliefs, race, or political orientation. Thus, the surveillance policies themselves risk becoming crime-engendering.

In the United States, the entire NYPD programme has been the focus of accusations (mention UCLA and Handshuh Case Law)²³ and the cases *Salman Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department*, *R (Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and ACPO* and *R (T) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis*²⁴, two linked appeals concerning retention of data by the police, indicate that the same direction will also apply to Europe.

Current models of public-private partnerships, led by police or intelligence, are likely to create an *extrajudicial space* in which informal and anomalous investigations are carried out on persons or groups improperly considered suspicious by other citizens or by groups opposed to these and reported in various ways, also anonymously.

Para-administrative investigations are conducted without authorisation by jurisdictional bodies, sensitive data is collected, witnesses are heard, evidence is gathered, even personal and administrative measures against property are taken, in the total absence of judicial authorisation and, therefore, without assuring the right to information and defence to people suspected of an unknown but dangerous thing such as 'pre-crime'. All this takes place on the basis of abstract 'social danger' indicators and absolutely arbitrary criminological models which have been academically challenged.

Thanks to the testimonies of Paul Wills,²⁵ in the legal case of *Salman Butt*²⁶ we learn, for example, that the spread of such sensitive extra-judicial data can have a dramatic and large-scale impact on individuals and entire communities. Willis explains that the information gathered by the Unit could have far reaching consequences, even internationally:

²³

file:///H:/AGENFOR%20INTERNATIONAL/GESTIONE%20PROGETTI/TAKEDOWN/WP%204/4.4/NYULawReview-90-5-Wasserman.pdf

²⁴ For these two cases please see Sessexcourt.co.uk/supreme-court-allows-linked-appeals-r-catt-v-commissioner-police-metropolis-acpo-r-t-v-commissioner-police-metropolis-2015-uksc-9-police-retention-data-jere/

²⁵ Paul Wills is the head of The Extremism Analysis Unit (EAU) within Prevent and operates directly under the authority of the UK Home Secretary who is accountable to Parliament. The testimony from Paul Willis as the Head of the EAU summarises the work that his department is responsible for.

²⁶ The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Dr Salman Butt (2016) Queen's Bench Division, High Court, Statement of Matt Collins

“The data (gathered within Prevent) may be disclosed to other organisations which may include other government departments and agencies, local authorities, police and other law enforcement agencies, courts and other judicial bodies, foreign governments and other authorities, foreign law enforcement and judicial bodies, and fraud prevention bodies.”²⁷

This entire model, which was adopted by Europol, is hardly ascribable to the legal principles of the Stockholm Programme [Swedish Roadmap], to the requirements of proportionality, predictability of behavioural impact, quality and understanding of the law, which underlie the established jurisprudence of the ECtHR in matters of prevention.

Furthermore, it implies a different governance of security, compared to that adopted in several Member States, as well as procedural models unrelated to common practices.

In the U.S. since 2004 new federal Information Sharing Environment (ISE) were instituted, to share information both internally and with the state police, the FBI, Fusion Centers, and other local agencies. As a consequence of this new approach, at least one terrorism liaison officer (TLO)²⁸ was assigned to each department involved to collate and transfer the information to the appropriate agencies within the ISE. Finally, in October 2007, President Bush announced the new National Strategy for Information Sharing that sets priorities for information sharing and establishes an integrated national capability for terrorism-related information sharing among federal, state, local, and tribal officials, the private sector, and foreign partners.

B. Defiance and Criminalisation

Models such as 'Prevent' are likely to adversely trigger the worst prejudices of large population segments who have become sensitive to media campaigns and fake news, turning good citizens into serial informers who overload investigative information gathering, creating dangerous polarisation processes. Moreover, the social stigmatisation of diverse communities, minorities, ideas, identities and their criminalisation through imaginative indicators, when not criminogenic (detached from a judicial procedure), engenders widespread suspicion, overloading investigation work and disrupting prioritisation criteria in matters of police cooperation, investigations and real prevention.

Perhaps it is also for this reason that a large part of the attacks from 2004 to today have been committed by people already known to the police and the Intelligence community, but whose prioritisation and consequent appropriate response from the police and intelligence forces has been lacking in terms of surveillance, and security protective measures. This is clear evidence of how the signals deriving from the multiple victimisation present in most criminals who have then committed serious crimes of terrorism, have not been detected by the LEAs and Intelligence forces, already overwhelmed in pursuing the ghosts of radicals reported by citizens frightened by the immigrants in their neighbourhoods.

²⁷ Statement of Paul Willis, pg. 9. See also CAGE, *Home Office Blacklisted: The secretive Home Office Units silencing voices of dissent*, London, Cage Advocacy, 2017, pg. 9.

²⁸ <http://www.tlo.org/training/index.htm> The Fusion Center Guidelines (<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ise/guidelines.pdf>) was created jointly by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in an effort to facilitate information sharing among law enforcement agencies. Another helpful document is The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, published in October 2003 by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA): http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/NCISP_Plan.pdf

Data emerging from the 2017 H.O. Prevent Report ²⁹ confirms that these policies generate a high number of false positives and false negatives, which do not remain without consequences as a result of preventive and repressive actions by the police.

In 2015/16, a total of 7,631 individuals were subject to a referral due to concerns that they were vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. The education sector made the most referrals (2,539) accounting for 33%, followed by the police (2,377) accounting for 31% of referrals. Of the 7,631 individuals referred in 2015/16, 2,766 (36%) left the process requiring no further action, 3,793 (50%) were signposted to alternative services and 1,072 (14%) were deemed suitable, through preliminary assessment, to be discussed at a Channel panel.

In 2015/16, 381 people received Channel support following a Channel panel. Of these, 365 (96%) individuals have subsequently left the process, and 16 (4%) are currently still receiving Channel support. Of those who have left the Channel process, 302 (83%) did so with their vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism judged as having been successfully reduced. The remaining 63 (17%) individuals withdrew from the Channel process, although in some cases support from other services may still be in place and any terrorism risk that might be present is managed by the police.

At the end of this extensive para-investigative work, which required the deployment of many thousands of agents and public staff and huge investments, the result is represented by 16 cases still receiving Channel support. It's not clear whether even a single attack has been prevented, while is very clear that between 2015 and 2017 several attacks were carried out. Moreover, the very expensive price of this policy is the disenfranchisement of large part of Muslims from their citizenship and their loyalty to the state. Was it worth?

Furthermore, as a third element, these prevention policies tend to generate a criminogenic effect that Paul Ekblom has defined as 'defiance':

"Defiance occurs when offenders challenge the legitimacy of prevention efforts and commit more offences rather than fewer. It has been suggested that some offenders act this way in response to being arrested for domestic violence. Defiance is more likely when the police are perceived to be unfair and heavy handed and there is evidence that people are more law abiding when police treat them fairly, even if the outcome is not what people desire"³⁰

The 'defiance' effect is one of the causes that can certainly help us to explain why serious crime phenomena are present here and there and in various forms throughout the various Member States.

There are two other consequences of these massive public awareness campaigns that are barely considered by political decision-makers and which may be added to the three highlighted so far: encouraging a climate of fear which does not correspond to factual reality, statistical trends or threat metrics, exposes security systems to political manipulation. The use of fear as an instrument of political struggle in media circles³¹ is a reality yet to be explored. We should also focus attention on how these policies are exposed to international destabilisation strategies by means of proxies, trolls and actual asymmetric cyber-war campaigns aimed at threatening social cohesion.

²⁹ Home Office, *Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2015 to March 2016* Statistical Bulletin 23/17, 9 November 2017

³⁰Ronald Clarke & John Eck, *Become a Problem Solving Crime Analyst in 55 Steps*, Italian version Università di Trento, 2008, Ch. 12 (original version London, Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, University College, 2003

³¹ David L. Altheide, *Terrorism and the Politics of Fear*, Lanham, Maryland, AltaMira Press, 2006

Finally, the fifth element, connected to this last aspect, is the phenomenon whereby security policies induce polarisation mechanisms within the national fabric; these in turn spawn internal conflicts, with serious consequences on domestic political cohesion.

C. Ownership and Coordination

The combination of community police work and 'broken windows methods'³² leaves the ownership of public-private prevention mechanisms to the police, like in the UK, or to intelligence agencies, like in Denmark. This is the logical consequence of the 'golden rule', i.e. the British security doctrine which foresees police supremacy in this type of critical event.

This ownership, however, can generate numerous undesirable effects. The first concerns the fact that the tools available to police forces and intelligence agencies in many countries, their duties and roles, are not adequate for social, educational or psychological prevention policies, which, manifestly, represent the facade of the 'safeguard' approach. In Denmark, for example, intelligence agencies govern the 'Safe Houses', while in the Netherlands this role is assigned to the police and in Belgium to the new 'CUTE' agencies, which operate beyond all institutional competences. In all cases there is a problem of trust, competences, aims and procedures among the various civil institutions involved (usually municipalities, schools, welfare and health care) and the security and justice systems (LEAs, Intelligence and Judges).

In the first phase of 'Prevent' implementation in the UK, this inter-institutional mistrust emerged to such an extent that legal measures were instated in 2015 to enforce 'Prevent' as a collaboration framework common to civil entities in society. Until then, civil society had largely boycotted the strategy.

The second element is of greater relevance. In fact, if it is the police forces that are assigned to prevention roles, then social entities tend to relinquish their spheres of responsibility and become disenfranchised. In essence, the security approach to prevention produces the result that social capital is lost to prevention methods, solely to the benefit of measures that inevitably converge to the usual tactics of surveillance and repression. These, in turn, risk producing more damage than solutions in situations where crimes have not yet been committed and where socially dangerous behaviour is defined in a vague and often prejudicial manner.

For this reason, the Flemish Region preferred to pass the ownership of these preventive contrast operations to the social institutions, with a 3-step model based on increasing gravity: first-level responsibility is assigned to direct practitioners (e.g. the schools); then, if the problem is not resolved at that level, the territorial institutions intervene and, finally, the police forces and the judicial system are engaged if the problem impacts security.³³ In some ways, these interventions are based on the socio-psychological philosophies of the 1930s, rather than on modern control systems and surveillance procedures implemented by intelligence and police forces.

Conversely, Italy is a rare example of jurisdictionalisation in prevention measures, with a clear division of roles and functions, albeit with the adoption of preventive measures which are among the toughest in the world. Municipalities and other local authorities are responsible for measures that are strictly

³² James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, *Broken Windows*, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 29-38, 1982

³³ The 'Antwerpen Model', we describe here, is the result of our interviews with CVE experts at the Police School in Munchen (2017); For a formal description of the process http://www.fdfa.be/sites/default/files/atoms/files/actieplan_radicalisering_eng.pdf

social in nature, while police forces implement preventive security measures under the authority and control of the judicial authorities, who may, in some cases, also intervene directly with similar intent.

Security measures and preventive measures, while fulfilling functions that may partially overlap since they are both aimed at preventing the danger of offences being committed, differ from a structural and legal point of view because: (1) security measures assume the execution of a fact clearly defined from a legal perspective (or offence or, as in the cases referenced in Articles 49 and 115 of the Italian Criminal Code, of so-called 'quasi-offence'); (2) prevention measures, on the other hand, disregard this assumption and are applied on the basis of indications envisaged by specific laws (see, for example, Article 1 of Law No. 1423 of 1965). The new “Anti-Mafia Code”, consolidating the legislation on anti-Mafia action and preventive measures concerning individuals and property, came into force in September 2011. It repealed Act no. 1423/1956 but did not alter the categories of individuals considered as social dangers. As regards the procedure for the imposition of preventive and security measures, section 7 of the Italian Legislative Decree prescribes that, at the request of the individual concerned, clear procedural rights are set. Lastly, in February 2015 the Italian Government adopted Legislative Decree no. 7, which subsequently became Act no. 43 of 17 April 2015, containing urgent measures to combat international terrorism. As a result, new terrorist offences have been included in the Criminal Code, notably one relating to travel by foreign fighters for terrorist purposes. In addition, the scope of preventive measures concerning individuals (and property) has been extended. A new measure involving confiscation of passports and identity cards has been introduced.

However, with the case '*De Tomaso v. Italy*'³⁴, the European principle of legality with respect to prevention measures has been further strengthened in Italy. The Court of Strasbourg has established that the quality of laws is a fundamental criterion for establishing the application of preventive personal and property-related measures. Socially dangerous or harmful behaviour, which forms the basis of preventive and security measures, must be precisely identified, accessible to the persons concerned and predictable in its effects.

Paradoxically, the reasons for the good standing of Italian practices in combating terrorism and organised crime lie in the implementation of a model that precisely opposes those of the English-speaking world: professionalisation of investigations and intelligence, separation of roles and procedural jurisdictionalisation are conducive to strong territorial control³⁵, which is considered to be the fundamental asset of prevention.

³⁴ <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-171804>

³⁵ Since its start in May 2017, the operation “periferie sicure” involved mainly policemen of the Italian National Police and Carabinieri (12.000). They carried out controls involving 55.000 persons, 10.000 vehicles and arrested 327 perpetrators, filing 849 legal claims and issuing 123 preventive measures. The parallel operation “città sicure” deployed 3.600 police staff, and resulted in 1.300 controls, 13.000 identified persons and 50 arrests.

2. Guidelines for prevention

From the previous paragraphs, it is clear how the work of police forces, intelligence agencies and judicial authorities, albeit implementing diverse national models, today must face new challenges related to the emergence of prevention activities which are not well codified nor consolidated, to the entry of new non-state actors into national prevention systems, as well as to the presence (and sometimes interferences) of international bodies at various levels and with various responsibilities.

The heart of these new challenges is represented by the relationship between security and rights, states and citizens, in globalised systems characterised by a high degree of available information and digitisation of security, but in the absence of the typical element of police activities: crime.

We have also seen that SCP represents a particularly effective fusion model among the various prevention techniques. However, the application of SCP techniques has also widened the differences between civil society, communities, citizens, states and fundamental rights, creating new contradictions in the applicability of its prevention strategies, if implemented in transnational contexts, with multiple jurisdictions, and where traditionally, different policing models are applied.

Let us continue with some examples to better understand the context. The Berlin Wall at the time of the DDR or the wall built by Israel against the Palestinian insurgency are certainly situational prevention tools that have proven their effectiveness according to the preventive logic of their respective governments. In both cases, as in many others, these 'hard measures' were justified by security motivations and they certainly helped to protect a segment of their citizens, usually that group harboured by the system in power. But the additional questions that arise today with respect to the past are: are these solutions in line with international law? Are they accepted by the population or, in other words, by the various communities and sub-groups that make up the population, citizens and non-citizens? What is the impact of these measures on the country system, and, more generally, on the world context, considering the proliferation of state and non-state actors, local, national, regional and international players in the global social fabric? And finally, are the costs of constructing and managing these control and surveillance systems proportional to the real threat level?

Many academics argue that gigantic investments in security, which detract resources from welfare, are not justified by the level of the threat, nor, above all, are they really useful in reducing crime levels which are already relatively low.

In the specific cases of terrorism and organised crime, we must also ask whether the institutional transformation called for by preventive security policies is not only effective, but above all, if it is in line with the global institutional framework, both at national and international levels, and with the legal traditions of the country that adopts them.

Finally, we must assess the impact and sustainability of these prevention systems, if measured on a longitudinal basis and considered in a global manner, taking into account all the values, groups and sub-groups at stake.

In fact, in many cases the *fear-security-media-politics cycle* can create damage far superior to what it aims to cure. Phenomena such as Brexit or the new social polarisation processes threatening the cohesion of various EU states, or the raging ascent of populism under the pressure of unfounded fears,

are precisely attributable to this pernicious cycle, where events, as stated by John Mueller, are appraised far beyond the significance of their factual dynamics and real nature.³⁶

So it is not so much a problem of the 'right to privacy', as is often advocated by supporters of human rights, but primarily and above all, it is a problem of control, of truly effective measures for society's benefit, of the role of government with respect to citizens, supra-state bodies and general priorities of the community. In short, this is a classic problem of power.

In conclusion, this is an eminently high-priority political issue, since the control and surveillance of security systems can create an imbalance in the democratic fabric with the aim of stabilising (or destabilising) the ruling elites and preventing the free renewal of the ruling classes, the functionality of the social revolving door, which is a guarantee of weights and balances in modern systems to prevent oligarchic and dictatorial processes³⁷.

2.1. Seven guidelines for prevention towards the cube model

In some ways, prevention is a new discipline in the security scenario, even if it has been under discussion for a long time now.

There are four new elements that characterise the current debate on prevention:

1. Differently to the past, the models focus on the area of 'pre-crime', in that legal limbo where the definition of social danger is the key to understanding potential escalations;
2. Substantial differences exist between the legal perspective, focusing on 'social dangers', and the police approach, concentrated on 'risk indicators'. The first leads towards security and preventive judicial procedures, while the second more in the direction of administrative approaches;
3. Police and Intelligence agencies play new roles in 'pre-criminal' prevention as an integral part of their mission and operations, often integrating their operational models and, in many cases, releasing themselves from judicial control;
4. Individuals and civil society organisations play increasingly newer roles in an apparently multiple governance of security.

This has resulted in a security discipline substantially different from that of the traditional police, always aimed more at repressing and fighting various forms of crime, rather than prevention in general.

We define this activity as a 'prevention police work'. It is above all an activity that, as we will see in the next chapter, implies multi-agency and multidimensional aspects, which are often ill-suited to the typical procedures underlying investigative, intelligence or judicial activities and also very different from the traditional sociological or psychological preventive methods aimed at tackling the 'root causes' of the phenomena.

³⁶ Mueller J, *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them*, Simon & Schuster, 2009. And Mueller J and Stewart MG (2016) Lawfare blog: *Conflating terrorism and insurgency*, in <https://www.lawfareblog.com/conflating-terrorism-and-insurgency>

³⁷ Michels R., *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens*, Leipzig, Werner Klinkhardt, 1911

Finally, it is an activity that today in Europe is largely deregulated and devoid of technical-procedural dimensions typical of the judicial system, and which is causing heated discussions about the implications in terms of rights, freedoms and control in the so-called 'pre-crime' area.

The debate between surveillance theorists and advocates of privacy rights, especially in the post-Snowden era, is polarised around the role of police forces and intelligence agencies in prevention operations, as we have seen. Therefore, the primary objective of these Prevention Guidelines is to

- redesign the different roles and how police and intelligence relate to the more global system of general prevention;
- verify the compatibility between the prevention police models present in Europe with respect to the legislative and regulatory framework emerging from European 'soft' and 'hard' jurisprudence;
- understand the implications of the de-jurisdictionalisation of police prevention procedures;
- deploy evaluation tools which are inclusive of the measures undertaken, in order to prioritise activities in line with factual reality.

What we describe below is a model of preventive security analysis, through 7 Guidelines, which is grounded in a different LEA operational approach and Intelligence in prevention, in a very clear relationship with the new social players emerging in the security field.

This model must be tested and validated by means of a tool we call the 'Cube', as an evolution of the more traditional 'crime triangle', with which we will draft various scenarios to understand what works, what fails and, above all, HOW to proceed in the prevention of organised crime and terrorism

Guideline 1:

Different types of prevention prevail depending on the actors involved and the events to be prevented. In any case, each actor applies proprietary rules deriving from its assigned general function. Respect for this diversity is essential for security to function properly.

In the case of prevention, the rules of the chain of command and the prevalence of the police forces, which are common to many countries for major and critical events, cannot be applied. This is determined by a simple reason: in a prevention context the event has still not occurred. In fact, in most cases, the crime does not exist as such and this implies significant operational and legal consequences.

Paradoxically, then, when a crime occurs, we leave the domain of pre-crime prevention activities and enter that of criminal investigation, i.e. a context governed by regulation, guarantees for suspects, contradictory debates and jurisdiction. So prevention is multi-faceted.

In 'pre-crime' prevention, we must consider that many problems arise through the failure of some institution – business, government agency, or other organisation, in some cases also the police – to conduct its business in a way that prevents crime rather than causing it. As Clarke (2006) noticed, many problems occur because one or more institutions are unable or unwilling to undertake a preventive strategy, or because these institutions have intentionally established a circumstance that stimulates crimes or disorder. This creates risky facilities and other concentrations of crime. Solving problems usually requires the active cooperation of the people and institutions that have failed to take into account the conditions that lead to the problem. These people have shifted the ownership of the problem from their shoulders to the shoulders of the police. Consequently, an important goal of any problem-solving process is to get them to assume ownership and the related social responsibility.

SCP envisaged a multiple prevention model based on *capable guardians* (related to the targets), and *handlers* (someone who knows the offender well and who is in a position to exert some control over his or her actions. Handlers include parents, siblings, teachers, friends and spouses), up to the *place managers* (persons who have some responsibility for controlling behaviour in the specific location such as a bus conductor or teacher in a school)³⁸.

The fact that they are many does not mean that they are equal and that relations between them are of the 'fruit salad' type. They are many and each has its own agenda, which can often be dissimilar or competitive with respect to the others. E.g. arms markets, which can play an important role in prevention, are unlikely to have the same interests as victims.

Security-related prevention and preventive security measures managed by the LEAs, possibly within the framework of actions under the supervision of the judiciary, are activities that are substantially different from those of social or psychological prevention and imply actions of last resort.

Intelligence agencies, which also implement roles attributed to *institutional place managers*, in some respects, are not LEAs in most Member States. Therefore, its invaluable information aimed at security-related prevention requires a separate third-party jurisdictional function, in order that it may be configured as a means of prevention, which is usually ensured by the judiciary.

These agencies are bodies which answer to the state and adhere to government-endorsed logical principles, which usually represent a part of the country, normally its majority. But we must not forget that in democratic systems, also minorities and oppositions have rights, often with the aim of subverting majorities.

Unlike these agencies, however, the capable guardians and handlers, perform preventive functions and can apply measures that are not security-related, but are of a social and psychological nature. These agencies are part of civil society and their agendas do not always coincide with those of the government of the moment. Therefore, also in this context, distinctions and separation policies are good practices which ensure freedom and the rule of law.

Guideline 2:

There is not one unique prevention police work model.

Prevention policing in Europe presents itself as a complex puzzle of diverse police, intelligence and prosecution models across the various territories.

In view of this and the presence of diversified legislative frameworks, today it is very difficult to conceive of a single European police organisational model, with all the implications this has on investigations, the admissibility of court evidence, the supervision of the LEAs and the role of intelligence.

EVOLUTION OF PREVENTION WITHIN DIFFERENT EU POLICE FORCES

Italy Traditionally LEAs are the executive body of the national authorities more for public order and security than prevention. At European level there are different organisational and institutional structures of the Law Enforcement Agencies in relation to preventive measures.

³⁸ For these theories see John Eck (2003), *Police Problems: The Complexity of Problem Theory, Research and Evaluation*, In Problem Oriented Policing: From Innovation to Mainstream. Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 15, 2003 edited by Johannes Knutsson. Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press.

In Italy, for example, the Ministry of Interior has command over the five police forces which operate throughout the country, exercising its authority over them through its Department of Public Security (DPS). The DPS is headed by the “Chief of Police - Director General of Public Security” who is appointed by the President of the Italian Republic upon recommendation of the Ministry of Interior (political institutions).

The DPS is in charge of the technical and operational coordination of law enforcement activities carried out by the 4 national police forces (Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, Polizia Penitenziaria). Their investigations are supervised and coordinated through the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and each one sits structurally in different Ministries: Polizia di Stato is Ministry of Interior, Arma dei Carabinieri, which now incorporated also the former Corpo Forestale dello Stato, Ministry of Defence; Guardia di Finanza, Ministry of Economy and Finance and Polizia Penitenziaria which depends from the Ministry of Justice, where also prosecuting and judicial functions are located.

The DPS manages, supports and administrates the five police forces through its coordination boards, multi-agency schools, information structures and joint databases. The DPS’s role increased over time with a view to maximising overall law enforcement efficiency and extending its duty towards the area of prevention from a new perspective.

Only from 1978 the ‘political police’- as it was called in the Fascist era- assumes the new formal definition of ‘prevention police’, as central direction of the DPS. However a clear distinction remains between the functions and the methods of the LEAs and Intelligence Agencies. From a juridical, procedural perspective, considering also their powers, LEAs and Intelligence are in Italy separate universes with multiple channels of communication within well-established legal procedures and strict controls. When they merge, as for example within the C.A.S.A., the judicial functions are excluded.

Republic of Ireland

Compared with the Italian (or French or Spanish) policing model, a very different and exemplary LEA is represented by An Garda Síochána (The Guardians of the Peace) in Ireland, which has as motto ‘Working with Communities to Protect and Serve’. The force provides both local and national policing with a very high degree of preventive practices and policies.

“Garda” is under the responsibility of the Irish Minister for Justice and Law Reform, which is responsible to the Government for the performance of An Garda Síochána. The Garda Commissioner is responsible for the general direction, management and control of the force.

An Garda Síochána is a community-based organization with more than 12,000 police and civilian employees throughout the country, listening to, acting for and working with the community.

An Garda Síochána core functions include firstly crime prevention and detection and working with communities to prevent anti-social behaviour.

La ‘Garda’ è probabilmente il modello più avanzato, dinamico ed effettivo di polizia di prevenzione esistente in Europa nel quadro di una forza di ‘community police’, che si situa agli opposti dei tradizionali modelli di polizia statale di derivazione militare.

U.K.

Past history plays also an important role in European policing models aimed at prevention. The United Kingdom, for example, does not have a single national police force, considering the necessity to respect the territorial specificities (England with all its counties, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales). Therefore, instead of one police, there are 44 geographic forces in England and Wales, and a single force in Scotland and in Northern Ireland. A very similar ‘federal’ structure is operative in Germany.

However, in the UK each force is led by a Chief Constable who is accountable to law, to the Home Secretary and to local democratic oversight. Democratic oversight is provided by elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in most areas and by the Mayor’s Office in London. Specialist police forces that work alongside the geographic forces include the British Transport Police, the Ministry of Defence Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.

The purpose of the UK police service, as defined by the “ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values”, is a combination between traditional policing models, community police in the style of ‘Garda’ and ‘intelligence-led LEA’. The ACPO statement prescribes: “to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen’s Peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do all this with integrity, common sense and sound judgment. We must be compassionate, courteous and patient, acting without fear or favour or prejudice to the rights of others.”

‘To prevent crime’, the Police Service works extremely closely with the numerous intelligence agencies in the UK on many joint operations and investigations, going far beyond the point when executive action of the police is needed. Over the years, a unique and close relationship has developed between the Security Service and Police Special Branches towards preventive policing models. More recently, this relationship has expanded significantly and now includes other parts of the Police Service.

“In 1984 the relationship between the Service and Police Special Branches was codified in the form of a set of Home Office guidelines for Chief Constables. The main objective of the guidelines was to suggest the way in which the Security Service and Special Branches should work together, and what their respective roles should be. The guidelines focused on the position of Special Branches as the main interface between the Security Service and the Police Service as a whole.

In addition to their responsibilities for policing the local force area and for preserving public order, Special Branches were to provide direct assistance to the Security Service by collecting information in support of our national security intelligence work. The guidelines emphasised the important role played by Special Branches in ensuring that the separate interests of both the Police and the Security Service were properly preserved.”³⁹

Information exchange between LEAs and Intelligence is mandatory within the ongoing Strategic Policing Requirement of the Home Office.

This multiplicity of models (traditional LEAs, preventive police, community police, Gendarmerie, etc.) is not negative in itself, because it corresponds to strongly consolidated realities within the national

³⁹ James Smart Lecture by the Director General of the Security Service, Dame Stella Rimington, 2017 - See more at: <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/intelligence-security-and-the-law#sthash.lzYigtFI.dpuf>

systems, which are precisely those charged with the responsibility for security. Although it may seem paradoxical in the light of continuous discussion on 'harmonisation', today's differences between the various police models must be considered as an added value for transnational investigations, for relations between states, the EU, European Agencies, Interpol, the UN and the various legal jurisdictions at national, European and international level, because they render security models consistent with national institutional, legal frameworks, quantitative dimensions of the threats at MS levels and with the political priorities of each Member States.

However, what is not yet well regulated, neither at European nor at international level, where there is ample room for manoeuvring and improvement, is the specific question of **multi-agency police prevention**, where issues of policy, practices and law remain open and where national policies and practices are still undergoing development and transformation.

Police prevention is a relatively new discipline within the framework of security activities. It derives from the traditional functions of the 'political police' in countries with a strongly centralised state structure, and from 'community police' practices in the English-speaking and northern European countries. It has a high information value, because it uses methods that today we call 'intelligence-led policing', while maintaining a profile that is substantially different from the activities, methods and missions of intelligence agencies, which have a different institutional qualification, different powers and a different role with respect to the Law Enforcement Agencies. This aspect is of primary importance in agencies such as Europol, which increasingly operate as hybrids in the fields of security and intelligence, managing and conveying security information without the need for specific legal authorisations related to individual cases, acting as agencies, rather than as LEAs, albeit preserving the hybrid nature of police forces without enforcement functions.

In addition to the importance of maintaining the diversity of institutional and operational models, there is also another very important aspect to consider when deciding on HOW to operate: the proven effectiveness of the model.

As discussed by Clare and Morgan (2009, pg. 215), "traditional police work firmly embedded in rights-oriented criminal justice procedures, has been responsible for the majority of success against terrorism post-9/11, despite the trend for individual-focused actions involving police and security operating with new legal powers"

Where the police act as police, intelligence agencies pursue intelligence and relevant decisions about criminal facts are taken by a third party (the judiciary), each within its own institutional and hierarchical domain, without an excessive 'fruit salad' factor, security and justice retain their neutral vocation for the common good, not significantly exploitable by (nor exploitative of) politics and the media. Thus, they work properly.

Guideline 3:

Introduce Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) to establish the ownership of interventions according to the environment

In any case, we know that the evolution of criminal profiles and their transnational nature requires new models of prevention, which extend beyond traditional police work.

This is why, in the late 1970s, Goldstein⁴⁰ theorised a police prevention model that today we know as Problem-Oriented Policing, or more simply POP.

This model differs from all the others, it is truly centred in prevention, rather than in investigation work or repression activities, and it combines traditional police models with the most advanced 'intelligence-led police' systems.

Clarke described this 'preventive policing' model as

“a method for analysing and solving recurrent crime problems, while community policing represents a solution to what is defined as the central difficulty of conducting police business – gaining the support of the local community in helping to prevent crime and disorder. Community policing is therefore focused on the means not the ends of policing, and its starting point is a single highly general ‘problem’ of conducting police business. This ‘problem’ is defined a priori rather than emerging from a careful analysis of the everyday business of individual departments. Even the emphasis on working with communities, which the two approaches (and crime reduction partnerships) share, is not really something they have in common. (...)

It is also important to understand the difference between problem-oriented policing and ‘broken windows’. Under the former, specific solutions to the variety of problems confronting the police emerge from careful and detailed analysis of the contributory causes of each. By contrast, ‘broken windows’ advocates the same general solution – policing incivilities and maintaining order – whenever crime shows signs of becoming out of hand. This approach is based on two principles, the first of which is that small offences add up to destroy community life. Thus, a large number of less serious offences, each of which is a minor irritant, together become a major one. For example, littering one piece of paper is nothing terrible, but if everybody does it the neighbourhood becomes a dump. The second principle of broken windows is that small offences encourage larger ones. For example, abandoned and boarded up properties often become the scene for drug dealing and can spawn many other crimes, even murders. This important insight has led New York City and other places to pay much more attention to policing against small offences.

....(Finally POP) should not be confused with ‘zero tolerance’ which is a political slogan, impossible for the police to deliver because it would soon result in clogged courts and an alienated population. (...)

Problem-oriented policing is data driven – and collecting, analysing and interpreting data is your business.”

The difference inherent in this preventive approach, compared to all the others listed so far, consists of the fact that POP offers us a series of practical solutions to the contradictions which have emerged up to this point regarding the prevention policies described in the previous paragraph:

- 1- It allows for prevention policies and practices without resorting to profiling tools, thus avoiding concentrating prevention on the quasi-unidirectional analysis of perpetrators, but maintaining the multidimensional nature of operations, especially in relation to criminal analysis;
- 2- It maintains a close temporal and spatial correlation between specific criminal events and prevention measures, as opposed to activities based on the idea of fighting root causes by

⁴⁰ Herman Goldstein, *Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach*, in *Crime and Delinquency*, April 1979, 234–58 and Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*. New York, McGraw Hill, 1990.

means of long lasting global projects, with a strong social or psychological component;

- 3- Moreover, it consists of neutral methods which are completely de-ideologised, and totally flexible with respect to the multiplicity of terrorist and organised crime delinquency;
- 4- It enhances social capital because it does not envisage police and intelligence resources as having a prevalent role in prevention, but maintains a case-based approach, where every practitioner can also be a stakeholder, according to the typical SCP model based on **capable guardians, handlers and place managers**.

Approximately 15 years ago, Clarke and Eck (2003) summarized the differences and similarities between the POP approach and its predecessors:

Differences between problem-oriented policing and other new strategies					
	Focus	Objective	Rationale	Methods	First steps
Problem-oriented policing	Specific, recurring crime problems	Remove the causes of these problems	Prevention is more effective than enforcement	Undertake focused action-research (SARA)	Identify problems requiring attention
Community policing	Minority neighbourhoods	Enlist local communities in the fight against crime	Communities can be the eyes and ears of the police	Build trust through contacts with residents and regular community meetings	Identify a minority neighbourhood and appoint community police officers
Crime reduction partnerships	Local areas	Harness resources of entire community in reducing crime	Coordinated multi-agency action is the most effective way to deal with crime	Form partnerships with businesses, community groups and local government	Form a multi-agency partnership
Broken windows	Deteriorating neighbourhoods	Halt slide of neighbourhood into serious crime	Nip trouble in the bud	Policing incivilities/order maintenance	Identify a deteriorating neighbourhood

Over time, as we saw in the previous chapter, the POP model underwent changes due to the new tendency of SCP to incorporate SPT models, with massive 'population change' campaigns and 'massive risk profiling'.

In the TAKEDOWN model, these aspects are relegated to the background and POP is re-assessed in its own SCP context, with the aim of defining multi-agency collaboration models differentiated according to objective risk reduction parameters.

Guideline 4:

Consider different aspects of information sharing

Many of the police models and practices proposed by the various European institutions are not easily adopted by the Member States.

Example: Information Sharing Agreements (ISA) in use in the UK, US, Denmark, Belgium or Holland are likely to conflict with laws that regulate the role of police and intelligence resources in most other European countries. The same applies to many aspects of public-private partnerships or private security governance models, as we have already seen above.

Certainly, the most important element of POP, compared to the multi-agency cooperation schemes analysed up to now and described as '*fruit salad*' approaches, is that it adapts perfectly to the various institutional police models present at Member State level, regardless of their differences.

In essence, a police force must gather information maintaining its own intelligence-led police profile in the framework of its 'law enforcement agency' mission, therefore without turning into an intelligence agency itself, which is another thing, nor into a propaganda arm of the various governments of the moment with actions of 'population change' or 'counter-narrative campaigns', this latter activity not falling within the brief of security forces.

Regarding this problem, which is one of the main reasons why the European counter-terrorism strategy has failed and also the point of greatest discussion on human rights and surveillance criticism, POP adopts a neutral attitude: practices and security measures based on POP techniques can be implemented both with the total or partial collaboration of the prevention agents (i.e. the famous public-private collaboration with its relative exchanges of information), and in a regimen of strong separation, both within the nation-states and in the European or international supranational context.

It must always be clear that it is not at all true that information sharing is always an advantage for police and intelligence activities, as repeatedly asserted in most European security policy documents. Many examples also show the opposite, i.e. that separation of roles is an essential factor for the conduct of effective preventive activities, as well as a significant guarantee for the rights of citizens and, not least, for the stability of the political and institutional system.

Moreover, in an exceedingly open exchange of information, many security dangers are hidden, starting from the possibility that transnational data bases may be hacked, thus jeopardising precious national information or that information exchanged between subjects with different agendas can lead to security problems. We must not forget, for example, that many countries use security systems for repressive activities, to criminalise opponents or to establish geopolitical alliances.

Furthermore, we must also consider that in various matters, national interests prevail over various security concerns, as do the procedural rules for the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials and the conduct of investigations. Finally, we must not forget the most important element: the subjects involved in security procedures or preventive measures do not all have the same goals and the same agendas. The goals of political decision-makers need not necessarily coincide with those of certain groups of citizens, or certain 'classes' and/or 'elites'. Therefore, it may not be always possible to fully implement sharing models that are too open, both in the national and transnational sense.

Recent events raised scepticism within the Intelligence community on this specific aspect of the security measures. The leaking of news and secret sensitive data from last September, which involved Europol staff, has been equally worrying, demonstrating a low level of security of the procedural systems and internal apparatus, as well as the risk of data concentration. This case showed that data collected through bulk acquisition, stockpiling or 'mass surveillance' by Europol can be hacked by hostile forces, proxies or organized crime. Not by chance, the most recent cyber-attacks in Europe and in the world were caused by NSA-enabled ransomware called 'Wannacry', thus highlighting how security sometime may backlash and represent a serious threat for the citizens and the security itself. The Europol leakage, as well as the NSA spying activities in Europe, combine with Snowden's revelations, severely threatens the trust of the national police forces and the intelligence agencies of the member states, who after cases like this, might have a good excuse for not supplying extra informative systems, of which there is considerable need in actions of prevention and contrast.

The coherence between security measures and fundamental rights, as well as the need to combine national and supra-national interest, pose a larger problem of consistency and coherence of the ISAs with fundamental rights at large, beyond the problem of data protection.

Guideline 5:**Communication is a Prevention Tool**

In the depths of the Great Depression, Franklin D. Roosevelt rallied Americans by reminding them that *“the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.”*

In the aftermath of 9/11 many people are worried far more about the truly tiny risk of being killed by terrorists than they do about the much greater risk of being killed in a robbery or some other criminal accident. Therefore this golden rule proposed by Roosevelt represents a pillar of the new prevention.

As a matter of fact, social and media campaigns aimed at reducing fear should be an important part of the counterterrorism plan. The more frightened we are, the more successful will terrorists judge their attacks. To a certain extent, fear campaigns powered by political parties, media or social movements (and in some cases even by institutions) are, voluntarily or involuntarily, part of the terrorist strategy. Not only does undue fear lower our quality of life but, as argued by David Altheide in *Terrorism and the Politics of Fear*, it also

“limits our intellectual and moral capacities, it turns us against others, it changes our behaviour and our perspective and it makes us vulnerable to those who would control us to promote their own agendas.”

Fear can lead policy makers to prioritize wrong initiatives under the pressure of media and politics, or countries to spend untold billions of dollars on protective measures, to restrict important liberties, and to make radical changes in foreign policy. Ultimately, fears can become an asymmetric weapon in the hands of internal and external forces to destabilize and polarize countries, thus undermining the social cohesion.

Guideline 6:**Learn to play with SARA and its siblings**

As we have seen, traditional police activities present many problems when they need to activate non-traditional prevention initiatives. The limitations of conventional policing stem from the extensive use of enforcement and the neglect of other effective approaches; from the difficulties to combine and harmonise fundamental rights with security due to the overuse of profiling techniques and administrative measures. In short, conventional policing is too narrowly based and results in opaque methods to define priorities.

For this reason, POP has adopted⁴¹ a 4-phase preventive approach, to be combined with traditional police activities. This approach is often defined by the acronym formulated by John Eck and Bill Spelman, defined as SARA, which summarises four basic operational activities: **Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment**.

SARA helps practitioners to find new ways of intervening earlier in the causal chain of terrorism and organized crime so that these problems are less likely to occur in the future. These new preventive strategies are not limited to efforts to identify,

⁴¹ Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach. *Crime and Delinquency*, April: 234–58, 1979; Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1990

arrest and prosecute offenders. Rather, in addition to the use of the criminal law SARA contributes to find other potentially effective responses, alone or in partnership with others, with a high priority on prevention.

SARA supplies police with a method of responding to the diverse nature of crime problems and helps them to become more effective at preventing crime than they have in the past.

SARA also has other Siblings. The most famous of these is the '5Is', which was defined by Paul Ekblom of the English Home Office, as an evolution of SARA. 5Is aims to capture, organise, and transfer knowledge of good practice:

1. **Intelligence** – gathering and analysing information on crime problems and their consequences, and diagnosing their causes.
2. **Intervention** – considering the full range of possible interventions that could be applied to block, disrupt or weaken those causes and manipulate the risk and protective factors.
3. **Implementation** – converting potential interventions into practical methods, putting them into effect in ways that are appropriate for the local context, and monitoring the actions undertaken.
4. **Involvement** – mobilising other agencies, companies and individuals to play their part in implementing the intervention.
5. **Impact** and process evaluation – assessment, feedback and adjustment.

The 5Is are supported by a wealth of other practical concepts and tools developed by Ekblom including his 'Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity' framework, a development of routine activity theory.

These techniques, which are powerful tools for the prevention and prioritisation of operational activities, today must be adapted to the new emerging prevention problems related to organised crime and terrorism. However, also the new international framework must be considered, the various activity jurisdictions, as well as the increasing urgency to cease surveillance and profiling activities, which have serious repercussions on the relationship between police, intelligence agencies and citizens.

Guideline 7:

Assess prevention results in order to prioritise future choices

At a national and European level, police forces and political decision-makers lack the ability to define whether actions deployed in the field actually work and their proportionality to the risk posed by the threat and the damage it can cause. Furthermore, we know from experience that some prevention activities undertaken in a given country can provoke new phenomena in others. A good example are the new laws that prohibit journeys into war zones, which have therefore raised the number of would-be foreign fighters who remain 'trapped' in their countries of origin and may be tempted to commit acts of terrorism right here, as their 'dreams' of suicide abroad are denied.

IMPACT and PROCESS evaluations are important tools for evaluating the effect of preventive safety decisions. To determine the overall effect of the response you need to answer four questions. Each question has a formula that you will apply in the following Handbook as part of the Toolkit to assess the results from the response, control and diffusion of benefits or displacement:

1. What is the overall impact of the decisions taken?



2. Did the problem change from before to after the response?
3. Was the response a likely cause of the change?
4. What is the relative size of the displacement or diffusion?
5. What is the Total Net Effect of the response (including diffusion and displacement)?

The practical formula used by Kate Bowers and Shane Johnson are very important tools for your assessments.⁴²

⁴² Kate Bowers and Shane Johnson (2003). Measuring the Geographical Displacement and Diffusion of Benefit Effects of Crime Prevention Activity. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 19(3): 275–301, 2003. See also Shane Johnson, Kate Bowers, Peter Jordan, Jacque Mallender, Norman Davidson, and Alex Hirschfield,. Evaluating Crime Prevention Scheme Success: Estimating ‘Outcomes’ Or How Many Crimes Were Prevented. *International Journal of Theory, Research and Practice*, 2008

3. Handbook on the cube model

A PRACTICE-ORIENTED PREVENTIVE TOOL AGAINST TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME

In this chapter we analyse how the 'Cube Model' responds to the challenges of contemporary prevention from a multidimensional, multidisciplinary and multi-agency perspective, according to the 'problem-oriented policing' model. We adopt a markedly practical and operational approach, albeit within a framework of rights and duties clearly structured on European principles. To simplify, we could say that the 'Cube Model' is the practical transposition of a modern vision of SCP, which knows how to combine all the applicable complex factors and which learns from the failure experiences applied to prevention, terrorism and organised crime.

3.1. Be very crime specific: from 'why' to 'how'

Terrorism and organised crime are complex latent phenomena which permeate all societies in different ways and degrees, in the form of permanent and constantly changing threats. No society is exempt, just as no society is free from criminal phenomena in the broad sense.

The major difficulty in contemporary prevention policies is to understand which policy and practice models are effective, sustainable and measurable with respect to the diverse phenomena of emerging terrorism and organised crime.

The starting point of the 'Cube' is that in reality, behind these terms of 'terrorism' and 'organised crime', there are a myriad of crimes, often very different from each other.

NON-TERROR ATTACKS: On 1 October 2017, Stephen Paddock, an avid gambler, murdered 58 people in Las Vegas and wounded another 546 with a series of automatic weapons firing on a concert from the windows of an adjacent hotel. When the police intervened, he committed suicide. The 64-year-old Paddock fired 1100 shots and had another 4000 in reserve, as well as 23 different weapons. The motivations of his act are not clear. His is not considered a case of terrorism, as 90% of cases have seen about 400 deaths per year killed in automatic weapon attacks in the United States.⁴³

TERROR ATTACKS: The massacre of 49 people and the wounding of another 58 committed by Omar Mateen, a 49-year-old security guard, at an Orlando night club in June 2016, was considered an act of terrorism; again, the crime was committed with an assault rifle and a pistol. The attack that began as an active shooter incident transitioned into a barricaded suspect with hostage's incident and ended as the second deadliest terrorist attack in the United States since September 11, 2001. Also Mateen died, killed by the police, following the attack. Mateen was not on an official terrorism watch list and was able to legally hold a state firearms licence, according to Florida records because he had worked as an armed security officer for the firm G4S since 2007. Mateen was a Muslim, although he did not practice his faith.

From this comparative example we understand how the definition of these phenomena has a strong ideological component, which drags us into endless discussions every time we try to define them.

⁴³ The detailed reconstruction of the Las Vegas attack by the police is available in <https://www.scribd.com/document/369538275/1-October-FIT-Report-01-18-2018-Footnoted> retrieved on 21/01/2018

The discussion about what is 'terrorist' or 'mafia' or, even worse, 'radical', 'extremist' is certainly useful to frame the aims of crimes, and therefore to define the relevant legal framework. But in many cases, such discussions are sterile, when not counterproductive, compared to the ability to anticipate future events, which is instead the purpose of prevention.

Similarly, adopting anti-mafia models in cases of normal crime, as happened with the case of 'Mafia Capitale' in Rome in 2017, can lead to serious judicial defeats that threaten to undermine the credibility of the judiciary and jeopardise complex investigations.

Another useful category as an alternative to terrorism, for example, could be that of 'mass shootings'. If we analyse cases such as the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, the attacks in Paris and in San Bernardino, California, in 2015 and in Brussels, Belgium, in 2016; mass shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, in 2012 and Charleston, South Carolina, in 2016; and the terrorist attacks in early summer 2017 in Manchester and London, England, where different persons and groups motivated by a variety of ideological, political, or individual factors represent a growing threat to our and other nations' security⁴⁴.

Choosing the 'mass shooting' category instead of terrorism, to continue the example (or organised drug trafficking instead of the more generic organised crime) means shifting the focus from motivation to methods, from *why* to *how*.

The Cube Model, therefore, does not focus on dissimilar phenomena, even if apparently catalogued (or not catalogued) under the common macro-labels of terrorism and organised crime, but on models which aggregate acts similar in their execution, in their phenomenology.

⁴⁴ Important analysis on these cases, from an SCP perspective, are to be found in Frank Straub, Jack Cambria, Jane Castor, Ben Gorban, Brett Meade, David Waltemeyer, and Jennifer Zeunik, *Rescue, Response and Resilience, A critical incident review of the Orlando public safety response to the attack on the Pulse nightclub*, Critical Response Initiative, Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2017; Edward F. Davis III, Alejandro A. Alves, and David Alan Sklansky, *Social Media and Police Leadership: Lessons from Boston*, New Perspectives in Policing Bulletin (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2014), <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/244760.pdf>; *After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings* (Boston: Massachusetts State Police, 2014), <http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/mema/afteraction-report-for-the-response-to-the-2013-boston-marathon-bombings.pdf>.¹⁸ Global Terrorism Database, "Incident Summary: 11/13/2015," National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, accessed June 3, 2017, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201511130008>.¹⁹ Rick Brazier et al., *Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the Inland Regional Center*, Critical Response Initiative (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2016), <https://ric-zaiinc.com/ric.php?page=detail&id=COPS-W0808>; Frank Straub, Jennifer Zeunik, and Ben Gorban, "Lessons Learned from the Police Response to the San Bernardino and Orlando Terrorist Attacks," *CTC Sentinel* 10, no. 5 (May 2017), https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss515.pdf.²⁰ Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "Belgian Radical Networks and the Road to the Brussels Attacks," *CTC Sentinel* 9, no. 6 (June 2016), https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss613.pdf.²¹ Greg Myre, "Manchester Bombing Is Europe's 13th Terrorist Attack Since 2015," NPR, May 23, 2017, <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/05/23/529645904/manchester-bombing-is-europes-12th-terroristattack-since-2015>.

The crimes listed under these macro-categories, such as terrorism or mafia, are of a diverse nature, as the new European directive on terrorism makes clear⁴⁵, offering us one of the most complete lists of these types of offences:

- (a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;*
- (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;*
- (c) kidnapping or hostage-taking;*
- (d) causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;*
- (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;*
- (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of explosives or weapons, including chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, as well as research into, and development of, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons;*
- (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions, the effect of which is to endanger human life;*
- (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life;*
- (i) illegal system interference,*
- (j) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in points (a) to (i).*

2. The aims referred to in paragraph 1 are:

- (a) seriously intimidating a population;*
- (b) unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act;*
- (c) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.*

For organised crime, an appropriate list is the one defined by the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of the Palermo Convention. Unfortunately, also these lists of an institutional nature and with a strong legislative aspect are not complete; they are only partially useful for the purposes of our analysis aimed at prevention, which is centred on *how* the crimes were committed for cataloguing and comparing purposes. Therefore, we must delve a little deeper into specific aspects in order to identify targeted solutions.

As Roberta Belli and Joshua Freilich wrote, "*what has meaning for the law might be irrelevant for prevention purposes*"⁴⁶. In fact, for the purpose of a targeted and reformed situational prevention,

⁴⁵ DIRECTIVE (EU) 2017/541 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA

⁴⁶ R.Belli and J.D.Freilich, *Situational Crime Prevention and non-violent terrorism: A 'soft' approach against ideologically motivated tax refusal*, in J.D. Freilich and G.R. Newman, *Reducing Terrorism*, op. cit., pg.183

which is precisely one of the goals of the 'Cube Model', we do not see decisive aspects of a common *modus operandi* in these crimes.

On 22 March 2017, Khalid Masood carried out a car attack in Westminster, killing four people and wounding 50 others. When his car collided with the Westminster Palace protection barriers, Masood got out and stabbed an unarmed New Palace Yard policeman to death.

From January 7 to January 9, 2015, a total of 17 people were killed in attacks on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, a kosher grocery store, and the Paris suburb of Montrouge. Three suspects in the attacks were killed by police in separate standoffs. They used assault rifles and homemade explosives.

These examples, chosen among the many unfortunately available, show how for the 'Cube', the traditional or judiciary categories are too broad. They include too many different kinds of crimes, all of which need to be separately analysed in their *modus operandi*. These crimes are committed for a variety of reasons, within different environments, by different offenders, with varying degrees of organisation, knowledge, skills and weapons, as shown by the examples above.

So far, crime has been classified in terms of *responses* to terrorism or organized crime and *why* perpetrators committed their crimes. Unlike to these common methodologies, our approach wants to know *how* crimes have been successfully committed. For example, 'terrorism' could include a detailed categorisation far beyond 'mass shootings' or 'terror acts', such as:

- Individual (or group) attack with assault weapons
- Individual (or group) attacks with explosives, IEDs
- Suicide Attacks (breakdown in different modalities, if organized, individual, etc.)
- Individual (or group) attacks with knife, and dual weapons
- Individual (or group) car or truck bombings
- Ram bombing
- Letter bombs/anthrax
- CBRN attacks
- Targeted assassinations
- Sniper attacks
- Individual (or group) ambushes
- Hostage taking
- Kidnapping
- Hijacking
- Critical infrastructure attacks

Each of these cases can be further segmented into sub-phenomena, in order to establish different operating modes and parallel scenarios. This is a very important preliminary activities to establish evidence-based and comparative preventive operations.

LESSON 1 OF THE HANDBOOK:

We must proceed from WHY to HOW. The starting hypothesis of the prevention model represented by the 'Cube' is that crimes must be absolutely specific, avoiding classifications that are too generic and 'ideological', often even beyond legal qualifications.

The transition from WHY to HOW opens up unprecedented prevention perspectives for the security policies. Let us consider the proposed example again: activating a strategy of reduction of the weapons in circulation can be considered a valid harm reduction measure in some of the cases mentioned, for example in the US, where weapons are freely available and are always at the centre of mass shootings (or terrorist acts). But it would be of little use in the case of attacks with knives or vehicles, such as cars, aircraft or other dual means, such as home-made explosives, which are indeed the most recurrent in Europe, where arms control is rigorous and therefore prevention measures have produced an effect that SCP defines as '*displacement*'. In these European cases, therefore, harm reduction measures must be structured differently. The modalities of the criminal acts are essential to define preventive strategies.

In addition to the purpose of the preventive response, the analysis of the *modus operandi* is strategic also for the analysis. As can be understood from the cases summarily mentioned, for example, the type of weapons used is very important, as it implies a specific logistic, and is closely linked to the choice of targets and the capabilities of the motivated perpetrators.

LESSON 2 OF THE HANDBOOK:

For the purposes of preventive analysis and response options to acts of serious crime, be it terrorism or organised crime, the description of the weapons used and their logistics, due to the MURDEROUS scheme, is a determining factor.

In this sense, the TAKEDOWN toolkit, by means of exercises with the Cube Model, could be considered an extension of the great research work done by the University of New York's POP Centre with its 74 problem specific guides⁴⁷.

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing

The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing has the mission to advance the concept and practice of problem-oriented policing in open and democratic societies. It does so by making readily accessible information about ways in which police can more effectively address specific crime and disorder problems. Launched in 2003 the POP Center web site has provided innovative learning experiences, curriculum guides, teaching aids, problem analysis tools, and an immense range of information to its users. Since the publication of the first POP Guide in 2001 over 900,000 copies of the POP guides and other POP Center publications have been distributed by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) to individuals and agencies throughout the world. POP Center materials are also widely used in police training and college courses. Among the many ongoing accomplishments of the POP Center the Problem-Specific Guides for Police summarize knowledge about how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime and disorder problems. Each guide is informed by a

⁴⁷ The updated list of the Guides Is available in <http://www.popcenter.org/problems/>

thorough review of the research literature and reported police practice, and each guide is anonymously peer-reviewed by a line police officer, a police executive and a researcher prior to publication. The review process is independently managed by the COPS Office, which solicits the reviews.

3.2. A new way to say CHEERS: In which cases should the cube be used?

In recent years, we have been inundated with analyses concerning the ideas of the perpetrators and the profiles of individuals and communities. Thousands of pages have been dedicated to Muslims, Christians, extremists, radicals, immigrants, 'delinquent types' and other such matters. Entire communities and social groups have come under the scrutiny of intelligence agencies and police forces, with the result that large sections of the population have lost confidence in states and supranational institutions and have been driven to various forms of escalation and protests. We have reached the point where the greatest activity of social media is precisely profiling and its use in mass surveillance. In this mix, media and politicians have built careers, collected resources and acquired power.

So let us affirm right away that the 'Cube' model only analyses real problems, i.e. it is a neutral security tool. Cases to be analysed by the 'Cube' are comparable and recurring according to the scheme defined by the acronym '**CHEERS**', which considers six elements to define a problem as part of the 'Cube' exercises: *Community; Harm; Expectation; Events; Recurring; and Similarity*.

- **Community** are problems experienced by the 'public', that's to say a stratification of different sub-groups (or sub-communities) composed of individuals, majorities and minorities, businesses, government agencies, parties, and other groups.
- In order to be part of the exercise, an event must impact members of the public, cause **Harm** to the whole community or part of it. We deal with serious crimes as part of the violations of the law, and legality, including legal preventive measures, is a defining characteristic of problems, unlike contemporary SCP methods (Clarke and Eck, 2003).
- **Expectations** concern what the community (or a large part of its members) expects from the security system to do to address the causes of the harm.
- **Events** refer to a chain of security incidents classified as 'serious crimes' as defined by the Palermo Convention and the Directive (EU) 2017/541.
- **Recurring** implies that similar incidents must recur in similar environments. They may be symptoms of an acute or a chronic problem. Whether acute or chronic, unless something is done, these events will continue to occur and for this reason prevention is a key. If recurrence is not anticipated, problem solving may not be necessary.
- **Similarity** means that the events are similar or related. They may all be committed by the same person, happen to the same type of victim, occur in the same types of locations, take place in similar circumstances, involve the same type of weapon, or have one or more other factors in common. Without common features, we have a random collection of events instead of a Cube problem. With common features, we have a pattern of events. Crime and disorder patterns are often symptoms of problems.

3.2.1. Motivations as part of the rational theory

In addition to the traditional CHEERS model in SCP, we must introduce new analytical factors if we want to grasp the character of the new forms of 'serious crime', especially in the area of 'pre-crime' prevention.

This leads us to introduce the **motivations** theme into the 'Cube' variables, what drives certain acts as situational contributions rather than profiling, together with '**readiness**', two substantially new components that render the Cube dynamic.

Indeed, the premise of terrorism is defined by the recent Directive (EU) 2017/541:

namely to seriously intimidate a population, to unduly compel a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. The threat to commit such intentional acts should also be considered to be a terrorist offence when it is established, on the basis of objective circumstances, that such threat was made with any such terrorist aim. By contrast, acts aiming, for example, to compel a government to perform or abstain from performing any act, without however being included in the exhaustive list of serious crimes, are not considered to be terrorist offences in accordance with this Directive.⁴⁸

For serious and organized crime the Palermo Convention set 3 fundamental criteria to define a vast array of crime types, where the scope of obtaining material benefits is at the core:

- (a) “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit;*
- (b) “Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty;*
- (c) “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.⁴⁹*

The declared aims are therefore the element of greatest difference between the two phenomena, often also beyond basic phenomenology or logistics which, in certain temporal phases and geographical areas, can supplement each other.

But there is a true difference between goals and motivations. On the one hand, in fact, a crime of terrorism, in its execution, can be assimilated to forms of organised crime; according to its purposes, however, it can take on different meanings (and consequently invoke opposing harm reduction strategies). Finally, both can have common primary motivations, beyond declared aims. For example, both in the cases of political terrorism and mafia-like organised crimes, there may be common motivations such as the control of tangible and intangible resources, elements of territorial power or the control of political systems, but with different or possibly conflicting purposes, of a strategic or tactical nature.

In many cases, also recently, terrorist groups have tried to use organised crime logistics to procure weapons or resources of various kinds. In the most extreme cases, such as those of terrorism in Italy between the 1970s and the 1980s, actual common actions took place, such as the 'Banda della Magliana' and NAR groups sharing common

⁴⁸ Recital 8 of the Directive

⁴⁹ United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 2

weapons arsenals. In any case, given the difference in goals between the various criminal phenomena, the police succeeded in defeating terrorist groups by exploiting the vulnerabilities of those criminals. The pressure of the police actions can, in fact, determine a conflict between the goals of organised crime and terrorism. The ability to act on the various final motivations of certain actors in the criminal sphere is one of the main reasons why the analysis of motivations is to be considered an instrument of prevention.

For this reason motivations have quickly become an important element of SCP in the last decade, beyond the problems of profiling.

Reduce provocations	
<div>Reduce frustration and stress</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Efficient queues and polite service.Expanded seating capacity.Soothing music and muted lighting.	
<div>Avoid disputes</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Separate enclosures for rival soccer fans.Reduced crowding in pubs.Fixed cab fares.	<p>When studying prisons and pubs, Richard Wortley noticed that crowding, discomfort and rude treatment provoked violence in both settings.</p>
<div>Reduce arousal and temptation</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Controls on violent pornography.Prohibitions on paedophiles working with children.Advice about avoiding sexual victimisation.	<p>This led him to argue that situational prevention had focused too exclusively on opportunities for crime and had neglected features of the situation that precipitate or induce crime.</p>
<div>Neutralise peer pressure</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none">'Idiots drink and drive'.'It's OK to say No'.Disperse troublemakers at school.	<p>As a result of his work, Clarke and Cornish have included five techniques to reduce what they called 'provocations' in their new classification of situational techniques.⁵⁰ These factors are very relevant for prevention</p>
<div>Discourage imitation</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Rapid repair of vandalism.V-chips in TVs.Avoidance of 'copycat' crimes by censoring details of <i>modus operandi</i>.	

The introduction of 'ideological' themes within the traditional situational prevention model has, however, created some confusion, especially when narratives (ideas, religions, political positions) have been confused with the 'motivations' underlying rational theory. With this confusion, situational prevention models have repeated the errors of socio-psychological prevention, frequently evolving into Terrorism Crime Prevention, which is the latest version of the surveillance systems. In reality, the narratives, in addition to being easily interchangeable, are also common to criminals and to simple opponents or innocent citizens with clean records. So, by working on profiling and focusing on the perpetrators, the risk is that of clashing against some fundamental rights, in addition to not grasping the dynamics of criminal phenomena, which are rooted in the environment rather than in the perpetrators.

As we have seen above, one of the major criticisms against the British 'Prevent' strategy is precisely this, having adopted psychological models as part of the mass surveillance that had been tested inside prisons for studying criminals, but which were then applied in mass surveillance programmes in order to pursue 'population change' and then expecting to screen 'High Risk Offenders' on the basis of ideas, belief systems and opinions. These policies have led to an increase in criminal phenomena, rather than

⁵⁰ Richard Wortley, *A Classification of Techniques for Controlling Situational Precipitators of Crime*, *Security Journal*, 14: 63–82, 2011

to their reduction, since they have set in motion '*defiance*' reactions on a large scale among the 'suspect' communities.

The most recent STP seems to have fallen into the error of previous sociological and psychological prevention models, when it included 'cognitive prerequisites' among the 'proximal factors for crime' in the analysis of omissive and violence-free criminals and posed the problem of 'neutralising' ideas and feelings of opposition (Belli & Freilich, 2009, pgs. 188-189 on tax protesters). In essence, by evolving into STP, it adopted 'conveyor belt' theories bearing a strong ideological content, which become a criminogenic factor, rather than a preventive and protective one.

In reality, these current preventive theories are of little help in dealing with crime in the real world because they tend to find causes in distant factors related to the profile of the offenders, such as childrearing practices, genetic makeup, ideologies, faiths, and psychological or social processes. These are mostly beyond the reach of everyday practice, necessitate risky ideological constructions on 'risk indicators' connected to the single (or group) personality and expose policing activities to the risk of infringing fundamental rights and International conventions. Finally the force neutral institutions to become propagandists of the temporary governments.

For this very specific reason, which has important technical and juridical consequences, the 'Cube' maintains the basic preventive structure of the classical SCP process, refusing the SPT extension, but framing the motivations and the consequent 'soft preventive techniques' within a different new innovative and dynamic model.

Within the 'Cube' model, ideologies, beliefs and ideas are part of a dynamic and environmental interplay and are not considered 'root causes'.

These highly sensitive factors are specifically connected to specific situations, and are not considered as generators of crime. Motivations are multi-semantic, situationally and temporally connected and for this reason this type of 'indicators' can be manipulated by all competing parties.

Being a radical in Rome or Berlin is a quite different thing from being a radical in Damascus or in Cairo. What makes the difference is that in Rome and Berlin freedom and law, key factors in political legitimacy and the foundation of the law, are in force



"Thus if you are Chinese the biggest threat right now is Tibetan, Uighur and other nationalists. If you are in Iraq it is religion (sectarianism is a much bigger danger than insurgency). If you are in Spain or Sri Lanka or Turkey, it's breakaway nationalism. (...) Some of the founder of Israel, including a future prime minister Menachem Begin, violently subverted a League of Nations mandate and blew up the King David hotel in Jerusalem killing over 90 people. It would be today's equivalent of killing UN peacekeepers. Moreover these were the guys who killed well over 100 Arabs, mostly old men, women and children, in the notorious Deir Yassin massacre. But it's not just Israelis who are hypocrites. We all are. In truth terrorism is what other do, never what we do. Perhaps that's the only defining characteristic. That's why America sees Islamic fundamentalists as part of the Axis of Evil, and why they in turn see America as the Great Satan (..) And we need to admit that our attitudes change when terrorism win. (...) Nelson Mandela, for decades listed by the U.S. as a terrorist, became president of South Africa, Nobel peace prize-winner, and perhaps the most feted man on Earth. Moreover our attitudes change when terrorism affects us personally, rather than someone far away. As a British

citizen I'am acutely aware of how many Americans, with a nod and a wink from the U.S. government, gave money- million of dollars- to the Irish Republican Army. Are our memories so short? Are our morals so shallo or our definitions of terrorism so flexible? Apparently they are." (Ross, 2009, pg. 232)

Similar fluid cases could be described for the cooperation between mafia and national or international politics in Italy, starting from the WWII and the role of the American Mafia in the liberation of Sicily.

All attempts to transform these ideological elements into security techniques quickly morphed into purely political or manipulative operations by one of the actors involved. Therefore their use became ambivalent: they could be protective elements, but they could also constitute a further risk escalation factor, as we shall soon see when analysing the stakeholders.

The motivations are relative. What counts is how the various actors perceive them with respect to the rational choice theory, which from the beginning envisaged the assessment of dynamic irrational rationality processes ('limited' or 'bounded' rationality) for prevention actions and this is precisely what constitutes the basis of the 'Cube Model':

"offenders behave in situations (physical and social environmental settings) according to the ways in which they perceive them. They perceive their own needs (they want money for a drug habit), and they perceive environments (near and far) as offering them opportunities to carry out their course of action, whether it be burglary, bank robbery, or a terrorist attack. Why offenders choose to commit crime as a means to get money rather than get a job is the question unanswered by rational choice theory. Or at least is seen as less relevant than the question why the offender chooses burglary instead of bank robbery, or why the terrorist chooses to bomb a building instead of hijack an airplane. It is offenders' perceptions of both opportunities and constraints that condition their course of action. To the outsider or observer of their behavior, the courses of action taken by offenders may or may not appear rational. To the offender, the behavior is perceived as a rational way of achieving an end." (Freilich and Newman)

Seen in this light, the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime bear a certain teleological level of 'rationality' and 'agency', even when they appear to the external observer to be completely illogical or devoid of purpose, if the reasons that support their perpetrators justify the expectations of the individual.

The apparent illogicality of a suicide bomber actually masks the logical search for a superior "good" to which he/she somehow consciously or unconsciously aspires (Becker, 1968, Tilley, 1997, pp. 95-107; Newman, 1997, p. 21). The difference between consciousness and unconsciousness exactly corresponds to that between narratives and motivations, which is a central distinction to understand what we mean by 'motivated perpetrator'.

Indeed, there is a substantial difference between motivations and narratives which justify acts at a given moment. What matters is how the parties involved use them: governmental power can use them to gain consent for their own security policies; perpetrators, on the contrary, to justify criminal actions judged immoral by most. Narratives, on which profiling often focuses (Muslims, Christians, extremists, radicals, etc.), can be temporarily adopted to justify or motivate a completely different nature or simply to attract attention, based on emulation mechanisms whose motivations coincide with primary needs. In other cases, narratives are used to provoke whoever is seen as an enemy and in yet other cases, to forge alliances and garner support, as often happens in prisons or on the international

political scene. Also recently, many Middle Eastern regimes (keeping the discussion at those latitudes) have exploited security narratives to justify wars or dictatorships.

Therefore, focusing too much on the declared narratives with respect to the motivations that are at the basis of the 'rational theory' is likely to lead us completely astray, because often the flaunted narratives are nothing more than artificially adopted 'provocations' or 'justifications'. We must never forget that chasing the 'conveyor belts' or the 'clashes of civilisations' too closely, as well as being counterproductive, risks being totally ineffective.

Though the link between violent movies and violence in society is much disputed, there is some evidence of 'copycat' crimes because media reports of unusual crimes sometimes provoke imitation elsewhere. It has also been shown, for example, that students who see their teachers engaging in illegal computer activity are more likely to commit computer crimes themselves, and that other pedestrians will follow someone crossing against a red light.

On 27 December 1996, Maria Letizia Berdini was killed by a rock thrown from a highway flyover near Tortona in Italy. The news got a certain amount of coverage in the press and since then stones thrown from overpasses have multiplied in emulation events: 63 cases were recorded up to 31 August 2017 and an actual total of 85 in 2016, almost one every 4 days.

However, the Italian police noted a cyclical pattern in these phenomena linked to geographical, information-related and territorial factors, albeit acknowledging the substantial heterogeneity of the perpetrators and the reasons they claimed to justify their acts.

Hence, the motivations, filtered of all ideological aspects, become translated into a set of correlations related to the criminal process and described as such in simulations.

LESSON 3 OF THE HANDBOOK:

Narratives are not motivations. Narratives are poly-semantic and can be exploited and manipulated by all actors, while motivations are rational needs which find a path to their targets through opportunity factors.

3.2.2. Assess the Readiness

In this fluid context, the link between prevention and crime is developed by the SCP approach through the introduction of 'readiness' parameters, an analytical category that can be adapted to almost all prevention models.

Also this category is prone to confusion, since 'readiness' is one of the mass profiling indicators in the '*Mappa*' strategy adopted by the English Home Office and other intelligence agencies.

Traditionally, the '**readiness**' of individuals and groups is expressed according to three levels, often accompanied by coloured visual maps:

1. Individuals ready to commit crimes almost without their being aware of it. These include environmental cues that may provoke or prompt individuals to action (Wortley, 1997, p. 66).
2. "Distal factors" which place individuals in different states of readiness (Wortley, 2011), and potentially more responsive to opportunity factors leading individuals and groups towards a higher propensity to commit crime (Tilley, 1997, pp. 95–107).

3. Individuals operating at a conscious state of readiness as a result of evaluating alternative means of meeting a perceived need, including revenging real or perceived grievances, and this conscious state is impacted by a host of background and situational factors (Cornish & Clarke, 1986, p. 3).

Recently, Canadian intelligence has developed a 'readiness' analysis model based on HOW crimes are prepared, rather than on WHY they are committed⁵¹:

"For example, in an attack planning scenario, indicators of mobilization to violence may include purchasing supplies, reconnoitring a target or recording a martyrdom video. It is important to note that a low-tech terrorist attack may require nothing more than a knife or a car. This type of attack is especially difficult to anticipate, but indicators are often present, even in the simplest of terrorist attacks.

A person preparing to mobilize to violence may also wish to conceal their activities from authorities or from the people around them. In that case, indicators of concealment and deceit could appear. For example, the person may use software to encrypt their communications, invent a cover story to justify their departure from Canada or create an alter ego." (CSIC, 2018)

So, in our event management view, 'readiness' is clearly in the HOW category of criminal path descriptors and precisely identifies various types of crime. In this sense, it is a factor that profoundly differs from those identified in the 'conveyor belt' theories centred on psycho-ideological precepts.

Following the different risk assessment models present in Europe, 'readiness' and 'motivation', in the Cube Toolkits framework, are correlations applied to *all actors*, not just to perpetrators. In particular, 'readiness' is a very important correlating element with regard to preventive actions in the pre-crime context.

LESSON 4 OF THE HANDBOOK:

What determines the urgency of a preventive action is the degree of readiness and the consequent perception of immediate danger. What we demand from prevention is that it should identify this degree by examining the concrete manner in which crimes are committed. 'Readiness' is also vested with extreme legal importance when defending preventive actions in the courtroom.

3.3. We break the law of the frame: liquid owners, stakeholders and first-line practitioners

The Cube Toolkit revolutionises the Law of the Frame principle, according to which someone can understand a painting only if they look at it from the outside. Instead, we try to understand the picture by staying inside the situations, often by observing them from within and constantly changing the point of observation from within.

In current prevention theories, stakeholders, first-line practitioners and owners of preventive actions are seen as static role-players and, in some cases, very confused ones at that. Conversely, the first fact on which the 'Cube' helps us to reflect is that these roles change according to the environment and, in many cases, they can also be reversed or excluded. The direct consequence is that harm reduction

⁵¹ Canada Security Intelligence Service, *MOBILIZATION TO VIOLENCE (TERRORISM) RESEARCH*, key findings, 2018

measures to be applied in context 'A' can be completely different to those required if a corresponding event occurs in context 'B'.

A given criminal tactic (for example, an individual suicide bombing) can have different meanings and require completely different prevention and response measures, albeit under a coherent narrative scenario, if it is perpetrated in Berlin or in Cairo, where very different environmental conditions and real motivations exist, with first-line practitioners and stakeholders taking on very different functions in relation to the environment.

For the purposes of our model, for example, confusing different types of conflict, such as events linked to counter-insurgencies, which constitute political-military strategies, with those linked to counter-terrorism, which addresses tactical phenomena in civil contexts, leads to wrong prevention and contrast strategies, as David Kilcullen has clearly explained (D.Kilcullen 2010, 2013, 2016).

The effects of these misguided analyses may be detrimental to safety, as recent studies have shown. In the case of terrorism, Sean M. Zeigler, an associate political scientist, and Meagan Smith, a quantitative analyst at RAND Corporation, have shown the close connection between terrorism and 'war on terror', based upon a quantitative analysis combining data from the Global Terrorism Database, from the University of Maryland, with civil war and insurgency data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in 194 countries. Spanning the years 1989 to 2014 allowed the researchers to directly compare terrorist attacks in the early post-Cold War era with those since 2001.

Their recent conclusions confirm the connection between terrorism and foreign politics, which is one of the much-debated topics lacking in 'Prevent':

*"While terror-related headlines tend to imply the worst, the truth is much more prosaic. Terrorism since 9/11 is down – and dramatically so – in countries not suffering from civil wars and insurgencies. The majority of terror incidents that have taken place during the global war on terror were linked with insurgencies and civil wars. While this was still the case before 2001, the association between terrorism and insurgency has grown significantly stronger during the era of the war on terror."*⁵²

Before 2001, countries with higher Muslim populations experienced less domestic terrorism, while since 9/11, these countries have seen significantly more– both domestic and international. This pattern is particularly strong in places recently afflicted with conflicts, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, and Sudan.

This finding may be a result of domestic upheavals in parts of the Muslim world and Islamist groups' involvement in Arab Spring-related conflicts. Islamist insurgencies have risen since 2001 and an increase in terrorism is likely a byproduct of this fact. It is possible that defensive measures in the West have forced a shift in targets. While jihadist terrorism has become more enduring and widespread in the past 15 years, as suggested by the reversal in Muslim-majority countries, it remains more local than global.

⁵² Sean M. Zeigler and Meagan Smith, *Terrorism Before and During the War on Terror: – a more dangerous world?*, Sage Publications, October-December 2017, pg. 1-8, consulted on 2-1-2018 in <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168017739757> . On this topic see also Findley MG and Young JK (2012) Terrorism and civil war: A spatial and temporal approach to a conceptual problem. *Perspectives on Politics* 10(02): 285–305. Findley MG and Young JK (2015) Terrorism, spoiling, and the resolution of civil wars. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(4): 1115–1128.

Importantly, interventions by Western countries may likewise be contributing to this pattern of terrorism in Muslim countries. Unsurprisingly, we found a positive correlation between Western military interventions on behalf of governments fighting civil wars and domestic terrorism in those countries. The models revealed that Western intervention was associated with anywhere from a two to five-fold increase in the expected number of domestic attacks. No doubt, intervening nations only participate in the most protracted and pernicious wars – those most likely to exhibit terrorism in the first place, suggesting that Western interventions may be a symptom of terrorism in these countries as well as a possible cause. In the past decade and a half, this includes multi-sided insurgencies in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Mali.”⁵³

In a similar vein and with evident hindsight, we recall the results of academic research and experience which confirm the close link between failed states, corrupt and non-performing governments and organised crime. Such actors take possession of the territory to carry out their criminal activities, in some cases using terrorist tactics or exploiting para-political models to achieve their goals.

When analysing a criminal event, we must be very specific about the crime itself but we should also place it in its geographical and territorial context, analysing its variations in similar contexts.

This is useful for understanding what types of prevention and response to implement, also with respect to their impact and the actual availability of means. Although it may come across as politically incorrect, it cannot be denied that also the walls of the DDR (Germany), Palestine or Ireland, performed their functions effectively *in their time and context, with respect to the primary interests of the respective governments of the time*. Conversely, such walls erected on the border between Mexico and the US, for example, make another impression, because the political conditions and values of freedom, multi-ethnicity and free movement in the USA have a different value and carry another weight compared to security demands. Hence, simply stated, the hard or soft means to be adopted in prevention must be considered in relation to the factors involved and their proportionality.

In these subjects, as Nick Ross reminds us⁵⁴, we should shun ideology and be very flexible. It is clear, for example, that specific strategies to protect targets in a European cities will differ substantially from those applicable in anti-terrorist actions in countries such as Syria or Libya, because the level of priority of the threat, real or perceived, is different, even if it can resort to the same terrorist tactics (e.g. suicide attacks). Similarly today, for example in Yemen, Egypt or Israel, it would not be very sensible to apply the very effective anti-terrorism prevention models of the Irish Garda, for the simple fact that the (real or perceived) environmental, social and security conditions are totally different.

In certain countries, to continue the example, problems of a political nature elicit responses of a singularly security-biased or military nature. In others, conversely, the security element is nothing more than a component of a much broader conflict management endeavour. If it is over-emphasised, there is risk of doing damage.

“If we get it right: (1) Terrorism can often be nipped in the bud; (2) ‘Situational’ measures such as target hardening are effective; (3) Tough military countermeasures

⁵³ Sean M. Zeigler and Meagan Smith, *Terrorism Before and During the War on Terror: A Look at the Numbers*, in War on the Rocks, National Security Network-University of Texas, December 2017

⁵⁴ Nick Ross, *How to Lose the War on Terror: lessons of a 30 Year War in Northern Ireland*, Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 25 (2009), pg. 229-244

are highly beneficial when precisely targeted; (4) Intelligence is king; (5) but compromise is emperor.” (Ross, 2009, pg. 241).

How to prioritise responses, allocate resources and which tools to use in terms of policies and practices - all of these variables must defer to the more general context, which is a fundamental condition of the security scenario.

The following distinctions, therefore, are not readily accepted from a methodological and scientific point of view:

- (1) the comparison that is often made between terrorist tactics in war or transition scenarios and phenomena of violence in Western countries;
- (2) The adoption of extreme and disproportionate strategies, as David Altheide wrote, that limit “*our intellectual and moral capacities, it turns us against others, it changes our behaviour and our perspective and it makes us vulnerable to those who would control us to promote their own agendas.*”

LESSON 5 OF THE HANDBOOK:

The security space is liquid and not static, as in any competitive contest for the control of tangible and intangible resources. All the players in that space are interoperable and their 'strength' varies according to context.

The SCP approach envisaged a multiple prevention model based on *capable guardians*, *handlers* and *place/institutional managers*. This classification is parallel to that now in vogue based on the terms *first-line practitioners* (=place/institutional managers) and *stakeholders* (=capable guardians, handlers), which are more generic.

As for criminal phenomena, the labels of organised crime and terrorism cover a plurality of phenomena, so behind these labels of stakeholders and first-line practitioners are hidden a plurality of subjects with diverse and, in many cases, divergent interests and agendas.

The idea of the Cube is based on the idea that critical events always take place because some of the actors involved have not adequately done their job in line with their social mission definition. As Clarke (2006) noticed, many problems occur because one or more institutions are unable or unwilling to undertake a preventive strategy, or because these institutions have intentionally established a circumstance that stimulates crimes or disorder. This creates risky facilities and other concentrations of crime.

The first finding is trivial and easy to understand: in a given country, common security problems emerging in different contexts imply diverse owners or varying degrees of ownership. If a juvenile crime case 'X' occurs in an environment 'A' (for example a school in Milan), it will have different roles and levels of responsibility with respect to a corresponding crime case 'X' occurring in an environment 'B' (for example a prison in Naples).

The idea that prevention is linked to the prominence of the security or intelligence forces is misleading. Solving problems usually requires the active cooperation of the people and institutions that have failed to take into account the conditions that lead to the problem. These people have shifted the ownership of the problem from their shoulders to the shoulders of the police. Consequently, an important goal of any problem-solving process is to get them to assume ownership and the related social responsibility.

But there is another more profound finding that deserves to be mentioned. We must not be afraid to admit that many problems related to organized crime and terrorism in Europe can arise from the contradictions of our political, social or economic systems. It is not always the case that a Da'ysh, a 'senior mentor', a recruiter or an international dark plot inspire terrorist events or mafia crimes, contrary to what the press and politics try to promulgate under the current belief system.

Many problems arise through the failure or refusal of some institution – business, government agency, civil society or other organisation – to conduct their activity in a way that prevents crime rather than causing it. In some cases, the activities of some social agencies may even be the trigger of security events.

In short, many problems occur because one or more institutions are unable (for lack of resources or ignorance) or unwilling (for gain or ideology) to undertake a preventive strategy.

What the current models do not represent is that in diverse ENVIRONMENTS and within the framework of diverse EVENTS, firstly (1) the roles and agendas of first-line practitioners and stakeholders vary and intersect each other and, secondly, (2) these entities are composed of many sub-groups, each with their own often competing interests and agendas, where security can be manipulated in the pursuit of non-transparent goals.

LEAs and intelligence forces are bodies of the state and in some cases, as we have seen, the governments which are expressions of certain states are one of the factors that facilitate criminal or terrorist phenomena, whether voluntarily (collusion) or involuntarily.

Capable Guardians and Handlers, on the other hand, are usually elements rooted in civil society, especially if they are not public servants. However, their interests do not always coincide with those of governments. It is not just a question of politics, of majorities and opposition, radicalism, social movements or terrorism. Where, for example, political power ends up as local prey to mafia organisations, which control how politicians are elected and how public procurement is conducted, it is then that citizens or individual groups can no longer share the same goals as their established elite, because the costs they must bear to sustain corrupt governments become unsustainable for the citizens themselves. Similar cases occur today in markedly dictatorial countries, where security is an instrument of repression against citizens.

Then there are communities of immigrants living under contradictory legal and juridical conditions, whose interests are in direct opposition to those of the state and the citizens of that country: the states want to reduce the costs and the political impact of immigration, while the immigrants do not want to return to the wars or desperate situations from which they escaped. The conflict of interests can then take many forms: groups of citizens residing in a state, perhaps already suffering financially due to the economic crisis, do not want to have immigrants who weigh on their welfare or on their job prospects.

Also the environment, where these phenomena occur, plays a decisive role as do the functions of first-line practitioners and stakeholders. Just think about the situations of prison inmates: only an extreme form of do-goodism would sustain that their interests and agendas coincide with those of the guards.

We then have striking cases of phenomena such as wikileaks, which have shown how states act against their citizens in the name of security, in an exercise of power cloaked in security-related narratives. This theme has become increasingly important in recent years and has taken on proportions unknown to prevention models before wikileaks and the advent of the global network.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that within the same category (e.g. 'security forces') many other sub-categories coexist, each with its own roles, varying degrees of separation and hierarchy, and not always coinciding. We have seen how important it is to keep intelligence roles, functions and procedures separate. But the same applies to the judiciary, and for the latter also with clear distinctions between the investigative and judicial functions. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the exchange of information within police forces, magistrates and intelligence agencies, albeit with due procedural restrictions, is a fundamental key to prevention.

These are just a few examples among the many which could be cited, which show how the traditional prevention categories can be much more *fluid* than what appears on the surface and how the differences and divisions are part of the system that until today has guaranteed checks and balances, freedom and stability. At the same time, these examples also demonstrate the need to make well-regulated changes in the prevention system, thus making relevant activities more consistent with the complexity of the phenomena.

The static nature of the models is probably the main error permeating current prevention policies. Such policies have applied schemes based on the supremacy of the police forces and security-related chains of command to all the problems in some way connected to terrorism and organised crime, in the course of critical and major events. Distinctions and detail are the key to prevention, while ideological labels (terror-related crimes, or mafia-style crimes) appeal to the press, but almost never work if applied to prevention. Similarly, the general labels of 'stakeholders' or 'first-line practitioners' do not tell us much about the 'ownership' and effectiveness of prevention activities, because they hide within them a plurality of elements, interests and operating modes, as well as skills and responsibilities.

So on this specific aspect, the Cube was tasked with introducing new categories of subjects (or 'forces') as parts of the security-related viral space, each with different 'weights' and 'instruments' in the simulation interplay. These include the media, politics, states and supranational organisations, all of which can play an important role in the prevention system.


LESSON 6 OF THE HANDBOOK:

Owners, Stakeholders and First-line Practitioners are liquid spaces in the security space and comprise much more than you think

3.4. From the triangle to the cube

The static dimension of traditional SCP models is well expressed by the image of the “crime triangle” (also known as the problem analysis triangle) derived from the routine activity theory formulated by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson. This model states that

predatory crime occurs when a likely offender and suitable target come together in time and space, without a capable guardian present. It takes the existence of a likely offender for granted since normal human greed and selfishness are sufficient explanations of criminal motivation. It makes no distinction between a human victim and an inanimate target since both can meet the offender's purpose. And it defines a capable guardian in terms of both human actors and security devices. (Ronald Clarke and John Eck 2003, step 9)



In the TAKEDOWN project, the Cube is the evolution of the Triangle, built and developed with the aim of responding to events like CHEERS in a dynamic and interactive way. The Cube starts off with two initial dimensions:

- (1) **Environments**, which regulate the targets available, the activities in which people can operate and who has differentiated responsibility at the location.
- (2) **Behaviours** which help pinpoint important aspects of harm, intent, and offender–target relationships.

Therefore, the Cube Model is a tool which produces case-based scenarios:

A Case-based virtual Environment for CHEERS events, since the environment in which the event occurs in some way determines the roles of the actors involved and their specific 'weights' with respect to the instruments available. For example, if the phenomenon occurs in a prison, it is clear that the role and the 'weight' of the judiciary will be greater than that of external school teachers or psychiatrists, who also operate inside the prison. Within a school, however, the weight of the same teachers will be totally different, even with respect to magistrates, who may also become stakeholders in that specific context.

Multidisciplinary because it allows for the combination of various crime prevention disciplines applicable both to terrorism and organised crime, both to individuals and networks (more than one). The Cube uses a variety of causal models to achieve its crime-reduction goal and it also adds to, and qualifies, some of the major theoretical approaches of other disciplines, like the Classical School and Deterrence Theory (Cozens, 2008; Jeffrey & Zahm, 1993), Social Structure Theories (Wilson and Kelling, 1982, or the behaviourists, and SCP, all framed within the specificity in terms of locations and typology of crime.

⁵⁵ The crime triangle is the basis for the SCP threefold analytic tool WOLF-DUCK-DEN: 1. Repeat offending problems involve offenders attacking different targets at different places. These are ravenous WOLF problems. An armed robber who attacks a series of different post offices is an example of a pure wolf problem. 2. Repeat victimization problems involve victims repeatedly attacked by different offenders. These are sitting DUCK problems. Taxi drivers repeatedly robbed in different locations by different people is an example of a pure duck problem. 3. Repeat location problems involve different offenders and different targets interacting at the same place. These are DEN of iniquity problems or hot spots. A drinking establishment that has many fights, but always among different people, is an example of a pure den problem. See John Eck, *Police Problems: The Complexity of Problem Theory, Research and Evaluation*. In *Problem Oriented Policing: From Innovation to Mainstream*. Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 15, edited by Johannes Knutsson. Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press (and Willan Publishing, UK), 2003

Multidimensional because it allows for the observation, navigation and manipulation of various events and scenarios by different observers depending on the roles played by the stakeholders and the first-line practitioners, according to the various prevention tools available. A multidimensional analysis is used to examine multiple variables simultaneously in order to determine the relationships between them. Unlike bivariate analysis where there is one dependent variable and one independent variable, multidimensional analysis has more than one independent variable (Babbie, 2010). Thus, rather than explaining variations in the dependent variable as a result of changes in a single independent variable, multidimensional analysis explains the variations in the dependent variable as a result of multiple independent variables.

Multi-agency since it allows for the creation of variable and interconnected series of virtual and real scenarios in which the various actors operate interchangeably. They will consequently have different 'weights' depending on their institutional or para-institutional roles.

Up-scalable and Flexible: because it allows us to simulate different scenarios, analysed by different observers, according to the perspectives of observers themselves, their agendas and interests, as well as their powers and roles in real and virtual space, in relation to the general interplay. Each time the variables are changed, the scenario of the sub-systems involved changes, and therefore must be adjusted. As changes affect the environment, the stakeholders and first-line practitioners involved and the prevention tools according to the availability of the various actors, the scenario or scenarios will produce new effects on the complex and overall system.

The so-called C.I.A. models, a community impact assessment used in Britain, provides a valid example. By applying a multi-systemic logical approach to individual environments (e.g. a prison is described as a subset of communities), the impacts of decisions on various communities are assessed, be they local, near or global in extent, both internal and external to the prison itself. The same problem can be seen from multiple perspectives (that of the prison director, the prisoners, the educators, intelligence forces, etc.). This, of course, introduces actors who far more complex than those directly involved, such as the role of inmates' families, the detention communities, the external local communities in proximity to detainees, the media, etc.

3.5. The Cube factors, parameters and variables – extending the initial matrix

In order to be able to operate with the Cube, a series of 5 factors have been present in the visualisation system so we may project multidimensional scenarios:

1. ENVIRONMENTS
2. ACTORS (with related 'motivation' and 'readiness')
3. FACILITATING CONDITIONS
4. MURDEROUS WEAPONS AND TOOLS
5. TARGETS

Each factor has different parameters and variables and can resort to different tools with respect to other variables with which it interacts. Each interaction produces a change of the location in the three-dimensional space and *modifies the prevention scene*. Hence, it is a dynamic model based on 5 factors, interrelated parameters and variables

3.5.1. Environments

For the heading ENVIRONMENT we consider 10 parameters and respective variables:

Residential – Locations where people dwell. Houses, flats, and hotel rooms are examples.

Recreational – Places where people go to have a good time. Pubs, nightclubs, restaurants, cinemas, playgrounds, and parks are examples.

Religious - Mosques, Churches, Synagogues, pray halls, etc.

Offices and Production – Different SCP categories are included under this heading. Locations of white-collar work where there is little face-to-face interaction between the workers and the general public. Government and business facilities are often of this type, including police and military installations. Access to these locations is often restricted. But these locations include also the traditional SCP category of 'retail' (Places for walk-in or drive-up customer traffic) and 'Industrial' (Locations for processing of goods. Factories, warehouses, package-sorting facilities are examples), and 'Agricultural' (Locations for growing crops and animals).

Education – Places of learning or study, including day care centres, schools, universities, libraries and churches.

Human service – Places where people go when something is wrong. Courts, jails, prisons, police stations, hospitals and some drug treatment centres are examples.

Critical Infrastructures and Public Ways – Critical Infrastructures are defined by the EU Directives, while public ways include all routes connecting all other environments. Roads and highways, footpaths and bike trails, and drives and parking facilities are examples. **Transport** – Locations for the mass movement of people. These include buses, bus stations and bus stops, airplanes and airports, trains and train stations, ferries and ferry terminals, and ocean liners and piers. **Open/transitional** – Areas without consistent or regular designated uses. These differ from parks in that they have not been designated for recreation, though people may use them for this.

Transitional areas - include immigration centres, abandoned properties and construction sites, facilities where homeless live or squatted business facilities and housings.

War and Transitional Territories - include war zones, failed states, transitional areas, insurgent contexts, areas under military occupation and the routes towards these locations. This category is relevant for foreign fighters and foreign terrorist fighters.

Virtual spaces - include internet, and the whole cyber dimensions.

3.5.2. Actors

For the heading ACTORS we adopt the SCP categorisation based upon environments-related behaviours instead of the common concepts of first-line practitioners and stakeholders, which is too vague and imprecise. Therefore we consider 4 different actors, who have different and variable weights in relation to the environments, their institutional function within the environment in the very specific CHEERS case and the leverage they can use:

Offenders and Suspects: They are those who have committed (or are suspected of committing) a particular crime and whose behaviours are useful to us in order to define analogous scenarios of prevention.

Handlers are in relations to offenders, they know the offender and can exert some control over his or her actions (parents, siblings, teachers, friends and spouses).

Capable Guardians are in relation to a target or a victim. They are people or institutions usually protecting their own belongings or those of family members, friends, neighbours and co-workers.

Place Manager is a person or an institution who have some responsibility for controlling behaviour in the specific location, such as the prison staff for a correctional institute, bus conductors in public ways or teachers in educational facilities. Among the 'place managers' we include also police, military and governments, as well as media, and internet companies and regulators (place manager of the new cyberspace), political parties and institutional movements, because their right or wrong decisions will have an impact on the push and pull dynamics of the incidents. For example, private internet companies are the place manager for their own virtual space. Because of the new shared security governance, they undoubtedly have specific powers and capabilities parallel to the postal police, intelligence and prosecutors, which are the public side of the 'place management' in this space.

3.5.3. Facilitating Conditions

Crime facilitators help offenders commit crimes, due to their capacity to blunt crime prevention. Evidence about facilitators can be found in investigative reports and from investigators, by interviewing victims and offenders, and by observing social situations. For the parameter FACILITATING CONDITIONS we set 5 parameters, which can of course be extended:

1. **Physical facilitators** are things that augment offenders' capabilities or help to overcome prevention measures. Internet allows ISIS to motivate vulnerable individuals, like telephones allow people to make obscene phone calls, cars can be used in terror attacks when protective barriers are not in place and paving stones can be transformed in weapons against the police for rioters. Physical facilitators can be legitimate (like the chat used by the young Kermisch to plan the attack in Rouen) or illegitimate (like the truck stolen by Anis Amri in Berlin). Some physical facilitators are tools, but others are part of the physical environment.

2. **Social facilitators** stimulate crime or disorder by enhancing rewards from crime, legitimating excuses to offend, or by encouraging offending. Gangs provide the social support for crime, for example, like abandoned facilities occupied by marginal groups of occupiers can provide the social atmosphere that encourages rowdy behaviours.

3. **Chemical facilitators** increase offenders' abilities to ignore risks or moral prohibitions. Studies shown that a number of foreign terrorist fighters, for example, used synthetic drugs to carry out their massacres. In other cases, drink heavily or use drugs before a crime is a strategy to decrease their nervousness. The nexus drug-crime is a key topic far beyond pretty crimes.

4. **Institutional facilitators** are individuals or organisations which voluntarily or involuntarily support mafia group and terrorism. Police can facilitate violent escalations when they overreact as response to provocations. Government can also facilitate crime, when they adopt legislations which decrease the risks for potential perpetrators or take wrong security decisions.

5. **Media Facilitators** can favour terrorism and crime, for example, when they over-report criminal cases, thus supporting lone wolves to achieve their main goal, which is fear. Media can also be part of the cyberwar and, voluntarily or involuntarily, become of weapon in the hands of proxies or competing forces.

3.5.4. Murderous Weapons and Tools

To assist in this specific component of the TAKEDOWN toolkits, we deploy a notorious SCP technique used to protect targets: the MURDEROUS approach, in order to better identify the characteristics of the weapons, which terrorists seem to value when planning a specific crime, given the general conditions of the attack.

Multipurpose: Most products, including common objects like cars or knives, can have a dual use.

Undetectable: This is a necessity considering the high security measures in place. This helps explain the popularity of Semtex, a small, lightweight, and largely undetectable explosive. It took only 11 ounces of Semtex packed into a small tape recorder to bring down Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Removable: The weapons must be portable, easy to steal and hide, which means that they must be light enough and small enough to be lifted and carried by one or two people.

Destructive: in relation to the objective selected. Guns in home-grown terrorism are most suited to killing targeted and 'iconic' targets therefore their lethality must be evaluated in close relation to the target.⁵⁶

Enjoyable: Terrorists enjoy their weapons and seemingly get a great deal of excitement and pleasure out using them.

Reliable: To be useful a firearm must be reliable in relation to the selected target and how the operation is planned. If they are familiar with a particular weapon (or one like it), they are likely to favour that weapon over another. This means that terrorists will likely shun unconventional or unfamiliar weapons unless their mission cannot be accomplished in any other way.

Obtainable: Availability is perhaps the most important of all weapon characteristics. Do I have it at home or in my workplace? Can it be manufactured in house? Usually connections between organized crime and terrorism are necessary to obtain weapons.

Uncomplicated: Complicated weapons that demand considerable expertise will rarely be used. In fact, when such weapons have been used, the attacks have often failed, precisely because the weapons were used incorrectly.

Safe: unless the perpetrator decided to carry out a suicide attack. Rarely mafia gangs use weapons, which may expose to risks the life of their killers.

3.5.5. Identify vulnerable targets

The anticipated identification of potential targets of organized crime actions or terrorist attacks remains a central objective of prevention within the analysis framework of the Cube. In order to prioritize specific settings based on risk assessment (i.e., expected loss + vulnerability), Clarke and

⁵⁶ The U.S. Department of Defense, Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC): DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, UFB 4-010-01. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2003 has several parameters to assess the lethality of weapons, which are derived from the counter-insurgency practices. In reality, homegrown terrorism follow different pathways and this clearly explains the difference between terrorism and insurgency.

Newman established a set of factors that assist in evaluating the vulnerability of such locations⁵⁷. These factors are:

Exposed, refers to the ability of the location to attract attention and be visible to surrounding areas or to stand out in any manner. Targets that “stick out” are more vulnerable than locations that are hidden among other buildings or structures.

Vital, targets are those that play a crucial role in the daily behaviors of a community. Locations that are highly Vital include water and food supply sources, electricity grids, and transportation systems. The inability of any of these locations to operate properly greatly inhibits the functionality of the community. These targets attract the attention of terrorists due to their ability to cause mayhem when inoperative.

Iconic, Iconic refers to the symbolic value of the specific location. Symbols that represent the nation’s power and unity are attractive to terrorists who seek to figuratively impair the strength of the country. Examples of Iconic locations include the Statue of Liberty or the White House.

Legitimate, targets include those that will bring about a positive reaction from the supporters of the terrorist or the terrorist organization. Consistent with the idea that terrorists are rational beings, they seek to maximize positive reinforcements and avoid condemnation, or negative consequences. Therefore, terrorists seek targets that will be viewed as Legitimate, which typically include locations housing military and government officials. Illegitimate targets would be considered locations housing children or defenseless persons.

Destructible refers to the ability to destroy the target/location or kill a targeted person. Although all targets are destructible in some way, some locations are more durable than others, and some persons are more heavily protected than others. Thus, the Destructible element refers to “the amount and accessibility of weapons required to destroy a target” (Boba, 2009, p.14). Targets that would require a large amount of weapons that are not easily accessible could be less attractive to terrorists than a target that could be destroyed with easily obtainable, conventional weapons.

Occupied targets include those that house a large amount of people. Terrorists characteristically seek to harm as many people as possible in order to strengthen their purpose (increase fear, increase legitimacy, etc.). Locations with high population densities provide the greatest opportunities for terrorists to exert great harm and establish fear among the targeted community. The Occupied element is dependent on timing as some locations may be heavily occupied only during certain times of the day or certain periods in the year. For example, a sporting arena houses tens of thousands of people in a compact location, but only during a sporting event. The locations with greater occupancies will be more vulnerable than those with fewer.

Near refers to the distance from which the location is to the terrorist’s home or the terrorist organization’s abode. Crime pattern theory and criminological studies have emphasized that offenders prefer targets that are closer to home and rarely travel large distances to commit crimes. This theory holds true for terrorism in that terrorists prefer opportunities in locations that they are familiar with and require less travel. Targets that are near home are not only easier to attack, but also easier to

⁵⁷ The following description is taken from Stacy Paton, EVIL DONE Vulnerability Assessment: Examining Terrorist Targets, Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The College for Design and Social Inquiry in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science, Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton, Florida, December 2013, pg. 27-31

escape from. Clarke and Newman suggest that this element holds the greatest relevance in domestic terrorism when the jurisdiction is larger. In foreign terrorism, all terrorists are relatively distant.

Easy targets include those that are weakly protected or are accessible to the public. It refers to the effort required to obtain access to the locations based on the provided security measures. For example, it was easy for the recent domestic terrorists to place the pressure-cooker bomb in a duffle bag and leave it on a busy public street during the 2013 Boston Marathon. It would be much more difficult to gain access to a federal building to do the same. The lack of security measures and accessibility reduces the required effort and increases the ease targeting a specific location.

4. Conclusion: Towards the toolkits implementation

Based on the guidelines and the lessons from the handbook, which were elaborated above, this chapter outlines the roadmap towards the technical development and implementation of the TAKEDOWN toolkits, which will be based on the TAKEDOWN cube-model.

In contrast to other projects and initiatives, the TAKEDOWN consortium has decided to not produce yet another physical handbook or guideline that is not taken up by the target groups (there are several exceptions of course). In contrast, the consortium takes a new and innovative approach by providing digital toolkits that are rooted on the principles of situational crime prevention and conceptualized as a dynamic software model.

While D4.1 provides the conception of the model and an initial matrix used for analysing and allocating exemplary cases in the cube-model, this chapter presents – based on the previous sections of this report – the operationalization of this approach, which can then be transferred into actual digital toolkits and combined with other resources from the research conducted in the project. This will ensure a successful implementation on the TAKEDOWN platforms.

In a first step, the initial matrix that was presented in D4.1 is therefore revised and extended with the factors, parameters and variables, which were defined in Chapter 3. Based on this operationalisation, the toolkits will offer a detailed analysis of CHEERS events as well as decision support based on existing good practices. In the second step, the objectives, concepts and functionalities of the toolkits for first-line-practitioners and law enforcement agencies are presented – including the interconnections with previous work that was done in the project. Based on these concepts, the toolkits will be programmed and implemented on the TAKEDOWN platforms as part of WP5 and WP6.

4.1. SCP-aligned case categorization matrix

As indicated above, the initial case categorization matrix presented in D4.1 was adapted according the main factors, variables and parameters as well as according to the guidelines deriving from the analysis of the SCP approaches. The adapted matrix, which is aligned with the SCP approach, is presented below. It consists of the definition of the domain and 5 main factors, which are divided into 36 parameters. These parameters are structured into 121 variables, which allow a detailed structuring of individual cases as a basis for the model-based decision support toolkits for both first-line-practitioners (FLP) and the law enforcement agencies (LEA).

FACTORS	PARAMETERS	VARIABLES
DOMAIN		Organized Crime
		Radicalisation / Terrorism
		Both (Nexus)
		Unknown
ENVIRONMENTS	Residential	Single Family House
		Apartment Building
		Hotel
		Other
		Unknown



	Recreational	Park
		Restaurant
		Bar and Nightclub
		Cinema
		Public Square
		Playground
		Other
		Unknown
	Religious	Church
		Mosque
		Synagogue
		Other
		Unknown
	Offices and Production	Government Facility
		Embassy
		Business Facility
		Retail Space
		Industrial Facility
		Agricultural Space
		Other
		Unknown
	Education	School
		University
		Day-Care Facility
		Library
		Other
		Unknown
	Human services	Prison
		Court
		Police Station
		Hospital
		First-Aid Station
		Fire Department
		Other
		Unknown
		Electricity Generation and Transmission Facility



	Critical Infrastructures and Public Ways	Oil Production, Processing and Transmission Facility
		Gas Production, Processing and Transmission Facility
		Road Transport Facility
		Rail Transport Facility
		Air Transport Facility
		Inland Waterways Transport Facility
		Ocean and short-sea Shipping and Ports
		Other
		Unknown
	Transitional areas	Asylum and Immigration Center
		Construction Site
		Abandoned Place
		Homeless Shelter
		Squatted Building
		Other
	War and Transitional Territories	Unknown
		War Zone
		Failed State
		Military Occupation Area
		Transition Routes
		Other
KEY PLAYERS	Offenders	Unknown
		Age
		Sex
		Religion (only when laws allows it)
		Citizenship
		Crime Record (Ecris)
		Employment
		Education and Skills
		Motivation
		Other
	Handlers	Unknown
		Parents
		Siblings
		Spouses



		Friends
		Other
		Unknown
	Capable Guardians	Owners
		Employees and Experts
		Other
		Unknown
	Place Managers	Police Officer
		Military Staff
		Government and Administration
		Prison Staff
		Teachers
		Security Staff
		Public Transportation Staff
		Internet Company
		Other
		Unknown
FACILITATING CONDITIONS	Physical Facilitators	Legitimate and dual-use Facilitator
		Illegitimate Facilitator
		Unknown
	Social Facilitators	Peers
		Role Model
		Milieu
		Other
		Unknown
	Chemical Facilitators	Alcohol
		Drugs
		Other
		Unknown
	Institutional Facilitators	Government
		Administration
		Police
		Military
		Educational Institutions
		Other
		Unknown

	Media Facilitators	Concealment
		Over-Reporting
		Biased-Reporting
		Unregulated
		Anonymous
		Other
		Unknown
WEAPONS AND TOOLS		Multipurpose
		Undetectable
		Removable
		Destructive
		Enjoyable
		Reliable
		Obtainable
		Uncomplicated
		Safe
		Unknown
TARGETS		Exposed
		Vital
		Iconic
		Legitimate
		Destructible
		Occupied
		Near
		Easy
		Unknown

4.2. Digital first-line-practitioners toolkit (FLP-Toolkit)

Objectives

Informed by the outcomes of the empirical research and in particular of the focus groups (see D3.4 and D3.6), the FLP-Toolkit aims at providing context knowledge for particular incidents by highlighting the similarities and variations with well-documented cases. This should help FLP to detect a problem or a case and get more information on what the FLP should focus on. As the toolkit is conceptualized as a decision support tool, it aims at suggesting response options in a given situation as well as information on who can provide support and how a FLP can support other stakeholders.

FLP-Toolkit Concept

The back-end of the toolkit consists of a case database (TD-Case-Database) that is structured along the SCP-aligned matrix presented in section 4.1. The TD-Case-Database is filled with cases collected as part

of the research. Synergies are also explored with available data-sets, which contain violent extremism and radicalization as well as organized crime cases. The cases are coded and included TD-Case-Database along the main factors, parameters and variables presented in the SCP-aligned matrix above. Furthermore, details on the case context are provided for each variable.

For the front-end, the digital decision support tool will be presented through an interface that is easy to use and clearly arranged in order to allow intuitive use. FLP have the opportunity select particular factors, parameters and variables and the toolkit suggests the most similar cases that match to the selection and provides case-related context information for the matching case variables. The toolkit is also connected with the good-practice library (see D4.2) and provides the next-best good practices, which match to the selection criteria.

Furthermore, based on the matching criteria and the country of the user, the toolkit also highlights institutions or platforms that provide advisory or support in case of an incident as well as links to further third-party resources. Finally, it is also intended that FLP can include cases and responses (practices) by filling out a simplified online template in order to support other FLP and stakeholders by increasing the body of information and hence the intelligence.

4.3. Digital law enforcement toolkit (LEA-Toolkit)

Objectives

Against the background of the outcomes of the empirical research as presented in D3.3, D3.5 and D3.6, also the LEA-Toolkit is conceptualized as a decision support tool for authorized users only. However, in contrast to the FLP-Toolkit, the LEA-Toolkit will provide more complex methods for the in-depth case analysis and the assessment of responses. It builds on the four basic operational activities defined in the SARA approach: Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment.

LEA-Toolkit Concept

Similar to the FLP-Toolkit, the back-end of the LEA-Toolkit is set-up as a case database, which is also structured by applying the SCP-aligned matrix (see section 4.1). The matrix is provided to the LEAs through a structured interface, where they can already assess prototypical cases that are included. The LEAs include anonymized cases through a database-connected interface and the cases are allocated automatically allocated in the visualization of the 3-dimensional cube model. Based on the allocation, the matrix suggests links between cases and responses that were implemented for similar cases. Based on the case allocation, the case connections and the related responses, the LEA user can then suggest alternative or additional responses that were for example successful in their operation. As part of the LEA-Toolkit, regular multi-stakeholder joint assessments are organized in the form of physical or virtual meetings for discussing the possible implications of the suggested responses. Hence, the LEA-Toolkit service needs regular management, moderation and guidance.

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